Can Israel maintain its strategic advantage in the event of a ground invasion?
Hezbollah has been officially at war with the Israeli state after the recent attacks in Beirut, which claimed the lives of hundreds of people, including some of the organisation’s senior commanders. Today’s essay goes back to the conflicts of 1982-2000 and 2006, compares the military strength of both sides and examines whether an Israeli ground invasion could be successful.
Previous conflicts between Hezbollah and Israel

The South Lebanon conflict began with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, in response to attacks launched by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from southern Lebanon. According to the IDF, the casus belli was an attempted assassination of Israel’s ambassador to the UK, Shlomo Argov. The primary goals were to expel the PLO from Lebanon and install an Israel-friendly government in Beirut. Another objective was to push back the Palestinian militants 40 km to the north.
On 6 June 1982, Israeli warplanes and warships bombed targets and ground forces began the invasion before noon. The first formations to be deployed were the Galilee, Ga’ash and Sinai formations, which moved along three axes (coastal road, Nabatieh and Fatah Land). Israel faced Syrian forces, quickly occupied the south and went to besiege Beirut from the western direction, which was achieved by late June.
In the middle of August, an agreement was reached for the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut. Palestinian forces left for Tunisia and the evacuation was completed on August 31. The agreement bolstered Israel, which hoped for a short war and made new allies in Lebanon. However, on September 4, 1982, eight Israeli soldiers were kidnapped by Islamists while in an observation post in the Hamdoun region, two of which were handed over to the Ahmed Jibril organization and the other six to Fatah. In November 1983, the six Fatah-held soldiers were given back to Israel in exchange for 4,700 Palestinian fighters detained in the Ansar camp in Lebanon, and 65 others imprisoned in Israel. In another agreement with Syria in 1984, Israel recovered three soldiers and, in return, gave 291 soldiers. By the same year, Damascus had recovered from the fighting, reasserted its control over Lebanon and contributed to the foundation of Hezbollah, a Shia Islamist movement seeking to drive out the Israeli invaders.
Another significant escalation was the bombing of the United States embassy in Beirut on April 18 1983, which killed 63 people. Islamic Jihad Organization, a Shia Islamist militia, claimed responsibility, even though it was later attributed to Hezbollah.
The invasion led to Israel occupying parts of southern Lebanon and eventually establishing a «security zone» there, which they maintained with the help of the South Lebanon Army (SLA), a Christian-dominated militia serving as an Israeli proxy. The Israeli occupation faced constant resistance, expressed in the form of low-level insurgency attacks. In particular, Hezbollah carried out guerrilla warfare, including bombings, ambushes, and rocket attacks against Israeli forces and SLA allies.
With the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1990 thanks to the Taif Agreement, the political influence of the Muslim community rose exponentially. This strengthened Hezbollah, which remained armed in stark contrast to all other militias, and increased attacks on Israeli and pro-Israel forces. The Israeli occupation became unsustainable due to growing resistance and domestic pressure increased as well, mainly following the helicopter disaster in 1997. By 2000, the new Israeli government decided to pull out of Lebanon, a move seen as a major victory for Hezbollah, which continued to capitalise on this withdrawal in order to bolster its legitimacy as a resistance movement.
Tensions between Hezbollah and Israel continued after the Israeli withdrawal, with skirmishes and cross-border incidents being common. The conflict focused on the control of Shebaa Farms, a disputed land in the Israel-occupied Golan heights. In July 2006, a Hezbollah raid into Israeli territory resulted in the capture of two Israeli soldiers, triggering the full-scale 2006 Lebanon War. The objectives were to change the situation in southern Lebanon and push Hizbullah from the border, north of the Litani river.
The conflict lasted for 34 days, with Israel launching airstrikes and a ground invasion targeting Hezbollah positions and Lebanese infrastructure, while Hezbollah responded with rocket attacks on northern Israel. No side managed to establish an advantage, however the new withdrawal of Israeli forces made Hezbollah the strategic winner, having defended Lebanon twice in six years.
In the course of the war, about 120 IDF soldiers and more than 40 Israeli civilians were killed. More than 1,100 Lebanese civilians and Hezbollah combatants died, and the war caused extensive damage to infrastructure in southern Lebanon. Around one million Lebanese and up to 500,000 Israelis were displaced. The Winograd Commission, convened in Israel to investigate problems in wartime decision-making, issued a critical report in January 2008, which was hailed by Hezbollah. In July 2008, following UN-brokered negotiations, the bodies of the abducted soldiers were returned to Israel in exchange for five Lebanese prisoners and the bodies of about 200 others.
Current power balances of both sides

The military capabilities of Hezbollah and Israel are starkly different in size, technology, and structure, with significant edges for Israel. The conflicts between these two forces reveal how a highly trained state military like the IDF can struggle against a guerrilla organization like Hezbollah, which uses unconventional warfare tactics.
One of Israel’s greatest military advantages is its access to the latest military technology (and endless US aid). The IDF’s air force is equipped with over 600 units, including advanced fighter jets like the F-35, F-16, and precision-guided missiles. The majority of them are American, indicating a lack of domestic production.
The ground forces are equipped with Merkava tanks, which are domestically produced and are considered to be equivalent to the capabilities of the M1 Abrams and the Challenger 2, among others. The main variants used are the Mk. 3 and the Mk. 4. Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar claimed that his organisation destroyed at least 750 armoured vehicles, while other sources mention lower numbers but still use Hamas as their primary source, because Israel refuses to disclose data. BulgarianMilitary.com used satellite images for its calculations.
The IDF also has access to advanced missiles and air defence systems (Arrow and Iron Dome respectively), satellite surveillance, drones for reconnaissance and strikes, and state-of-the-art intelligence-gathering technologies. Mossad is well-known for precision strikes, with the pager explosions in Lebanon being the latest hit. Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, which it has not disclosed, although a minister called for a nuclear strike on Gaza last November.
Hezbollah’s military wing, commonly referred to as the «Islamic Resistance», is estimated to have between 20,000 and 30,000 fighters, with thousands more in reserve. Its fighters are divided into different units specializing in various forms of guerrilla warfare, urban combat, and intelligence operations. Iran provides most of its financial support.
While Hezbollah cannot compete with the IDF in conventional terms, it excels in asymmetric warfare, using small, mobile units, tunnels, and civilian infrastructure to mitigate the effectiveness of Israel’s technological superiority. The combat experience during the Syrian Civil War, in which Hezbollah intervened in 2012 to support the Assad government, increased their proficiency in both guerrilla tactics and more conventional warfare.
Hezbollah’s missile arsenal is the main advantage of the group and includes a variety of weapons supplied primarily by Iran and Syria. Its arsenal includes short-range Katyusha rockets and longer-range guided missiles that can target Israeli cities, as evident in many strikes. Hezbollah’s missile arsenal was responsible for much of the damage during the 2006 war, where its forces fired more than 4,000 rockets into northern Israel during the 34-day campaign. By 2021, Hezbollah missiles were estimated to be more than 130,000.
In recent years, Hezbollah has tried to penetrate Israel’s Iron Dome defense system, with some of its missiles overwhelming and destroying launchers. The threat posed by the organisation’s missiles is widely discussed among mainstream media.
Despite the missile arsenal, Hezbollah has no air defence systems, aggravating the already high civilian toll.
Conclusion
The comparison between Hezbollah and Israel reveals a significant disparity in military strength and resources. Israel, with its advanced technological edge, air superiority, and substantial US support, commands one of the most capable militaries in the world. In contrast, Hezbollah has become a highly effective asymmetric force, being the most powerful non-state actor on a global scale, eventually surpassing Lebanon.
The two previous conflicts in Lebanon demonstrated that while Israel can deliver devastating strikes, Hezbollah’s guerrilla warfare and rocket attacks can counter Israel’s conventional forces. Whether another ground invasion could neutralise Hezbollah remains uncertain, as the past wars suggest a prolonged and costly engagement for both sides with advserse impacts on their economies and living standards.
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