Troy Southgate

Nov 17, 2024

I NOW wish to discuss Hegel’s thoughts about human freedom in light of one’s continuing engagement with the world. For this, I shall use the example of the parliamentary system, a formula which implies freedom and yet impedes it.

In his 1820 work, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts), Hegel sets out three fundamental principles which he believes can secure autonomy. These are universality, particularity and individuality. The first of these, universality, insists that an individual must have self-awareness and the ability to separate oneself from each given situation. This is essential to acquire a sense of one’s own agency and achieved by taking a step back and reflecting on the potential consequences of our actions. Secondly, Hegel argues that by way of particularity we must choose a specific option and act upon it. Without this practical necessity we would not possess the freedom to make choices or act in a particular way. Thirdly, both universality and particularity are brought together as individuality. This means that after the self-detachment of the first principle and the active commitment of the second, an individual must ultimately come to identify with a specific option. Hegel calls this ‘self-limitation,’ because rather than avoiding or running away from every option that becomes available to us the reflection (universality) and deliberation (particularity) that has already taken place finally leads to an acceptance of our station in life (individuality).

If we now apply this process to the modern electoral system, we can imagine our subject developing a basic sense of self-awareness. A political awakening, if you will. This could involve him starting-out with the premise that he finds himself in an unpleasant world full of conflicting principles and one in which everything appears strange and alien. By the time we arrive at the point of particularity, on the other hand, he is already weighing-up the political options and commits himself by voting for a particular party. Finally, reflection and deliberation has brought our friend to the stage of individuality and that means limiting oneself by adhering to a given ideology.

Although my example is a faithful representation of Hegel’s notion of freedom, there is no way that this can possibly begin to operate within the bounds of Western democracy. Universality, or self-awareness, is clearly impossible in a society in which one’s opinion has already been formed by the controlled media and therefore most of us are born into a system in which differentiation is completely non-existent and where mass conformity is the order of the day. Hegel’s second tenet, particularity, which asks us to commit ourselves by examining the options available to us and taking deliberative action, is purely irrelevant in a situation that preserves the identical nature of political parties through the illusion of choice.

And what are we to make of Hegel’s idea that freedom is thereby assured by limiting ourselves and accepting our position in life? Especially, it must be said, when the choice that has been made and acted upon is ultimately based on a false premise. I do not disagree with Hegel’s triadic analysis of freedom, necessarily, but our political masters have rendered our ability to achieve universality, particularity and individuality within the context of the twenty-first century somewhat impossible. In terms of fulfilling Hegel’s concept of engagement with the world, therefore, rather than seek to compromise with modernity and its fraudulent processes we must accomplish our freedom within the more authentic and organic world of the periphery.