James Goldgeier is a professor of international relations in the School of International Service at American University and the author of several books on U.S. foreign policy toward NATO and Russia. As Goldgeier sees it, American public opinion has been changing for a number of reasons—not least the growing perception that U.S. dollars aren’t making a difference in the conflict. The Republicans in the House, meanwhile, are aligning increasingly with Donald Trump, the former U.S. president and likely Republican nominee in 2024—an admirer of Putin who’s long questioned American support for Ukraine. European backing for Kyiv remains relatively strong, despite all the challenges the conflict has brought to the continent—but as the political fortunes of the European populist right rise, those fortunes are complicating EU support for the war effort.

That development, Goldgeier says, heightens the threat an aggressive, authoritarian Moscow might represent, not only to nearby democracies but to the entire international order created after World War II. And all of it hangs on a highly uncertain question that won’t be resolved for the better part of a year: who’ll win the U.S. presidential election in November 2024 and hold power in Washington by January 2025.

On the question of manpower, we’re now seeing extraordinary reports about Russian casualties: Of the original invading force of about 360,000 soldiers, some 300,000 have been killed or wounded. Clearly, there are significant Ukrainian losses as well, but there isn’t clear public data on those numbers.

We do know the biggest challenge for Ukraine’s military is with its stocks of artillery shells. Earlier this year, there was an intense debate in the U.S. over whether Washington should send cluster bombs, which are controversial—partly because they often fail to detonate, leaving unexploded ordnance that harms civilians after a conflict. But the only reason the Americans were considering sending cluster bombs was that it didn’t have any more artillery shells to send. There’s a lot of concern now that Ukraine needs a new infusion of military assistance—especially artillery, especially from the U.S.

That said, more shells won’t mean that the front lines will change. Both sides are dug in well enough to prevent the other from making big gains. And now it’s winter, when the terrain is going to make everything harder.

Bluhm: In the early days of the war, there was remarkable unity in European support for Ukraine. And just recently, the European Union just announced it’d open negotiations with Ukraine on joining it. But in Hungary, Viktor Orban is continuing his efforts to disrupt the Union’s backing for Kyiv, vetoing the most recent aid proposal. How do you see what’s going on with EU support?

Goldgeier: It’s still remarkably strong, really.

It’s worth remembering how the EU reacted in 2014, when Russia invaded and annexed Crimea and fostered civil war in Ukraine’s Donbas region. The EU imposed sanctions on Russia then, though many were surprised that Europe got on board with tough American sanctions—especially considering Germany’s close business ties to Moscow at the time. Still, the sanctions were limited; the U.S. didn’t have much military assistance going to Ukraine; and Berlin and Moscow kept working on the undersea gas pipeline Nord Stream 2.

But the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 really galvanized the West.

Since then, the war’s had a major impact on Europe. The continent has been significantly affected by the number of refugees from Ukraine, as well as higher energy prices. So the endurance of European unity has been quite striking. It’s a major step for the European Union them to begin membership talks with Ukraine, along with Moldova. This doesn’t mean Ukraine is coming into the EU anytime soon—that might take years—but it is a signal of European seriousness.

It’s true, Orban has ties with Putin, and that’s been getting in the way. But Europe has been able to continue with significant measures in support of Ukraine and against Russia. At the last European Council meetings, Orban held up a major assistance package for Kyiv because he’s trying to get the EU funding for Hungary, which the Council had frozen on account of his authoritarian domestic moves. His opposition to Ukraine aid can still muck up the works in Brussels, but it’s impressive how firm the European commitment has stayed since February 2022.

“The leader of the Republican Party is effectively Donald Trump—and Donald Trump has long admired Vladimir Putin. Trump hasn’t, meanwhile, backed assistance for Ukraine. His supporters in Congress are essentially following his lead. And the more Trump speaks out in favor of Russia and Putin, the more his closest supporters in the Republican Party are going to follow that lead. Which makes it very tough to get a deal for Ukraine assistance done, even though bipartisan majorities are for it.”

“Americans like to back a winner, and Ukraine seemed to be winning, so it seemed like America’s assistance was having a positive impact. And polls showed support for it. But the hopes for a strong Ukrainian counter-offensive this summer didn’t really produce the results people had hoped for. Now a narrative has emerged in the U.S.: We’ve provided all this assistance, but things haven’t really changed much. So why should we provide more? Shouldn’t we just try to find some way to end the whole thing?”

“It makes a huge difference for this war whether Joe Biden or Donald Trump wins. And Vladimir Putin is clearly waiting to see which way the election goes. Which is why we’re very unlikely to see any kind of serious negotiations to end this war until after the election. There’s no reason for Putin, who’s yet to show any real interest in negotiations at all, to change his attitude about them until he sees how things turn out in November. Putin is counting on a Trump victory to create a positive situation for him in Ukraine. If there’s a Biden victory instead, Putin may have to start taking the idea of negotiations seriously.”