WITH reality explained by the coming-together of perception and thought, something that ultimately transcends “the world of appearances” through knowledge, that which we originally perceive as Duality is transformed into Monism.

As we saw in Part Three of this series, what we first imagine to be reality is based on the two-sided dichotomies of “Mind and Matter,” “Subject and Object” and “Thought and Appearance”. Steiner believes that Kant is also responsible for perpetuating this tendency, dividing his philosophy between the objects we perceive and the “things-in-themselves,” although arranging percepts in accordance with our own particular constitution enables us to make sense of the world. Steiner accuses Kant of “building castles in the air,” creating a false opposition that has no actual basis in perception:

Every kind of reality which is assumed to exist outside the sphere of perception and conception must be relegated to the limbo of unverified hypotheses. To this category belongs the “thing-in-itself.” It is, of course, quite natural that a Dualistic thinker should be unable to find the connection between the world-principle which he hypothetically assumes and the facts that are given in experience. For the hypothetical world-principle itself a content can be found only by borrowing it from experience and shutting one’s eyes to the fact of the borrowing. Otherwise it remains an empty and meaningless concept, a mere form without content. (p.60)

For Steiner, there can be no such limits on Knowledge because the objects in the external world require no explanation and act in accordance with their own specific laws. More importantly, the Self is capable of understanding them through the subsequent combination of perception and thought. It is we, ourselves, who grapple with the problem of knowledge and even if we suffer the odd setback there is no reason why we cannot find answers to our questions over a period of time.

Steiner is of the view that when the Dualist divides knowledge into two parts, “subject” and “object,” he posits certain things within his field of consciousness and ascribes certain other things outside of his consciousness entirely. The Dualist – and therefore the Kantian – regards those of his concepts which are not included within consciousness as little more than “subjective representations” that remain, or so he assumes, beyond the realms of human wisdom. It is thus on the “objectively real” that the Dualist must depend for knowledge, always conscious that without them he would be left with nothing but “ideal” conceptualisations that transform the world into a hazy dream.

One form of philosophy that is dependant on “real principles” is Naïve Realism. Known under an assortment of names – including Direct Realism, Perceptual Realism and Common Sense Realism – this strand of thought involves basing one’s entire worldview on what one sees before one’s eyes. In other words, a direct awareness of external objects that are in no way to be interpreted as representations:

The fact that his hands can grasp, and his eyes see, these objects is for him sufficient guarantee of their reality. “Nothing exists that cannot be perceived” is, in fact, the first axiom of the naïve man; and it is held to be equally valid in its converse: “Everything which is perceived exists.” The best proof for this assertion is the naïve man’s belief in immortality and in ghosts. He thinks of the soul as a fine kind of matter perceptible by the senses which, in special circumstances, may actually become visible to the ordinary man (belief in ghosts). (p.63)

The philosophy by which the Kantian posits “things-in-themselves” which lie beyond our capacity for knowledge is thus rejected on the basis that it merely conceptualises, obfuscates or even mystifies the “real” objects that already exist. In the event that something cannot be detected by the senses, the Naïve Realist will refuse to accept it as reality. The same school of philosophy will even insist that knowledge itself is simply the result of sense-perception creating an impression on our minds.

Universal concepts, such as the idea of a flower, are considered “abstract” in the eyes of the Naïve Realist and only a single flower has any basis in reality. This limited approach, with its

fundamental principle of the reality of all percepts, contradicts experience, which teaches us that the content of percepts is of a transitory nature. The tulip I see is real to-day; in a year it will have vanished into nothingness. What persists is the species “tulip.” This species is, however, for the Naïve Realist merely an idea, not a reality. Thus this theory of the world finds itself in the paradoxical position of seeing its realities arise and perish, while that which, by contrast with its realities, it regards as unreal endures. Hence Naïve Realism is compelled to acknowledge the existence of something ideal by the side of percepts. It must include within itself entities which cannot be perceived by the senses. In admitting them, it escapes contradicting itself by conceiving their existence as analogous to that of objects of sense. (p.64)

However, the Naïve Realist can only admit the “ideal” into his worldview if he considers it to be an invisible force that operates between the objects that he can physically detect through the senses. Consequently, this also allows him to accept the plausibility of a supernatural deity.

Steiner does not hesitate to describe Naïve Realism as a “self-contradiction” which, by entertaining the idea of hidden forces, betrays its first principle of only acknowledging that which comes to us by way of the senses:

The imperceptible forces of which perceptible things are the bearers are, in fact, illegitimate hypotheses from the standpoint of Naïve Realism. But because Naïve Realism knows no other realities, it invests its hypothetical forces with perceptual content. It thus transfers a form of existence (the existence of percepts) to a sphere where the only means of making any assertion concerning such existence, viz., sense-perception, is lacking. (p.65)

This leads us onto Metaphysical Realism which, ordinarily, maintains that everything which exists does so independently and does not derive its existence from either being experienced or conceptualised. At the same time, Steiner highlights a particular strain of the philosophy that will only recognise that an object is “real” when it enters into our consciousness. Whilst this is similar to Naïve Realism, the Metaphysical Realist occupies a middle ground between that and Idealism in terms of his belief that the perceptible objects which form relationships with one another are impermanent whilst the imperceptible forces responsible for producing them are permanent.

As a result, in order to include imperceptible factors within his philosophy the Metaphysical Realist must rely on thought. This raises another problem, that of trying to decide whether the concept or idea derived from thought is just as important as percepts. Steiner argues that without concepts it is impossible to identify the relations between the percepts themselves. Metaphysical Realism thus

merges itself in a view of the world according to which the principle of perceptibility holds for percepts, and that of conceivability for the relations between the percepts. This view of the world has no room, in addition to the perceptual and conceptual worlds, for a third sphere in which both principles, the so-called “real” principle and the “ideal” principle, are simultaneously valid. (p.65)

Steiner presents this philosophy as a variant of Monism which, by seeking to combine Realism and Idealism, creates a new conglomeration in an attempt to cast-off any suspicion that it is contradictory.

It is worth reiterating the Austrian’s own view that knowledge is obtained when perception first encounters an object and then employs the medium of thought to ensure that a link is established between the Self and the world through the unification of percepts and concepts. In the case of both Naïve Realism and Metaphysical Realism, however, knowledge is essentially limited due to the fact that each sees

in the contents of mind only ideal representations of the real world. For, to these theories, whatever falls outside the subject is something absolute, a self-contained whole, and the subject’s mental content is a copy which is wholly external to this absolute. The completeness of knowledge depends on the greater or lesser degree of resemblance between the representation and the absolute object. A being with fewer senses than man will perceive less of the world, one with more senses will perceive more. The former’s knowledge will, therefore, be less complete than the latter’s. (p.66)

Steiner explains that it was common among the earliest proponents of Metaphysical Realism to assume that their philosophy would eventually be capable of understanding the precise nature of its “metaphysical reals” through the appliance of concepts, but it eventually became the case that the Metaphysical Realist began to rely far more on percepts as a means of achieving this objective:

Because concepts are before the mind in transparent clearness, it was thought that we might deduce from them the metaphysically real with absolute certainty. Percepts are not given with the same transparent clearness. Each fresh one is a little different from others of the same kind which preceded it. In principle, therefore, anything inferred from past experience is somewhat modified by each subsequent experience. The character of the metaphysically real thus obtained can therefore be only relatively true, for it is open to correction by further instances. (pp.67-8)

Thinkers such as Von Hartmann employ what is known as the “inductive method” to identify similarities between the subjective worldviews of humanity, meaning that Metaphysical Realists rely solely on percepts in their quest for knowledge and not – as Steiner does – on the crucial interaction between percepts and concepts.