A CONCISE theory of knowledge, as presented by Steiner, can enable us to make sense of the relations between things and form a comprehensive philosophy of reality:

Positive knowledge is acquired by us through particular cognitions; what the value of our knowledge is, considered as knowledge of reality, we learn through the Theory of Knowledge. By holding fast strictly to this principle, and by employing no particular cognitions in our argumentation, we have transcended all one-sided world-views. One-sidedness, as a rule, results from the fact that the inquiry, instead of concentrating on the process of cognition itself, busies itself about some object of that process. If our arguments are sound, Dogmatism must abandon its “thing-in-itself” as fundamental principle, and Subjective Idealism its “Ego,” for both these owe their determinate natures in their relation to each other first to thinking. (p.167)

This, as one might expect, is a direct reference to both Kant and Fichte.

Interestingly, Steiner cites Alois Emanuel Biedermann (1819-1885) as a prime example of a philosopher whose thought is closest to that of Steiner’s own. A Protestant theologian who joined the Young Hegelians – rubbing shoulders with revolutionaries such as Max Stirner (1806-1856), Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) in the process – Biedermann promoted a form of “free Christianity”.

Despite the similarities between Steiner and his Swiss counterpart, however, the latter made a similar error to Fichte in that he failed to identify cognition as the link between thinking and the “given,” falling into the trap of confusing the theory of knowledge with metaphysics. Biedermann’s ideas are very similar to those of Steiner, but his methodology is nonetheless open to question:

Hence, we have had no occasion to compare our position directly with his. Biedermann’s aim is to gain an epistemological standpoint with the help of a few metaphysical axioms. Our aim is to reach, through an analysis of the process of cognition, a theory of reality. (p.168)

Without grasping the inner workings of knowledge, we are told, no philosopher worthy of the name has any right to make presumptions about objects, the Self or consciousness.