G. W. F. Hegel’s (1770-1831) Phenomenology of Mind, first published in 1807, offers some interesting thoughts about the master-slave relationship, although, as I intend to show, they were expressed at a time when the world was just beginning to enter a new technological age and therefore the potentially liberating facets behind this relationship are considerably more difficult to recognise.

Hegel believed that when man consumes something natural – food, for example – he is incorporating the world into himself. By doing so, he destroys the purely subjective dimension and creates a form of temporary self-sufficiency that appears to link him with that which was previously regarded as external. This idea is even communicated by the modern expression, ‘you are what you eat’.

However, once these items of sustenance have been consumed the individual soon finds himself back where he began. Hunger inevitably creates a need for more consumption, but rather than look at the resources of the world as something external he now feels empty and unfulfilled due to the fact that man-as-subject can no longer regard food-as-object if it has already been consumed on a previous occasion. This leads our human subject to yearn for something that can be incorporated into the self without being destroyed.

For Hegel, this involves what is known as the ‘dialectic of desire,’ an understanding that real fulfilment can only be acquired by coming face-to-face with another subjectivity: “Self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.” Instead of consuming one another, the two subjects begin to clash and, before long, establish a hierarchy with the master attempting to force the slave to accept his own dominance. Due to the fact that their mutual consciousness has not yet realised that it is part of a universality, struggle is inevitable. It is not in the interests of the master to kill the slave, however, because that would destroy the object in the way that consuming food also eradicates that which is external to the self. Conversely, therefore, the master realises that by dominating the slave he is exerting his authority over the world and also ensuring that his counterpart remains alive and under his control. Ultimately, this arrangement is unsatisfactory because the slave is nonetheless regarded as less than the master and is thus unable to reinforce or reciprocate the master’s own exaggerated sense of self.

Ironically, Hegel believes that it is the slave who takes the subjective dialectic to the next level by realising that he is at the mercy of the master by fearing for his life. It is the possibility of death, in other words, which takes the slave away from his own individuality and self-hood. This happens because the slave’s preoccupation with his own demise separates him from the menial tasks in which he is ordinarily engaged and his consciousness “has been inwardly dissolved, has trembled to its depths, and everything fixed in it has quaked.” Unlike the master, the slave is able to perceive of himself as a universal being that is finally at one with the world. For Hegel, this is the beginning of true freedom and the slave (as “labouring self”) is able to achieve this transcendence by forming a higher unity with the environment through creative work. The master, being wholly detached from such labour due to his more ascendant position on the socio-economic ladder, is unable to progress beyond his own subjectivity and finds himself completely estranged from the world.

My own thoughts in relation to Hegel’s analysis of the relationship between master and slave are contingent upon his use of the word ‘creative’. Given that he wrote prior to the consolidation of the Industrial Revolution, at a time when many forms of labour were still ‘creative,’ it is clear to see how the slave – despite his subjugation, or perceived inferiority – would have had a more authentic existence to that of his master, but in the modern world it is becoming extremely rare for slaves (paid or otherwise) to engage in any form of ‘creative’ labour. In fact today’s slave is far more likely to relinquish his own sense of individuality at a computer terminal or on a factory conveyor belt than experience a more tangible connection with the real world by gathering crops or looking after cattle.

In that sense, at least, any quest for the universal identification discussed by Hegel would be dashed on the grinding wheels of mass production. And that, of course, leads to the creation of a more challenging dialectic.