CONTINUING his discussion of militaristic strengths and weaknesses, Machiavelli argues that auxiliary soldiers are just as ineffectual as the mercenaries themselves:

These soldiers may be useful and good in themselves, but for the person who calls them in they are always disadvantageous, because by losing, a prince is thoroughly defeated, and by winning, a prince becomes under their control.

The reason being, of course, is that auxiliaries are usually borrowed from one’s allies and therefore their true allegiances are inevitably found elsewhere.

Using the example of Pope Julius II, who used Spanish auxiliaries in his attempt to secure Ferrara, Machiavelli explains that the Pontiff was actually saved from a humiliating compromise when the auxiliaries themselves were routed by his Swiss enemies at Ravenna. Ironically, he claims, the military defeat effectively nullified the threat of having to deal with the Spanish later on.

He also cites examples of how things do not go quite to plan for those who decide to employ the services of auxiliaries, including the Florentines having used French soldiers at Pisa and the Emperor of Constantinople deciding to send Turkish fighters against his fellow Greek neighbours:

Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of auxiliaries, because they are much more dangerous than mercenaries. With them the failure is ready made. They are all united, and all yield obedience to others.

Machiavelli tells us that Cesare Borgia initially hired French auxiliaries during his campaign in the Romagna (pictured), but later chose to use mercenaries as he found them more dependable. Notwithstanding the fact that those same mercenaries, drawn from the ranks of the Orsini, later presented him with so many problems and it was only when he had his own soldiers around him that things slowly began to improve. Ideally, as we have seen, Machiavelli insists that mixed armies – comprised of both local troops and mercenaries – offer the best course of defence. To summarise, he believes that

no principality is secure without having its own forces; in fact it is entirely dependent on good fortune, not having the courage which in bad times would defend it. It has always been the opinion and judgement of wise men that nothing can be so uncertain or unstable as reputation or power not founded on its own strength.

Frederick finds Machiavelli’s remarks preposterous, not least as a result of the fact that the survival of a principality often depends on one’s ability to adapt:

I think that a man in danger of being entombed would not lend his ear to the speeches of those which would say to him that it would be unworthy of him of owe his life to others, and that it is better to perish than to embrace the cord or the stick that others throw to him to save him. This reflection shows to us that the first priority of men is that of self-preservation, and the second is that of their well-being; this entirely destroys the paralogism that is the hallmark of the author.

He even goes so far as to accuse Machiavelli of being envious of the ability of certain auxiliary generals, a matter that fuelled his concern about them always representing a fifth column. Frederick believes that any prince worthy of the name should himself adopt a more auxiliary position by taking and providing support both when and where it is needed:

The powers which can do without mixed or auxiliary troops are well to exclude them from their armies; but as few princes of Europe are in this situation, I believe that they do not risk anything with the auxiliaries, as long as the number of the nationals their is higher. Machiavel wrote only for small princes, and I acknowledge that I hardly see in him but small ideas; it does not have anything large nor true, because he is not an honest man. Who fights only by himself is only weak; who jointly does it with others is strong.

There is also criticism of Machiavelli’s invective against the use of Swiss troops, which, even in his own time, had already served the French well in numerous campaigns. Machiavelli is also accused of fearing the same underhand tactics that he himself has already proposed as a course of action throughout his book.

TO BE CONTINUED…