Geopolitics

War in Ukraine III: an Interim Assessment

Peter Turchin

Sixteen months into the war the final outcome of this conflict is still uncertain. Public statements from both sides continue to express unbounded confidence in their eventual victory (see, for example, Russia’s Strategic Failure and Ukraine’s Secure Future). But which way has the advantage swung, is known only to the military professionals serving on the general staffs—they have the data. A proper assessment of the prediction from the OL model, discussed in Part II, will have to wait until the war is over and the data become available to the public. Even then, however, we will not know everything.

What can be said about the state of this conflict now (as of July 2023)?

The official sources cannot be trusted (except in pushing their own propaganda). As an example, here are two assessments of the state of the on-going Ukrainian counter-offensive, which began on June 4, 2023:

Estimates on relative casualties vary hugely depending on who is assessing them (and which side they favor). American officials estimated in May of 2023 that 50,000 Russian troops were killed and 180,000 wounded, whereas for Ukraine the numbers were 20,000 killed and 130,000 wounded. The implied casualty ratio is 2.5 to 1 in the direction opposite of what is predicted by the OL model. Generally speaking, the official US stance is that Putin made a horrible mistake invading Ukraine and that Russia will lose the war. This opinion is expressed by serving officials and most retired generals, as well as columnists and reporters in mainstream American newspapers. In February of 2023, for example, the New York Times published an article, Soaring Death Toll Gives Grim Insight Into Russian Tactics, in which it stated…

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Categories: Geopolitics, Military

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