Among the most ambitious interpretations of the development of the Americas is the thesis advanced by Claudio Véliz in The New World of the Gothic Fox. Véliz argued that the English-speaking and Iberian civilizations transplanted fundamentally different cultural traditions to the New World. The Anglo-Protestant tradition was represented by the Gothic Fox: decentralized, pragmatic, adaptive, entrepreneurial, and resistant to hierarchy. The Spanish and Portuguese tradition was represented by the Baroque Hedgehog: centralized, uniform, hierarchical, and committed to preserving an integrated social order. According to this interpretation, the institutional and economic divergence between North and South America was not accidental. It reflected the inheritance of distinct civilizational models.

There is much that is persuasive in Véliz’s historical account. The British colonies did develop stronger traditions of local self-government, voluntary association, religious pluralism, and commercial experimentation. The Iberian colonies were more centralized, more bureaucratic, and more closely integrated with church and crown. Yet there is a problem with the theory when it is applied to the contemporary world. The theory may explain how the Americas developed, but it does not explain how Americans and Latin Americans actually behave today.

Indeed, a curious reversal appears to have taken place. The descendants of the Gothic Fox increasingly behave like hedgehogs, while the descendants of the Baroque Hedgehog are often forced to behave like foxes.

The central weakness of the Gothic Fox thesis is that it assumes the traits that create a successful society will continue to characterize the individuals who inhabit that society centuries later. This assumption overlooks a fundamental reality: success changes incentives. Once institutions become prosperous, stable, and powerful, they alter the behavior of the people who live within them.

The United States of Thomas Jefferson was a nation of small farmers, craftsmen, merchants, and independent producers. Jefferson envisioned a republic composed of self-reliant citizens who owned property, worked for themselves, and participated actively in local civic life. Such a society corresponded closely to the fox metaphor. Individuals were expected to solve problems independently, move where opportunities existed, and create wealth through personal initiative.

Yet Jefferson’s vision did not ultimately prevail. The victorious model was not Jeffersonian but Hamiltonian. Alexander Hamilton imagined a nation of banks, industry, finance, infrastructure, and large-scale economic development. Over time, Hamilton’s vision became reality. Industrialization, urbanization, mass education, and corporate growth transformed the United States into a society dominated by large organizations.

Today, the typical American does not aspire to become a farmer, artisan, or shopkeeper. Instead, he seeks admission to a university, acquisition of credentials, employment within a large organization, promotion through bureaucratic hierarchies, and long-term financial security. Success is increasingly defined by one’s position within an institution rather than by one’s independence from institutions.

The social ideal is no longer the entrepreneur but the professional.

Even Americans who speak admiringly of entrepreneurship often pursue careers that are fundamentally bureaucratic. They seek employment with large corporations, government agencies, hospitals, universities, consulting firms, and technology companies. The average graduate is more likely to dream of securing a position at a prestigious employer than opening a small manufacturing business or neighborhood store.

This transformation has profound implications for Véliz’s theory. The contemporary American often behaves in ways that appear distinctly hedgehog-like. He specializes narrowly, follows structured career paths, accumulates credentials, and depends upon large organizations for economic security. His life is often organized around institutions rather than individual initiative.

By contrast, many Latin Americans inhabit economic environments characterized by uncertainty, inflation, political instability, and limited formal employment opportunities. In these conditions, survival frequently requires entrepreneurial behavior. Individuals must improvise, adapt, and create economic opportunities where none formally exist.

Walk through the streets of Asunción, Lima, La Paz, or Guayaquil and one encounters a vast informal economy. Family businesses, street vendors, small traders, independent contractors, informal transport providers, neighborhood restaurants, and self-employed workers form a substantial portion of economic life. Many individuals simultaneously maintain several income streams. They are required to display flexibility and adaptability simply to survive.

Ironically, these behaviors resemble the fox more than the hedgehog.

The conventional response is that this entrepreneurship reflects necessity rather than opportunity. This objection is correct, but it does not entirely solve the problem. It merely introduces a distinction that Véliz himself did not sufficiently emphasize.

There are two forms of entrepreneurship.

The first is opportunity entrepreneurship. An individual identifies a profitable possibility and voluntarily pursues it. This is the entrepreneurial ideal often celebrated in Anglo-American culture.

The second is necessity entrepreneurship. An individual creates his own employment because stable employment is unavailable. This form of entrepreneurship is widespread throughout the developing world.

The existence of necessity entrepreneurship does not prove that Latin America has become culturally Anglo-Saxon. However, it does reveal that the relationship between culture and behavior is more complicated than Véliz’s framework suggests. Institutional environments shape behavior as powerfully as inherited cultural traditions.

The deeper irony is that the success of the Gothic Fox may have produced conditions that make fox-like behavior less necessary.

The Anglo-American world constructed highly efficient institutions capable of organizing production on enormous scales. Corporations, universities, financial markets, and government agencies became extraordinarily successful. As these institutions expanded, they absorbed functions that had previously been performed by independent individuals.

The result is a society in which millions of people pursue security through organizational membership rather than entrepreneurial independence.

The fox built institutions so effective that his descendants no longer need to behave like foxes.

Conversely, many Latin Americans continue to operate within environments where institutions are less predictable. Under such conditions, flexibility becomes indispensable. People must constantly adapt to changing regulations, fluctuating currencies, unstable governments, and uncertain employment prospects.

The hedgehog, facing instability, learns fox-like habits.

This paradox suggests that Véliz’s theory is strongest as a theory of origins and weakest as a theory of outcomes. It helps explain why certain institutions emerged in different parts of the Americas. It does not necessarily explain how contemporary individuals behave within those institutions.

The distinction becomes even more apparent in the digital age. Modern technology increasingly allows economic activity to occur outside traditional organizations. Independent creators, freelancers, online merchants, consultants, software developers, and remote workers are once again capable of operating as small-scale producers. In this respect, the digital economy may represent a partial revival of Jeffersonian conditions.

Yet even here, large institutions continue to dominate. Platforms, algorithms, credentialing systems, and corporate networks shape opportunities. Most participants remain dependent upon structures they do not control.

Consequently, the twenty-first-century United States appears less like a republic of foxes than a highly sophisticated Hamiltonian system staffed by millions of specialized hedgehogs.

This does not invalidate Véliz’s historical insights. It simply demonstrates that cultural inheritance is not destiny. Institutions evolve. Incentives change. Successful societies transform themselves in unexpected ways.

The ultimate paradox is therefore simple. The Gothic Fox may have triumphed historically, but in doing so he created a world in which fox-like behavior became increasingly unnecessary. Meanwhile, the descendants of the Baroque Hedgehog, confronted by instability and scarcity, were compelled to become more adaptive, entrepreneurial, and improvisational than the original theory would have predicted.

The fox won the game, but victory changed the rules. In the process, the fox began to resemble a hedgehog, while the hedgehog learned many of the tricks of the fox.