A New Security Force, An Old Political Question

Brazil is facing a serious public security crisis. Organized criminal organizations have expanded their influence far beyond drug trafficking. They operate across state borders, infiltrate legitimate businesses, launder money, control communities, and challenge the authority of the state.

Few would dispute that Brazil needs a stronger and more coordinated response.

But President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s proposal to create a National Guard raises questions that go far beyond the fight against organized crime.

The central issue is not whether Brazil needs effective law enforcement. It does.

The issue is who controls that enforcement, what limits are placed on its authority, and how the Brazilian people can be certain that a new federal security force will never become an instrument of political power.

These questions are particularly important in a country whose democratic institutions emerged from a period of military dictatorship and where the relationship between political authority, policing, and individual freedoms remains historically sensitive.

A National Guard could become a useful institution for combating organized crime. Equally, if poorly designed, it could create overlapping jurisdictions, weaken state autonomy, concentrate coercive power in Brasília, and establish a security structure vulnerable to political interference.

The difference will depend not on presidential promises but on constitutional guarantees, institutional independence, transparent oversight, and clearly defined limits.

Lula’s Proposal: What We Know So Far

The proposal is no longer merely an abstract political idea.

On 3 November 2026, the Senate approved the Public Security Constitutional Amendment, PEC 18/2025, in two rounds of voting, with 73 votes in favour in the first round and 75 in the second. The proposal strengthens the constitutional position of the Unified Public Security System (SUSP) and expands federal coordination in the fight against organized crime. [1]

Two days later, on 5 November, Lula announced plans to establish a separate Ministry of Public Security through a provisional measure.

During a livestream with federal deputy André Janones, Lula also spoke about creating a special National Guard. He referred to the need for additional investment, police preparation, and cooperation with states and municipalities. [2]

The government’s broader security agenda emphasizes intelligence cooperation, combating criminal organizations, disrupting illicit financial networks, and strengthening coordination between federal, state, and municipal authorities. [3]

These are legitimate objectives.

However, the constitutional amendment, the proposed ministry, and the proposed National Guard are three distinct developments.

The amendment establishes a broader constitutional framework for public security cooperation. It does not, by itself, provide a complete operational blueprint for a new National Guard.

As of 8 November 2026, important questions about the proposed force’s legal powers, command structure, recruitment, deployment, accountability, and relationship with state police remain unresolved in the publicly reported plans.

And until those questions are answered, the Brazilian public is being asked to trust an institution whose full design has not yet been presented.

Brazil Is a Federation, Not a Centralized Police State

Brazil’s constitutional system is built on a division of authority between the federal government, the states, the Federal District, and municipalities.

This division is not an administrative inconvenience. It is an essential feature of Brazilian federalism.

Article 144 of the 1988 Constitution establishes the country’s public security institutions and their responsibilities. [4]

The Federal Police investigates federal crimes and certain interstate and international criminal activities.

The Federal Highway Police performs policing functions on federal highways.

The Civil Police of the states is principally responsible for criminal investigations within state jurisdiction.

The Military Police carries out preventive and visible policing and is responsible for maintaining public order.

The Military Police and Civil Police operate under the authority of state governors, subject to constitutional law, judicial oversight, and other legal controls.

This arrangement prevents all ordinary policing authority from being concentrated in a single federal command.

It also recognizes a practical reality: Brazil is not one uniform society.

The security challenges of Rio de Janeiro are not identical to those of Brasília, São Paulo, rural Goiás, the Amazon region, or the southern border states.

Local knowledge matters. Regional experience matters. Accountability to state institutions matters.

A police officer who has spent years working in a particular community often understands its criminal networks, social tensions, geography, and operational challenges far better than an official directing operations from Brasília.

A federal government can establish national standards and coordinate intelligence without necessarily assuming direct operational control over every aspect of public security.

The danger begins when coordination gradually becomes command, and command becomes political control.

The Military Police Must Not Become a Secondary Institution

Brazil’s Military Police forces are established institutions with long histories, operational experience, and an extensive presence throughout the country.

Their officers face organized crime, armed gangs, drug trafficking, violent robberies, and dangerous public order situations.

They operate in environments where a routine patrol can turn into a life-threatening confrontation within seconds.

These institutions are far from perfect. Cases of corruption, excessive force, criminal infiltration, and failures of accountability must be acknowledged and confronted.

But those problems are arguments for reform, professionalization, and stronger oversight, not automatically for replacing existing institutions with a new federal force.

A National Guard operating without clearly defined responsibilities could create several problems:

• Overlapping authority: Federal and state forces could compete for operational responsibility, creating confusion during emergencies.
• Political disputes: Governors and the federal government could disagree over deployments, priorities, and operational command.
• Competition for funding: A new national institution could absorb resources that might otherwise improve existing police forces.
• Recruitment problems: Experienced state officers might be drawn into better-paid federal positions, weakening local institutions.
• Institutional rivalry: Competing police organizations could become more concerned with jurisdiction and prestige than effective cooperation.
• Political vulnerability: A federal force with broad domestic deployment powers could face pressure to serve the priorities of the government of the day.

The central question is whether Brazil needs another police institution or whether the country would benefit more from improving the ones it already possesses.

Brazil already has a National Public Security Force (Força Nacional de Segurança Pública), established in 2004, which draws on personnel from existing security institutions to support operations under federal coordination. [5]

That makes the case for another national force even more deserving of scrutiny.

Before creating an expensive new federal structure, the government should explain why strengthening the Federal Police, state police forces, and existing interagency operations would be insufficient.

Creating a new institution is not necessarily the same as solving an existing problem.

Who Will Control the National Guard?

This is perhaps the most important question of all.

Who will appoint its commanders?

Will senior officers be selected through professional, merit-based procedures, or will political appointments dominate the leadership?

Will the force answer directly to the president, to a federal minister, or to an operational command protected by statutory safeguards?

Who will authorize deployments?

Could a governor refuse the presence of the National Guard in his state?

Could the federal government deploy it during political demonstrations?

Would it have powers to arrest, search, investigate, conduct surveillance, or use military-grade equipment?

What independent body would investigate abuses committed by its members?

And what would happen if a National Guard commander refused an instruction considered unlawful?

These are not minor administrative details.

They determine whether the institution becomes a professional security service or a potential political instrument.

A democratic police force must be loyal to the Constitution, not to the president who created it.

Its officers must serve the Brazilian state and its citizens, not a political party, electoral movement, or ideological project.

Recruitment, promotion, training, and disciplinary procedures must therefore be insulated from partisan interference.

Professional training should emphasize constitutional rights, proportional use of force, public accountability, operational competence, and lawful obedience to civilian authority.

It must never become a mechanism for ideological conformity.

A force trained to identify political opponents as enemies of the state would represent a fundamental threat to democracy, regardless of which party controlled the government.

Venezuela: A Warning About the Politicization of Security Forces

The experience of Venezuela deserves serious attention.

The Venezuelan National Guard was established in 1937, long before Hugo Chávez came to power.

It was not originally a socialist institution.

However, during the Chávez presidency and subsequently under Nicolás Maduro, the National Guard became part of the Bolivarian military and security system and played a significant role in internal security operations.

The consequences have been documented by international human rights investigators.

In its 2017 report on human rights violations during Venezuelan demonstrations, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights documented widespread excessive force, arbitrary detentions, and mistreatment of protesters by Venezuelan security forces, including the Bolivarian National Guard. [6]

The report stated that security forces, principally the National Guard, were allegedly responsible for at least 46 deaths during demonstrations between April and July 2017.

These findings are particularly disturbing because the victims were not simply members of organized criminal groups. They included people participating in political demonstrations.

Human Rights Watch’s November 2017 report, Crackdown on Dissent, independently documented violent repression, arbitrary arrests, and torture involving Venezuelan security institutions. [7]

The important lesson is not that every National Guard will inevitably become an instrument of repression.

That would be an exaggerated and historically unsupported conclusion.

The lesson is that security institutions can change their political character when institutional independence deteriorates, command structures become politicized, and checks on executive power are weakened.

An institution originally justified as a means of maintaining public order can, under different political circumstances, become a mechanism for suppressing opposition.

Brazil is not Venezuela. Its constitutional institutions, political system, judiciary, and federal structure are different.

But those differences are not an excuse to ignore historical warnings.

Democratic safeguards exist precisely because political power can be abused.

The question is not whether Lula intends to reproduce the Venezuelan model. There is no established evidence that this is his intention.

The question is whether Brazil would be creating an institution sufficiently protected against the possibility of such abuse by any future government.

The Danger Is Bigger Than Lula

There is another point that deserves consideration.

Supporters of Lula may trust his administration to establish and operate a National Guard responsibly.

Opponents may fear that the institution could become an extension of federal political power.

But neither side should judge the proposal solely by its opinion of the current president.

Every power granted to Lula today could be exercised by a political opponent tomorrow.

Governments change. Presidents leave office. Political majorities rise and fall.

Institutions remain.

A law designed to give one administration additional authority may eventually place that same authority in the hands of someone with entirely different political convictions.

Those who support expanding federal policing powers should ask themselves whether they would feel equally comfortable with those powers under a president they deeply distrust.

And those who oppose Lula should apply exactly the same standard to a future right-wing administration.

The constitutional question is not whether one trusts a particular politician.

It is whether the powers being created are appropriate for any politician to possess.

That is the difference between defending a political leader and defending a democratic institution.

Fighting Organized Crime Requires More Than Another Uniform

Brazil’s organized criminal organizations have evolved into complex networks.

Groups such as the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV) are not merely collections of street-level drug dealers.

Their activities involve trafficking routes, illegal financial transactions, weapons distribution, prison networks, territorial control, and infiltration of legitimate economic activity.

Some criminal organizations operate across multiple Brazilian states and maintain international connections.

This creates a genuine need for federal coordination.

Indeed, the government’s own explanation of PEC 18/2025 emphasizes stronger cooperation against criminal factions and militias, expanded Federal Police responsibilities, and improved institutional integration. [3]

But effective action against organized crime requires far more than increasing the number of armed officers.

It requires intelligence sharing, financial investigations, effective prosecution, secure prison management, border enforcement, and cooperation between institutions.

The government should prioritize disrupting the money that finances criminal organizations.

Illegal profits must be traced, assets seized through lawful procedures, money-laundering networks dismantled, and criminal influence over public institutions investigated.

Police operations may arrest individual criminals, but dismantling an organization requires attacking its leadership, financing, recruitment, and logistical infrastructure.

A new National Guard might contribute to that effort if it fills a clearly identified operational gap.

But creating another uniformed force without solving failures in intelligence sharing, investigations, prosecution, and prison security risks treating the symptoms rather than the underlying disease.

The Financial Question: Who Will Pay?

Brazil also needs to confront the financial consequences of establishing another national institution.

A National Guard would require recruitment, training, salaries, pensions or retirement arrangements, vehicles, equipment, facilities, communications systems, administrative personnel, and operational infrastructure.

Depending on its size and mandate, the costs could be substantial.

These expenses would not disappear after the initial establishment of the force.

They would become recurring obligations within the federal budget.

At the same time, existing state police forces continue to face challenges involving salaries, staffing, professional development, equipment, and working conditions.

Would a new federal institution receive better funding and working conditions while state police officers continue to struggle with shortages?

Would federal recruitment attract experienced officers away from state police forces?

Would the new organization duplicate existing training facilities, administrative structures, and operational capabilities?

And would the government provide a transparent financial assessment before requesting approval?

The recently approved constitutional amendment also addresses the financing of public security, including protections for the National Public Security Fund and National Penitentiary Fund. [1]

This makes transparency over any additional National Guard expenditure particularly important.

The public deserves a detailed cost-benefit analysis comparing the creation of a National Guard with alternative investments in existing institutions.

A federal security force should not become another permanent bureaucracy simply because creating a new institution is politically more attractive than reforming an old one.

Brazil needs better security outcomes, not merely a larger security bureaucracy.

What Would a Constitutionally Responsible National Guard Look Like?

Rejecting the concentration of police power does not mean rejecting federal cooperation.

There are legitimate situations in which a national response may be necessary.

Large-scale organized crime operations, interstate criminal networks, serious emergencies, and situations where local institutions are overwhelmed can justify additional federal assistance.

But any National Guard should operate under strict safeguards.

Its responsibilities must be clearly established in law, with explicit limits preventing unnecessary duplication of existing police functions.

Its leadership should be selected through transparent professional procedures, with meaningful legislative and independent oversight.

Deployments should follow legally defined conditions, including clear rules governing requests from governors, exceptional interventions, operational command, and the duration of missions.

The use of force must remain subject to constitutional protections, judicial review, and independent investigation.

Political affiliation must never become a recruitment criterion, and lawful political dissent must never become a reason for police attention.

The institution’s budget, operational performance, disciplinary record, and use of extraordinary powers should be subject to public scrutiny, with appropriate protection for genuinely sensitive investigations.

These safeguards would not prevent every possible abuse.

But they would make political misuse more difficult and strengthen public confidence.

If Lula’s government believes a National Guard is necessary, it should welcome these restrictions rather than regard them as obstacles.

A security institution designed to protect democracy should have no reason to fear democratic accountability.

Strengthen the States, Do Not Reduce Them to Subordinates

Brazil’s federal system is not an obstacle to public security.

It is a constitutional arrangement intended to distribute political authority and prevent excessive concentration of power.

The federal government has an important role in confronting interstate and international criminal networks, coordinating intelligence, and providing resources.

State governments have an equally important responsibility for policing and public order within their jurisdictions.

Neither level of government can solve Brazil’s security problems alone.

The answer should be cooperation between institutions, not competition for political authority.

Federal assistance should strengthen state capabilities rather than make them dependent on Brasília.

The Military Police should receive better training, modern equipment, adequate staffing, professional recognition, and stronger institutional accountability.

The Civil Police should have the investigative resources necessary to build cases that lead to successful prosecutions.

The Federal Police should be strengthened in its capacity to investigate organized crime, corruption, money laundering, and criminal networks operating across jurisdictions.

These institutions must share intelligence and cooperate effectively.

A National Guard should be considered only if the government can demonstrate that it will provide capabilities that existing institutions cannot reasonably deliver.

And even then, it must complement the states rather than become a mechanism for overriding them.

The Final Question: Security for the People or Power for the Government?

Brazilian citizens have every right to demand protection from violent crime.

They have every right to expect their government to confront criminal organizations, protect communities, secure borders, and enforce the law.

But they also have the right to question the expansion of state power.

Indeed, that is precisely what citizens in a functioning democracy should do.

Lula’s proposed National Guard must be judged by its constitutional structure, operational necessity, accountability, and long-term consequences.

Not by its name.

Not by presidential speeches.

And certainly not by promises that it will always be used responsibly.

Brazil has already experienced the consequences of excessive political power and security institutions operating without sufficient democratic safeguards.

The country should not need another historical lesson to understand why those safeguards matter.

The fundamental issue is not whether Brazil should fight organized crime more aggressively.

It should.

The issue is whether fighting organized crime requires creating another federal institution with potentially extensive powers over public security.

Who will control it? Who will supervise it? Who can stop it? And what prevents its powers from being used for political purposes?

Until these questions are answered, public concern is not extremism, obstructionism, or opposition to law enforcement.

It is democratic vigilance.

A government genuinely committed to constitutional democracy should welcome such scrutiny.

Because a strong democracy does not depend on trusting the good intentions of those currently in power.

It depends on institutions capable of restraining those who abuse it.

Brazil needs stronger police institutions, not weaker state autonomy. It needs cooperation, not centralization for its own sake. And above all, it needs security forces loyal to the Constitution, never to a political party.

The Military Police must be respected, professionally strengthened, and held accountable. They must not be reduced to subordinate spectators in a system increasingly controlled from Brasília.

The real test of Lula’s National Guard will not be how much power it gives the government, but how effectively that power is limited.

Because the most dangerous police power is not necessarily the power a government uses today. It is the power it creates for whoever governs tomorrow.

References and Sources

[1] Brazilian Senate, 3 November 2026. Senate Approves Public Security Constitutional Amendment, PEC 18/2025.

Official legislative record documenting the amendment, Senate votes, and proposed changes to Brazil’s public security framework.

https://www25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/materias/-/materia/172997

[2] Agência Brasil, 6 November 2026. Lula Meets to Discuss the Ministry of Public Security.

Reporting on Lula’s announcement of a proposed Ministry of Public Security and his remarks concerning a special National Guard.

https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/radioagencia-nacional/seguranca/audio/2026-11/lula-se-reune-para-discutir-ministerio-da-seguranca-publica

[3] Brazilian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 3 November 2026. PEC da Segurança Pública é aprovada no Senado.

Official explanation of the constitutional amendment, integration of security institutions, federal coordination, and measures against organized crime.

https://www.gov.br/mj/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/pec-da-seguranca-publica-e-aprovada-no-senado-apos-articulacao-e-trabalho-coordenado-do-mjsp

[4] Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, 1988. Article 144: Public Security.

Establishes the constitutional responsibilities of Brazil’s federal and state police institutions and the relationship between Military Police forces and state governors.

https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm

[5] Aos Fatos, 2022. É falso que Lula anunciou criação da Guarda Nacional.

Historical fact-check explaining the existing National Public Security Force, created in 2004. The article concerns a previous, false claim and should not be confused with Lula’s actual November 2026 remarks.

https://www.aosfatos.org/noticias/falso-lula-guarda-nacional/

[6] United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2017. Human Rights Violations and Abuses in the Context of Protests in Venezuela.

Documents allegations of excessive force, arbitrary detention, torture, and deaths involving Venezuelan security forces, including the Bolivarian National Guard.

https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/VE/HCReportVenezuela_1April-31July2017_EN.pdf

[7] Human Rights Watch, 29 November 2017. Crackdown on Dissent: Brutality, Torture, and Political Persecution in Venezuela.

Independent investigation documenting repression of political demonstrations and serious abuses by Venezuelan security institutions.

https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/11/29/crackdown-dissent/brutality-torture-and-political-persecution-venezuela