Alternatively, perhaps stereotypes are only inaccurate group beliefs, and so therefore accurate beliefs are not stereotypes.  If this were true, one would first have to empirically establish that the belief is inaccurate—otherwise, it would not be a stereotype. The rarity of such demonstrations would mean that there are few known stereotypes. Increasing recognition of these logical problems has led many modern reviews to abandon “inaccuracy” as a core definitional component of stereotypes (see Jussim et al, 2016 for a review).

Nonetheless, an emphasis on inaccuracy remains, which is broadly inconsistent with empirical research.  My book, Social Perception and Social Reality: Why Accuracy Dominates Bias and Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, (hence SPSR) reviewed 80 years of social psychological scholarship and showed that there was widespread emphasis on inaccuracy.  Some social psychologists have argued that the “kernel of truth” notion means social psychology has long recognized stereotype accuracy, but I do not buy it. It creates the impression that, among an almost entirely rotten cob, there is a single decent kernel, the “kernel of truth.”  And if you doubt that is what this means, consider a turnabout test (Duarte et al, 2015):  How would you feel if someone described social psychology as having a “kernel of truth?”  Would that be high praise?

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