Pictures of Israel

That might all seem needless to say, but the order was in response to a case filed at the world court by South Africa in late December—a high-profile illustration of the swing in global sentiment against Israel since the Hamas attacks of October 7.

Within the country, the assault and its fallout have upended public life: Hundreds of thousands of Israeli reservists have been called up into the military; many Israeli businesses have slowed operations; and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has invited former opposition parties to join a national-emergency government. Meanwhile, Netanyahu—the head of Israel’s government for all but a year and a half of the last decade and a half—has seen his approval ratings drop around 30 points, to 15 percent, since the conflict began. What do all these changes mean for Israel and its position in the world?

Natan Sachs is the director of the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. To Sachs, it may be easy to see that Israel’s response to the October 7 attacks has opened a great divide between how most Israelis and how many abroad see the country’s military campaign in Gaza—but it’s harder to understand the causes and consequences of this divide. A majority of Israelis believe the war is not only justified but a proportionate reaction to an existential threat. And the trauma of October 7 has left many of them demanding greater security, while feeling less receptive to global criticism of what they’re doing to achieve it.

This enormous gap in perspective between Israelis and their country’s critics, Sachs says, is enabling dangerous simplifications of the conflict, on both sides and beyond—as shallow narratives about who’s right and who’s wrong impede potential solutions to the conflict’s hardest problems.

Which is important to understand, because it explains the chasm in perceptions between the way Israelis tend to see the current reality and the way many abroad tend to see it. Israelis are still reliving that day; they’re still processing what happened; they’re still hearing stories about friends and relatives—stories of heroism, stories of atrocity. October 7 is still the major event in their minds.

Many around the world were appalled by the Hamas attacks, but now many of them are appalled by Israel’s actions in the war and by the horrible consequences in Gaza. Among Israelis, the gulf between this emergent view and their own drives two things: a sense that they’re misunderstood victims; and also a deep, existential fear—which in turn drives a lot of Israeli thinking about what the country should do next.

October 7 and the war that’s followed have reconfirmed many Israelis’ and Palestinians’ deepest fears of one another. Many Israelis and Palestinians have always feared that if the other side ever had power over them, it would be calamitous. Israelis fear that if Palestinians could overwhelm them militarily, the Palestinians would massacre them—horrifically. And Palestinians fear that if Israelis undertook another all-out war against them, Israel would expel large numbers of Palestinians from the land, as happened in 1948.

For many Israelis, October 7 confirmed the truth in their deepest fears—and they now feel an existential terror that motivates them to do anything in their power to prevent these fears from being realized in full. If there’s a single sentiment that captures how Israelis are talking today, it’s that they’ll never let this happen again. I hear it again and again—that no matter what people abroad might think about them, they’ll never, ever let this happen again.

One of the main reasons for the formation of the state of Israel, as so many Israelis retain it today, was that Jews from Eastern Europe to Baghdad would have a place where they could be safe and able to protect themselves. But on October 7, they failed to protect their brethren and their children on the border with Gaza.

As a result, their existential fear is coupled with a deep sense of failure. It’s an instant, overwhelming trauma. I think many outside Israel don’t really appreciate what a profound moment of calamity October 7 was. But it’s important to appreciate it, regardless of how much you might sympathize with Israel—because it’s affecting Israeli calculations in a very consequential way.

“When they’re attacked, people tend to move into a defensive posture, and Israelis have done that. … [They’ve] become much more hawkish. But there’s an important distinction here: Hawkishness in Israel can mean hawkishness on security questions—without meaning hawkishness about building more settlements on occupied Palestinian land or expanding Israeli territory.”

“Almost universally, Israelis see the claim that their country is committing genocide as absolutely preposterous—and South Africa’s appeal to the ICJ as a political act more than a legal one. Given many Israelis’ history in the Holocaust, they find the genocide accusation especially galling. Which could strengthen Israeli indignation toward international institutions.”

“Global pressure—above all, from Joe Biden—has had a massive effect on Israel’s conduct in its northern front with Lebanon. … In Gaza, I’d say, outside pressure has had a more limited but still important effect, which is becoming more important with time. At the moment, there’s a chance of a major deal to exchange Israeli hostages for Palestinian prisoners—and the U.S. and other international powers are playing key roles in moving Israel toward it.”

Days of Rage

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