It depends

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At the most recent NatCon, Curt Mills of The American Conservative debated Max Abrahms, Associate Professor of International Security at Northeastern University, on the subject of US foreign policy and Israel. Both raised good points and made a respectable show of it. Max explained how rewarding US-designated “terror” groups such as Hamas only reinforces what they do, while Curt decried the incredibly amount of latitude (and support) given to Israel by the USA over the years, and how their acts threaten, rather than enhance, US interests regionally, and beyond.

I wouldn’t call Curt an Arabist, a term used to deride those at the US State Department either seeking a more balanced approach to regional US policy or those who favour Arabs over Israel, but it is a term often used to critique those critical of the State of Israel in a zero-sum game. Being critical of excessive permissiveness to Israel runs in parallel with US war fatigue/opposition to more US military ventures abroad. I lean toward this position, but I think that it is high time to consider how effective those arguments are in light of recent events in Israel and its neighbourhood, and in Iran as well. Max argued for what is essentially the old neo-conservative approach of strong support for Israel and a muscular US position in the region to counter “terror”.

The term “neo-conservative” (neo-con, for short) has fallen out of favour lately, and with good reason; the perceived failures of the “Great War on Terror” were in part laid at their feet for being the most vocal supporters of it. Secondly, that cohort has almost entirely drifted away from the Republican Party and towards a tactical support of the Democrats in the name of a popular front against Donald Trump, a man who they see as risking US hegemony via flirtations with what is incorrectly viewed as “isolationism”, along with his media-described “soft approach” to Vladimir Putin.

Third, by way of their migration to independent or Democrat camps, they have effectively blurred the very thin line that separated them from what were known as “liberal humanitarian interventionists”, a group firmly inside of the Democrat Party (think Samantha Power). There really is no significant difference between these two groups anymore, especially considering how the neo-cons of old have pretty much dropped whatever aspects of social conservatism they had once adopted (e.g. tough on crime).

“Okay Nic, what is, or what was, a neo-con anyway?”

I’m glad you asked. Some readers have asked me to do a geneaology of neo-conservatism, but that would require a huge effort that I can re-visit around Christmas when I have some down time. Suffice it to say that neo-conservatism arose in the late 1960s among a group of former Trotskyites like Irving Kristol (the brilliant father of the less-brilliant William) who were disaffected with the social liberalization that they viewed as going too far in the USA, particularly in its urban settings. More importantly, they wanted America to take a muscular approach on the world stage against the Soviet Union (the old Trotsky vs. Stalin feud refused to die down, even though times had changed). To them, detente was a risk that offered little in the way of reward. Lastly, Israel held a special place in their worldview, a “plucky” little state surrounded by enemies, “the only democracy in the Middle East”. It is not uncouth to state that the overwhelming majority of notable neo-conservatives were themselves Jewish.

It was with Ronald Reagan entered the White House where they began to exert some direct influence on US policy, but their real influence would have to wait until George W. Bush and Dick Cheney arrived on stage in 2001. W’s first term was the heyday of US neo-conservatism. Dubya speechwriter, David Frum, coined the term “Axis of Evil’ to denote US targets for regime change Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. He would go on to co-author the book “An End To Evil: How To Win the War on Terror” with fellow neo-conservative, Richard Perle, a proposed recipe that included direct military confrontation with several states targeted for regime change.

Like I said, I won’t go into full detail on the neo-conservatives and their background in this essay, but it must be re-stated just how influential they were during the first Dubya term in office. And because of that rapid rise influence, their downfall was just as fast; a lot of the blame for the failure to pacify Iraq were laid at their feet. In due time, “neo-con” became a pejorative, and rightly so.

Over the next several years, body bags containing the remains of US soldiers came home and questions about the justification for removing Saddam Hussein from office grew louder and louder. It turned out that Saddam did not have WMD of any type that could be deployed against other states, especially Israel. It also turned out that Iraq was not exactly welcoming US soldiers as liberators (outside of the Kurdish-heavy north of the country). The Afghanis too were mixed in their response to US boots on the ground, with the Taliban growing more confident by the year that the US forces and its allies, restrained by strict rules of engagement, would eventually leave and create a new vacuum for them to re-fill.

Furthermore, the bete noire of the neo-conservatives, the Iranians, actually gained from the toppling of Saddam Hussein. Pro-Iranian Shi’ites were now in control of the south of Iraq, and much of the centre, including most of Baghdad. Although not always in lockstep with the Iranian Mullahs, Iran’s zone of influence now stretched further west, to the point that it could transport weapons to its allies in Syria and Lebanon (Hezbollah), creating a “Shi’ite Crescent” to contest US, Israeli, and Saudi designs on the region. The Iranian nuclear program continued apace, despite international opposition to it, including at the UN. Would Iran get the bomb?

Lastly, their case for exporting liberal democracy abroad by bombing was shown to be without merit. Culture and history got in the way of turning Iraq and Afghanistan into progressive liberal democracies. The USA may have won initial conflicts in both of those countries, but the maximalist aims of the neo-conservatives were always out of reach and were pie-in-the-sky fantasies.

The lesson became: no more direct intervention with boots on the ground, and lead from behind if necessary (e.g. Libya, Syria), as the cost in blood and treasure would be too much for America to bear due to domestic opposition to such adventurism abroad. The assumption was that if the USA and its allies couldn’t handle pacifying Iraq within permitted means of international law and conventions, Iran would be an even tougher nut to crack. The neo-cons had to tactically retreat and lick their wounds.

Not all of them were required to do that, though. Some weathered the reputational harm by easily seguing between one administration and the next. Vicki Nuland was the best example of this:

Geopolitica

Vicki Victae

Niccolo Soldo

·

March 10, 2024

I admit that this will open me up to accusations of ‘midwittery’, but my second favourite film of all-time is Ingmar Bergman’s 1957 classic “The Seventh Seal”.

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Vicki seamlessly sailed through the Dubya, Obama, and Biden regimes, meeting her Waterloo when the much-touted Ukrainian summer counteroffensive failed from the get-go.

It’s important to include Vicki “Fuck the EU” Nuland and Ukraine and Russia in this essay as well, because the neo-conservatives were on the same page with other foreign policy wonks in Washington who viewed Moscow as the chief stumbling block towards “A New American Century”. Russia was (and I still think remains) the only country that stands in the way of US nuclear primacy, the key condition required for “full-spectrum dominance” aka global hegemony for the USA. Neo-conservatives and those close to them were heavily involved in nuclear disarmament talks during the later years of the Cold War, leaving them highly suspicious of Soviet, and latter Russian, intentions. For the neo-conservatives, Russia was the major stumbling block to be removed, or at least neutralized, on the global chessboard. This is why Nuland became point person for Russia policy in several administrations, whether de facto or de jure. It’s also why the neo-cons were joined at the hip with liberal humanitarian interventionists on the regime change train in places like Georgia and Ukraine.

The neo-conservatives represent the maximalist wing of US foreign policy hawks in that their objectives are the most extreme, whether they be regime change in Moscow or the establishment of liberal democracies in Baghdad and Kabul.1 The DoD contented itself with the removal of Hussein in Iraq, and al-Qaida from Afghanistan, and are very happy seeing how much Russian blood has been shed in Ukraine at little cost to the USA. Their objectives over the past two decades have largely been met (although not entirely). The neo-cons have failed in their objectives, as they were both extreme and wholly unrealistic in retrospect (and even at the time, at least in my opinion).

10/7 and Iranian Under-performance

The fear of Iran and what it could do should the USA and Israel engage in military action in the Middle East yet again hung over the heads of US foreign policy planners for years after the neo-con debacle. Israel was humiliated by Hezbollah in 2006, while Iran (in tandem with Russia) kept the Ba’athist regime in Syria on life support up until less than a year ago. Lingering in the background were fears of the Iranians closing the Persian Gulf to shipping, an event that is argued would crash the global economy overnight, and open Russian and Chinese military support, should Tehran ever find itself on the defensive.

Instead, the Hamas raid of 10/7 led in rapid succession to the strategic defeat of Hezbollah, the lopsided slaughter in Gaza, and the evisceration of 40 years of Iranian geo-strategy in the Middle East as the Ba’athist regime collapsed almost overnight almost one year ago. The Shi’ite Crescent was no more, Hezbollah isolated, and worst of all, Israel and the USA openly attacked Iran’s nuclear program facilities without anyone lifting a finger to come to their aid.

Tucker Carlson, someone who is under severe attack these days, made some predictions that have not panned out with respect to the USA attacking Iran.

On June 5th, Tucker stated the following in a long post on X:

The spectre of thousands of dead Americans and a collapse economy was raised by him.

In an interview with Steve Bannon on June 17th, he opined that: “”I think we’re going to see the end of the American empire… Will the Iran War Be the Downfall of MAGA?”

Neither of these things came to pass.

In an interview with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian that was aired on July 7th, he asked: “If War Breaks Out With Iran, Would They Receive Assistance From Russia and China?”

Neither Russia nor China came to Iran’s defense.

There are varying reports on just how much damage the combined Israeli and US attacks on Iran’s nuclear program caused. However, the optics are just as important; no one came to Tehran’s rescue. What stops these two from attacking Iran again? Where is Iran’s deterrent?

At the same time, Israel faces little military opposition to its regional designs. Iran has been evicted from the Levant and further south, left with a tiny proxy in Yemen that at most is a nuisance to shipping in the Red Sea. Their turn will come. Hezbollah has been defeated, and moves are now in the works to disarm them, something that will be met with violent resistance to be sure, but they no longer have a direct channel to arms like they did up until last December.

We now see a Middle East that is almost entirely composed of US allies and proxies, and this has been achieved with very little American blood shed since Iraq went quiet.

Neo-Con Vindication?

Recommend Fisted by Foucault to your readers

You’ll never think of Foucault the same way again