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1. I think the main problem in your list of observations is the extreme disunity of anarchists, they cannot even agree on a definition for anarchism.

   It seems that before any real movement of anarchists is to be formed they must, for reasons of practical necessity, agree on certain definitions and issues before they begin acting.

   I have long noticed from studying anarchists that, they are really no different than their statist analogues. The PC anarchist left is just Obama light, the an-caps are, as Kevin Carson calls them, ‘vulgar libertarian’s’ and apologists for walmart.

   Anarchists seem to ram all the modern culturally relevant arguments through the ‘magic window’ of anarchism and resume the same fights they had when they were statists, on the other side. Not much changes. Really what is the difference between say a ‘fat tax’ and insurance companies raising premiums on obese people? What is the real difference between PC mandates for equal pay for equal work or racial hiring quotas vs. a Chomskite workers syndicate making the same demands/restrictions? Not much, if you ask me. The same pathologies that plague America at large are more-or-less completely transferred into the anarchist milieu, with little to no modification. These pathologies are what is ripping our nation and anarchism appart.

   This seems to indicate that the problem is more than just the state and anarchists need to build some sort of coherent explanation that goes to the deeper roots of the pathologies.

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2. That’s a pretty good summation. I think the one thing that has set me apart from many other anarchists is that I’ve always been an anarchist first, before I was anything else (leftist, rightist, syndicalist, anarcho-capitalist) so I tend to find a kinship with another kinds of anarchists and libertarians in ways that anarchists whose primary focus is on their hyphens do not.

   But there are a lot of anarchists and libertarians, probably the majority, maybe a super-majority, who are primarily interested in their hyphens: “Well, yes, I’m an anarchist…but I’m really most concerned about the environment.” You see this among both left and right libertarians/anarchists. Anarcho-syndicalists are labor militants first, an-coms are socialists first, an-caps are free market libertarians first, anarcha-feminists are feminists first, racist anarchists are racists first, anti-racists anarchists are anti-racists first.

   There’s nothing intrinsically wrong with this. People can’t be expected to base their hierarchy of personal values on remote abstractions like “anarchism,” particularly when ideas like this have only very limited audiences in the real world.

   This is why many people get confused when they ask me why I do all this and they find I’m not interested in advancing the interests of any one group, or any particular set of moral ideals beyond the anarchist philosophy itself.

   My basic politics have always been the same: opposition to imperialist war, an emphasis on cooperative economics, support for civil liberties issues across the spectrum of left and right (defending both the First and Second Amendments, for instance), and philosophical anarchism with an emphasis on decentralization, voluntarism, and pluralism. I’ve always been conventionally “liberal” on most social and cultural issues, but anti-PC, anti-Communist, and anti-totalitarian humanist or whatever one wishes to call it.

   I may advocate many other things as well, in terms of organizing methods, strategic considerations, positions on individual issues, or the creation of intermediary or secondary institutions. But I consider these to be personal preferences or matters of practical concern, not matters of great moral truths. I suppose my personal outlook is somewhere between Stirner (pursue your own interests within the context of whatever circumstances you find yourself in, and forget about society), Junger in his stormtrooper days (the battle is its own ideal, regardless of what you’re fighting for) and Junger in his latter years (calm detachment from the exterior world through realization that freedom comes from the inside rather than the outside).

   Strategically, I tend to promote all forms of anarchism, libertarianism, and related ideas, as everyone knows. I see pan-secessionism as the natural supplement to that, because it’s a tool for dealing with these kinds of differences.

   As critical as I’ve been in the past of what the gay rights movement has become, I actually think there are many things anarchists can learn from it. Human sexuality appears to be something of a continuum, but hard-wired homosexuals are probably less than three percent of the overall population, maybe less. Yet the influence of the gay rights movement reaches far beyond what would be expected from those percentages (I can see Todd flinching now, lol). So my future vision for anarchists is something where hard-core self-identified anarchists would remain a relatively small percentage group demographically that manages to exercise influence way beyond its numbers, and in all the cultural, ideological, and demographic milieus from which anarchists are drawn. I also envision anarchists achieving leadership positions in larger, popular or mass organizations (sort of an anarchist version of the the alleged “Jewish conspiracy,” lol).

   Just as the number of gays is relatively small, the number of “homo-sympathizers” is quite large, perhaps a majority of the population at this point. So anarchists would be a relatively small group, with “libertarians” in their multiplicity of forms being a much larger group, eventually becoming a de facto majority. Just like the number of people supporting gay marriage or marijuana legalization has gone from very small percentages to a majority, so would we work to raise support for the wider tactical concept of pan-secession, or at least the idea of secession itself, to majority levels, thereby gaining a super-majority of libertarians and non-libertarians alike. At that point, we’d actually see things starting to happen.

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3. “Yet the influence of the gay rights movement reaches far beyond what would be expected from those percentages (I can see Todd flinching now, lol).”

   I certainly admit there have influence far in excess of their numbers.

   We see that the social views of revolutionaries are only imposed from above. Where in history have the vast masses of people even voluntarily accepted the extremes of radical social policy? In Soviet Russia, Jacobin France, post-Second World War America and post-Second World War Europe these radical views were shoved down the masses throats by Bolsheviks or one-worlders. We see the inherent conservatism of the masses during the years between 1919-1939 where the communists sought to subvert the European working class and failed. The European working class was essentially conservative and religious, only after two world wars was it totally destroyed and replaced by a strange hybrid of plutocratic consumerism and socialist politics and mores.

   You have the two cases of a slow kill view corporate capitalism or a fast kill via Jacobinism/Bolshevism. The end is the same, as CS Lewis said “The Abolition of Man.” The problem with these social radicals is that they are the shock-troopers of empire, whether they realize it or not.

   If anarchists really loved ‘organic society’ and ‘mutual aid,’ they would be pro-family traditionalists. Before the corporate capitalism and Bolshevism we had innumerable mutual aid societies they were called “families” and what is more ‘organic’ than the family? One cannot systematically destroy the only proven source of mutual aid society and then demand a mutual aid society. If you kill the goose that lays the golden eggs, don’t demand golden eggs.

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4. That gets us to the question of whether social change normally comes from above, or from the ground up, or does it depend on the kind of social change?

   Most people think at least some kinds of social change are good. For instance, most people are glad we know longer have slavery. I’m sure Todd would regard the Christianization of Rome to have been positive social change (at least until it was coopted by the state).

   It’s fashionable among progressives to regard social and political change as coming from the “bottom up,” i.e. oppressed people revolting against their masters. That’s the way humanities fields are normally taught in academia nowadays (for instance, everything is viewed through the lens of race, class, and gender).

   No doubt some change occurs that way. There have been slave revolts, mutineers, and prison escapes as long as there has been slavery, armies, or prisoners. But I also think an analysis more like Hayek’s has much merit as well: Change begins with philosophical elites formulating new ideas and critiquing existing systems, and these trickle down to the masses. As I once wrote:

   “The standard pattern in the history of the advancement of radical movements is that a new revolutionary outlook first captures the imagination of the intellectual elite, who become dissenters, and this new outlook then advances into the ranks of those who are most likely to opt for radicalism, or who have the least to lose by doing so. So, in turn, the intellectual dissidents are joined by student radicals and rebellious youth, bohemians and counterculturalists, members of the lumpenproletariat and the underclass, and marginalized or outcast social groups. Eventually, radical ideas begin working their way into the ranks of the conventional proletariat, and then into the middle class, and, finally, the establishment, with social reactionaries reluctantly being dragged along.”

   Whether the results of this are good or bad (or either one, depending on the circumstances), I think a case can be made for it. When I was studying history in grad school, much ridicule was heaped on the older “great man” theory of history. But I think a case can be made for that as well. Most of the world’s greatest intellectual and philosophical systems, and the cultures derived from them, are normally given a label associated with a solitary individual: Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Confucianism, Marxism, Hegelianism, Darwinism, etc.

   And the thought of any major historical epoch tends to be defined by a handful of individuals. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca in antiquity. Augustine and Aquinas for the Middle Ages. Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and the philosophes for the Enlightenment. Hegel, Kant, and Rousseau for the Romantic era. Nietzsche, Darwin, and Marx for the 19th century. Freud, Weber, the Frankfurt School, the existentialists, and postmodernists for the 20th century.

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5. “The problem with these social radicals is that they are the shock-troopers of empire, whether they realize it or not.

   If anarchists really loved ‘organic society’ and ‘mutual aid,’ they would be pro-family traditionalists. Before the corporate capitalism and Bolshevism we had innumerable mutual aid societies they were called “families” and what is more ‘organic’ than the family? One cannot systematically destroy the only proven source of mutual aid society and then demand a mutual aid society. If you kill the goose that lays the golden eggs, don’t demand golden eggs.”

   Well, that’s the biggest conflict between myself and the left-anarchists. On one hand, the left-anarchists claim to want to represent the oppressed masses of the earth, whether the impoverished Third World masses, or the underclasses in the First World. But the PC values they simultaneously promote are most dominate among cosmopolitan First World elites, the left-wing of the middle class, and the radical leftist subculture. The bottom line is that if you want to take the side of the “wretched of the earth” you’d best get used to accommodating yourself to some serious cultural conservatism. That’s one of the messages I try to convey. That doesn’t mean the PCers can’t have any personal views they wish, and have their own sects, tribes, and institutions, but trying to universalize all that is in serious conflict with the rest of their stated ambitions.

   My view is that all this PC stuff is just another set of faith traditions or tribal values like anything else. Uber-PCers think a vast laundry list of Archies, Isms and Phobias are the ultimate sins, just like these folks from the “Orange Church of God” have their own take on the matter:

   http://www.christiansurfers.com/2012/04/09/4608/

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   • I should probably add to this that it’s not necessarily either/or with these contending sets of cultural values.

     For instance, when Russian anarchists were organizing among the peasants,Kropotkin pushed them to avoid talking about matters of philosophical, religious or cultural conflict, and focus on areas of common interest.

     I know leftists and left-libertarians who say they feel I sometimes single out their side for criticism, which is probably true given the dominance of PC in so many areas at this juncture. But it’s certainly true leftists as much as anyone else could be involved in organizing opposition to the common enemies that resistance movements everywhere face, while simultaneously engaging in activism around more conventional lefty issues. For instance, if bringing gay marriage to Alabama is their big thing, then they could simultaneously maintain an activist organization to agitate for such while still supporting an Alabama secessionist movement that has a generally conservative orientation on grounds that breaking up the US empire and defeating the global corporatocracy is the first order of business.

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6. “The European working class was essentially conservative and religious, only after two world wars was it totally destroyed and replaced by a strange hybrid of plutocratic consumerism and socialist politics and mores.

   You have the two cases of a slow kill view corporate capitalism or a fast kill via Jacobinism/Bolshevism.”

   Couldn’t it be argued that, value judgments aside, this was inevitable due to population growth, heightened mobility, mass production, dramatic technological expansion, increased interconnectedness, the growth of the world market economy, etc? Meaning maybe it was just the destiny of older, more traditional forms of society to go the way of the dinosaurs? Maybe they just couldn’t withstand the onslaught of modernity? Maybe modernity is like fire (or nuclear technology). Yeah, maybe it’s dangerous, and disruptive, but maybe there’s no putting the genie back in the bottle?

   Obviously, human choices enter into the picture. But couldn’t at least some of this be attributed to forces beyond anyone’s control?

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7. “I’m sure Todd would regard the Christianization of Rome to have been positive social change (at least until it was co-opted by the state).”

   We can speak of positive changes in at least two ways: 1) a qualified positive change and and 2) unqualified positive change. The former is good with out qualifications the latter is good with qualifications.

   In one sense the christianization of the Roman Empire was a qualified good and a qualified evil. It was a qualified good in that 1) slavery was eventually outlawed, 2) women gain more dignity and legal standing in society, 3) charities were widespread, 4) ritualized murder (gladiatorial game) were abolished and the generally atrocious pagan society was replaced with something more humane. It was qualified evil in that by making ‘everyone’ in the empire christian, quality controls were given up and the overall standard and quality of Christianity went down.

   I am generally unfavorable toward Constantine, but I admit that there were some undeniable befits to his rule and legacy. One of the most balanced views on the Gospel vs. Christendom can be seen in an article written by David Bentley Hart: No Enduring City: http://www.clarion-journal.com/clarion_journal_of_spirit/2013/12/no-enduring-city-david-bentley-hart.html

   “This is not a claim that can be adequately defended in a few pages, of course. At the very least, however, it seems obvious to me that Christian culture could never generate any political and social order that, insofar as it employed the mechanisms of state power, would not inevitably bring about its own dissolution. Again, the translation of Christianity’s original apocalyptic ferment into a cultural logic and social order produced a powerful but necessarily unstable alloy. For all the good that it produced in the shaping of Western civilization, it also encumbered the faith with a weight of historical and cultural expectation often incompatible with the Gospel it proclaimed.
   When Christianity became not only a pillar of culture, but also a support of the state, and thereby attached itself to that human reality that necessarily sustains itself through the prudential use of violence, it attempted to close the spiritual abyss separating Christ and Pilate on the day of their confrontation in Jerusalem. At the same time, however, it created a cultural reality animated (or at least haunted) by the language of the Gospel: the often tacit but always substantial knowledge that all of human power’s pretenses and delusions and deceits have been exposed for what they are, and overthrown by God’s Incarnation as a man who was the victim of all the enfranchised religious, political, and social forces of his time and place. There was no way for such an alliance to avoid subverting itself.
   I am not saying only—though I am saying—that the concrescence of Christianity into Christendom necessarily led in the West, over the course of centuries, to its gradual mortification, its slow attrition through internal stress, and finally its dissipation into the inconclusiveness of human history and the ephemerality of political orders. I am saying also that Christendom could not indefinitely survive the corrosive power of the revelation that Christianity itself had introduced into Western culture. Christian culture’s often misunderstood but ultimately rrepressible consciousness of the judgment that was passed upon civil violence at Easter, by God, was always the secret antagonist of Christendom as a political order.
   Certainly, reflective intellectual historians have often enough noted the ironic continuity between the early modern rise of principled unbelief and the special “apocalyptic vocation” of Western culture; and the observations of Ernst Bloch and many others on the “inevitable” atheistic terminus of the Christian message are, while not correct, at least comprehensible: for modern Western atheism is chiefly a Christian heresy, and could not have arisen in a non-Christian setting. Which yields the troubling thought that perhaps the historical force ultimately most destructive of the unity of the Christian culture of the West has been not principally atheism, materialism, capitalism, collectivism, or what have you—these may all be secondary manifestations of some deeper problem—but Christianity. Or, rather, I suppose I should say, an essential Christian impulse that, as a result of the contradictions inherent in Christendom, had become alienated from its true rationality and ultimate meaning.
   Anyway, to return to my point of departure, a belief in providence is an ineffably precious thing at times. It seems to me rather absurd when Christians feel obliged either to celebrate or to lament the conversion of Constantine—to proclaim it either as the victory of the true faith over its persecutors or as the victory of the devil over the purity of the Gospel—rather than simply to accept it and all its historical sequels as part of the mysterious story of grace working upon fallen natures: to love everything good and splendid that it produced, to deplore everything sordid and evil, and then to recognize as well (and this is the most challenging task of all) that the tale of Christendom’s failure and defeat is also enfolded within those same workings of grace. Christendom was that cultural reality that was constitutionally, materially, morally, intellectually, and religiously disposed to hear the Gospel as a cosmic truth, to which it was therefore always open, if not necessarily very obedient. For that, Christians would be churlish to be ungrateful.
   All of that, however, is now an exhausted history, one at least as tragic as it was joyous. The sheer banality of modern secular culture, and of its curiously rationalistic brutalities, may be a catastrophe for Western civilization; but it is also the inevitable result of a confusion between two orders that can never be one, and between which any real alliance can be at most a dialectic of reciprocal enrichment and impoverishment, in which each draws strength from the other only by surrendering something of its own essence.
   So perhaps the best moral sense Christians can make of the story of Christendom now, from the special vantage of its aftermath, is to recall that the Gospel was never bound to the historical fate of any political or social order, but always claimed to enjoy a transcendence of all times and places. Perhaps its presence in human history should always be shatteringly angelic: It announces, even over against one’s most cherished expectations of the present or the future, a truth that breaks in upon history, ever and again, always changing or even destroying the former things in order to make all things new. That being so, surely modern Christians should find some joy in being forced to remember that they are citizens of a Kingdom not of this world, that here they have no enduring city, and that they are called to live as strangers and pilgrims on the earth.”

   While I might find somethings to disagree with basically to the extent Christendom applied the Gospel it created good, but to the extent it did not apply the Gospel it did evil. Ultimately this alliance could only be subverted by the Gospel and lead to a post-Christendom world, though it was not foreordained that this secular theocracy would be the final result.

   I would rather not be pigeonholed into either great masses or great men, I think it is often both. Think of Julius Caesar a charismatic man gained power by utilizing the will of the people of Rome. The ‘masses’ and the ‘great man’ worked in tandem with Caesar.

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8. “Couldn’t it be argued that, value judgments aside, this was inevitable due to population growth, heightened mobility, mass production, dramatic technological expansion, increased interconnectedness, the growth of the world market economy, etc? Meaning maybe it was just the destiny of older, more traditional forms of society to go the way of the dinosaurs? Maybe they just couldn’t withstand the onslaught of modernity? Maybe modernity is like fire (or nuclear technology). Yeah, maybe it’s dangerous, and disruptive, but maybe there’s no putting the genie back in the bottle?”

   It seems you are saying that given the inevitable course of industrialization and modern capitalist society such a social transition from conservatism to socialist/consumerism inevitable. There are a lot of questions wrapped up in this. 1) did conservative society have to die in the wake of modernization? 2) if conservatism had to die, did it have to become secular/consumerist/socialist? 3) if conservatism had to die, it might have become something else Fascism, or Nazism, or technocracy or some unknown alternative? I think Keith is arguing for position (2). It is a position one could hold, but I don’t know tightly one can hold to it. I think a good case can be made for (1), but even then I would be hesitant to say it was ‘inevitable’ if by inevitable we mean something that is as inevitable as baking soda and vinegar inevitably fizzing over on contact. I think something like position (3) is just as likely as (2) and don’t think, short of knowledge of alternatives, we could really say that (2) or (3) is more likely.

   “Maybe they just couldn’t withstand the onslaught of modernity?”

   Surely conservatism as it existed in the early twentieth century was unable to survive the assaults of secularism, capitalism, communism and two world wars, but was that necessarily so? I don’t know. Conservatism seemed to survive the earthquakes of the French Revolution, Napoleonic Wars, and 1848 revolutions. It is conceivable that it could have survived into the future in a somewhat modernized form.

   “Maybe modernity is like fire (or nuclear technology). Yeah, maybe it’s dangerous, and disruptive, but maybe there’s no putting the genie back in the bottle?”

   Again it is possible, but I think we have historical examples of ‘ideologies’ being put back into the bottle. We have had Manicheanism (3rd century AD) and Mazdakism (6th centry AD) (both heretical forms of Zoroastrianism) being essentially banished from the Near East, where on the verge of becoming a world religion (at least Manicheanism).

   If, I understand the argument being presented here as, conservatism was one phases of human societal evolution that was eventually passed over and replaced by something newer, not necessarily better, but more adaptive, to use a Darwinian metaphor. The obvious response is maybe all of these same things could be said of anarchism. Maybe anarchism is doomed to inevitable failure to nation-states and ultimately a one-world-state. Just as secularism, the enlightenment, capitalism, communism and world wars led to the destruction of conservative communities and ideology so it did with anarchist community and ideology.

   If were are going to look at history this way, the conservative is in a much better position than the anarchist. We conservatives, in the west, only lost control about 100 years ago. The anarchist lost control around the world for the last 4,000 years. If we accept that man originated in hunter-gatherer tribes and later built empires, the anarchist position would appear even more hopeless than the conservative, given that we are so far removed from the last global anarchist society. This also brings up an other interesting point, if the whole world returned to anarchism would the primitivists be right? The only point in the past when such conditions held was a primitivist condition.

   In short Keith’s arguments, if for the sake of argument we grant the truthfulness of all his assumptions, proves to much. It not only counts against conservatism it also counts against anarchism.
   As a side note, this is an example of reductio ad absurdum. The goal of this mode of argument is to tacitly accept your interlocutors premises and then show him it leads to conclusions he would be unwilling to accept.

   In modern society education has been so lax that no one is taught logical thought any more. For example no one is really allowed to right for any publishing house unless he first learned grammar. How could one right if one did not first know grammar. The same holds for arguments. Logic like grammar is the necessary prerequisite for argumentation. I encourage everyone, who reads this, to study the law of thought we call logic. Arguing without logic is like writing without grammar, both of which can be seen with a fair degree of frequency on youtube.

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9. My comments above weren’t really intended to be an argument for or against anarchism. In fact, I tend to think one of the reasons Marxism got the upper hand over anarchism in that struggle is Marxism was much more compatible with the wider “managerial revolution” that was occurring in the early to mid 20th century.

   “If, I understand the argument being presented here as, conservatism was one phases of human societal evolution that was eventually passed over and replaced by something newer, not necessarily better, but more adaptive, to use a Darwinian metaphor.”

   Yes, that’s a good way to put it.

   “The obvious response is maybe all of these same things could be said of anarchism.”

   Yes.

   “Maybe anarchism is doomed to inevitable failure to nation-states and ultimately a one-world-state. Just as secularism, the enlightenment, capitalism, communism and world wars led to the destruction of conservative communities and ideology so it did with anarchist community and ideology.”

   Yes, quite possibly. Perhaps the defeat of globalism would see the resurgence of both anarchism AND conservatism, i.e. decentralized political and economic institutions where social and cultural conservatism are the norm. Or a world federation of semi-autonomous states that contain largely self-managed village communities or workers cooperatives within themselves, with a mixture of “liberal” and “conservative” regions.

   “If were are going to look at history this way, the conservative is in a much better position than the anarchist. We conservatives, in the west, only lost control about 100 years ago. The anarchist lost control around the world for the last 4,000 years. If we accept that man originated in hunter-gatherer tribes and later built empires, the anarchist position would appear even more hopeless than the conservative, given that we are so far removed from the last global anarchist society.”

   Not a good track record, lol. 🙂

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10. “I should probably add to this that it’s not necessarily either/or with these contending sets of cultural values.

    For instance, when Russian anarchists were organizing among the peasants, Kropotkin pushed them to avoid talking about matters of philosophical, religious or cultural conflict, and focus on areas of common interest.”

    I would say that on a fundamental level PC-leftoids are conservative oikophobes. Oikophobia is “fear of your home.” Leftoids are oikophobes in two senses 1) they are often disaffected Jews or Christians were rebelled against their strong willed mothers (if Jews) and strong will fathers (if Christians). 2) leftoids are oikophobes in the sense that the left itself is born out of conservatism and hates the underlying principles of its philosophy for example income inequality was seen as a danger by Aristotle, charity is a Christian virtue, dignity for women is a Jewish-Christian virtue, religious tolerance was first articulated by Tertullian, Tertullian and Menucius Felix were some of the first people to, the first was the Cynic Diogenes, call themselves a “citizen of the world.”

    Tertullian:

    Apology
    Chapter XXXVIII:

    But as those in whom all ardour in the pursuit of glory and honour is dead, we have no pressing inducement to take part in your public meetings; nor is there aught more entirely foreign to us than affairs of state. We acknowledge one all-embracing commonwealth—the world.

    http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf03.iv.iii.xxxviii.html

    Menucius Felix:

    The Octavius of Minucius Felix
    Chapter XVII.

    Nor can you well perform your social duty unless you know that community of the world which is common to all, especially since in this respect we differ from the wild beasts, that while they are prone and tending to the earth, and are born to look upon nothing but their food, we, whose countenance is erect, whose look is turned towards heaven, as is our converse and reason, whereby we recognise, feel, and imitate God, have neither right nor reason to be ignorant of the celestial glory which forms itself into our eyes and senses.

    http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf04.iv.iii.xvii.html

    Stupid leftoids cannot even come up with a genuin idea and stole the world citizen from the socratic schools (Stoics and Cynics and Platonists) and the Christians and as usually did not give the credit to them.

    I’ll probably write a paper on this, but there is nothing that is good in the left that is not stolen from the conservatives with out giving them credit. This dove-tails with Rothbard claiming the left seeks radical ends with conservative means. The left is really a heretical branch of conservatism, Spengler seems to share this view as well in Prussianism and Socialism.

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11. “Yes, quite possibly. Perhaps the defeat of globalism would see the resurgence of both anarchism AND conservatism, i.e. decentralized political and economic institutions where social and cultural conservatism are the norm. Or a world federation of semi-autonomous states that contain largely self-managed village communities or workers cooperatives within themselves, with a mixture of “liberal” and “conservative” regions.”

    I totally agree here and that is why I, in my own way, seek to undermine the legitimacy of the global tyranny we could call ZoG, Bable or the NWO.

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12. One proviso though once the global elite falls I believe that ‘liberal societies’ will be very rare. For example even the radically leftists kibbutzim which sought radical gender equality ended up with the women raising children, cooking dinner and washing the clothes and men plowing the fields. The more things change the more they stay the same.

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