2026: Budanov’s year. Coup? CIA defeats MI6? Biletsky, Syrsky, and others.

I believe the future belongs to General Kirillo Budanov, head of Ukraine’s military intelligence. The country’s most accomplished spook. One of the CIA’s most astounding assets. A man so beloved by Ukraine’s military community that they record rap freestyles to him, addressing him as their beloved ‘Doctor Mengele’.

And just as I was finishing this article off, more confirmation of Budanov’s fortune arrived – Zelensky made the somewhat unexpected decision to name him the new leader of his presidential administration.

A few weeks back, I translated Ukrainian analysts who thought that Zelensky would be scared off by the immense ambitions of the ‘fucking insane’ Budanov. Evidently not.

Zelensky’s justification for choosing Budanov is highly significant — besides security, Budanov will need to worry about negotiations. As I’ll show at the end of today’s article, there are many signs indicating that Budanov favors an end — or at least pause — to the war.

With Zelensky increasingly unpopular, Budanov could be an excellent transition-guarantor. For both the president and the country.

There have already been many rumors in the Ukrainian press that Zelensky hopes Budanov, as leader of his presidential administration, could guarantee his personal security after leaving office.

Zelensky would likely offer Budanov the following tradeoff — you take power, but keep me alive and take on the responsibility of an undoubtedly difficult peace. Budanov’s control over a vast array of ultranationalist military units and paramilitaries would make him even better placed to control the explosive post-war situation.

Or to put things in a more conspiratorial manner: in late November, MI6 man Andriy Yermak was forced to resign as head of the presidential administration. And now, long-time Yermak enemy, CIA-man Budanov has replaced him. London vs Washington once again.

I’ll look at Budanov’s 2025 and 2026 prospects in much more detail at the end of this article, along with his likely sidekick, Azov ‘White Fuhrer’ Andriy Biletsky. Let’s start by looking at some of the political disappointments and disasters of the year.

Zero chance for Zaluzhny

Of course, it is much more common to think that a different Ukrainian general will replace Zelensky.

On the 31st of December, the Washington Post published its predictions for 2026. Let me explain what’s wrong with them.

Zaluzhny’s imminent rise to power has been predicted with ever-increasing transparency since late 2023. But it still hasn’t happened.

The likelihood of Zaluzhny finally taking the reigns this year hinges on WaPo’s war prediction:

In other words, WaPo’s David Ignatius believes that the war will essentially continue as it has already. I would note that Zaluzhny himself wrote an article a few months ago arguing that the war is no longer in a stalemate – Russia has broken out of it.

What is important is that Ignatius rules out the two possible alternatives to the frontline status quo. He excludes Ukraine accepting Russian demands. And he excludes Russia breaking through and winning strategic victories, like taking the southern city of Dnipro (population 1 million). Note, by the way, that Ignatius agrees with my assessment that it is Russian advances in the south, not the Donbass, that would be most decisive in future.

This means that the Washington Post is predicting that Zaluzhny will replace Zelensky while the current battlefield status quo continues. I don’t find that plausible.

Why? Because Zaluzhny has been quite powerless the past few years, and I don’t see why another year of the same should change that.

Ever since early 2024, Zaluzhny has been stewing away in London as Ukraine’s ambassador. Zelensky decided to remove him from his post as commander-in-chief of the army due to his popularity, and more importantly his 2023 Economist article arguing that there is no foreseeable way out of the existing military stalemate.

Zelensky, in contrast, believes then as now that the frontline status quo is in fact quite ideal. That is probably not unrelated to the fact that Zelensky can best stay in power as long as the current wartime authoritarianism continues.

Over the past two years, the situation for Ukraine at the frontlines has worsened. But Zaluzhny isn’t any closer to taking power. He has just sat in London and went to conferences. Sometimes he would claim that World War 3 has already begun, sometimes he would call on Ukrainian troops to embrace death. More recently, he has struck a more pessimistic tone with his claims that Russia is exiting the stalemate.

Sure, polls claim to show that a vast majority of Ukrainian trust Zaluzhny more than Zelensky. But does that really matter? We’ve seen the same polls for more than two years now. Yes, no doubt many Ukrainians would vote for Zaluzhny merely as an alternative to Zelensky. However, the opinions of the masses have little impact on history.

Anyway, March polls following the White House argument with Trump showed Zelensky beating Zaluzhny by 20%. And Zelensky can certainly count on more opportunities to point to ‘pressure by Trump/Putler’ as a reason to support him in the coming year. It’s certainly worked in beating off his corruption scandal the past two months.

Anyway, Zaluzhny really isn’t that hot anyway. Many Ukrainian military bloggers and nationalists despise Zaluzhny for his catastrophic and ill-planned 2023 counter-offensive. Even worse, he abandoned the army in 2024 with reference to ‘disability’, whereas ordinary men with tuberculosis and HIV are routinely mobilized. After all, Zaluzhny had once promised to fight with Ukraine till the end. Not much of a man of his word. A few days ago, photos of Zaluzhny taking a holiday in the Maldives with his wife went viral.

Ukrainian MP Mariana Bezuhla drew attention to some of Zaluzhny’s past statements in this regard:

Of course, there are situations in which Zaluzhny could take power. But this would not be one of the status quo. Were Russia to make dramatic advances at the frontlines — taking or seriously threatening major cities like Dnipro or Zaporizhzhia, for instance — then perhaps it would be possible for Ukraine’s western sponsors or domestic elements to demand or force a change in president. Zaluzhny is a possible choice, I suppose — though certainly not the only one.

But Ignatius predicts Zaluzhny coming to power without any such Russian breakthrough. Not likely.

My reader may ask about Zelensky’s supposed agreement to elections he voiced a few weeks ago. But to begin with, Zelensky said that they could only take place on conditions of the US providing security for them — intervening in the war against Russia in other words. Second, Zelensky and his team have said numerous times that they would like to see elections conducted using the state services app Diiya, which is controlled by Zelensky’s party. Such elections are hardly likely to be competitive.

Coup?

But but, my reader my insist, Zaluzhny could be installed through a western-backed coup! As I said, this could be conceivable given a real collapse on the frontlines. And we saw a few months back how anti-Zelensky, pro-western Ukrainian media has hinted at the idea of a repeat of the 1963 south Vietnam coup. But with more of the same at the battlefield, I see no reason why it could happen.

In fact, I am quite coup-skeptical in general. For several reasons. First of all, who would organize it from abroad? Right now, it isn’t the anti-Zelensky Trumpian USA that control’s Ukraine’s wallet. It is the EU that finances Ukraine now, and the 90 billion euro loan they just gave will cover Ukraine’s needs for at least a year. And why would the EU want to replace Zelensky?

Regime change in a country engaged in an existential war is a terrible idea, as the February 1917 revolution showed. The entente, initially somewhat excited that the venal Tsarist regime was going, soon regretted their support for the revolution as Russia collapsed into civil war and they lost their largest ally against Germany. I believe that the EU is also likely to prefer Zelensky, corruption and all, to the chaos and Russian breakthroughs that might result from a vacuum of power in Kiev.

Domestically, I also don’t know why Zelensky should fall to a coup. The army is under control of the fanatically loyal and politically indifferent Oleksandr Syrsky. Certainly, Zelensky is possibly weaker now that his beloved righthand man Andriy Yermak is gone. But with the toxic Yermak apparently gone, the opposition is more positive about Zelensky. Many powerful officials loyal to Zelensky (and Yermak) remain in government.

Ukrainian society has been hammered by frontline casualties and brutal forced mobilization for years. Yet for all that, there is no sign of a revolutionary situation. Individuals attack press gangs harassing them, sometimes with fatal results. But there is no real organized resistance. I think that the Ukrainian state, given a helping hand by NATO, will manage just fine in repressing any such resistance.

Poorly Poroshenko

Let’s move onto another very disappointing ‘leader of the Ukrainian opposition’.

There were reports in August 2025 that Zaluzhny has been engaged in the construction of an election campaign team in London. He is apparently working alongside figures in the team of ex-president Petro Poroshenko. I’m sure something like that is happening, but I still don’t really see elections happening any time soon.

Poroshenko is an even more pitiful figure than Zaluzhny. All his grandstanding this year about Zelensky’s corruption and incompetence amounted to nothing, as usual. His demands for a coalition government — another aspect of the December 31 WaPo prediction — also came to naught.

Besides all that, Poroshenko looks weird. His post-2022 Ozempic look is more unnerving than ever. How I yearn for the jolly rotund Poroshenko the Chocolate King of old.

The most notable Poroshenko story this year was probably his escape from Zelensky’s clutches. At the start of the year, Poroshenko’s bodyguards were arrested, accused of receiving tens of millions of dollars in suitcases during the 2019 elections. The origin of the suitcases: Moscow.

Many thought that Zelensky was gunning to throw Poroshenko in the slammer as part of the ever-smoldering treason accusations against the ex-president that Zelensky first launched back in 2021.

This anxiety certainly encouraged Poroshenko to support the late July protests against Zelensky for his offensive against the anti-corruption organs. But as Zelensky’s fervor faded on that front and he lost his beloved Yermak, it seems he had to give up on Poroshenko too. Earlier in December, news came out that Poroshenko’s imprisoned bodyguards had been released.

With Poroshenko no longer contemplating prison or exile, I believe his oppositional fervor will abate. His ‘parliamentary opposition’ was always rather imaginary — despite fraying at the edges, Zelensky continues to enjoy a parliamentary majority.

And after all, Poroshenko agrees with all of Zelensky’s nationalist, militarist policies, but merely thinks that it isn’t enough. I certainly don’t think Poroshenko has much appetite for participating in a coup that could cost him his freedom. He’s a businessman, not a revolutionary.

Syrsky stays

Winning the intrigues, losing the war

Syrsky’s loyalty to Zelensky means that the president has no need to fear a rebellion by the army establishment.

Zelensky made the (Russian-born) Oleksandr Syrsky into commander-in-chief of the army at the start of 2024, replacing the worryingly popular Valery Zaluzhny. Syrsky, nicknamed ‘the butcher’ for his enthusiasm in sending troops into the meatgrinder, certainly does not pose any political problems for Zelensky.

There are few people more hated in Ukrainian social media than Syrsky. But unlike Zaluzhny, who declared in late 2023 that the war was unwinnable, Syrsky does not let himself be troubled by reason. That’s because he is committed to fulfilling Zelensky’s desires. These have little to do with the strategic military perspective.

Instead, the main concern is packaging the war for the media. This means exciting, daring operations like the 2024 invasion of Russia’s Kursk oblast. This means morale-boosting ‘counter-offensives’ to retake villages or parts of cities.

It doesn’t matter if the territory is soon retaken by Russia. It doesn’t matter how many scarce Ukrainian troops die. All that matters is that for a few hours, days, or weeks, Ukrainian and western opinion is buoyed. Hope returns, emotions are stimulated.

Syrsky is also associated with the most potentially impactful reform of the year – the Corps reform. Announced at the start of the year, it was meant to solve the organizational chaos afflicting the army.

But has it worked? Given that Ukrainian soldiers keep on complaining about the same problems the Corps reform was meant to overcome — irresponsible generals with no regard for the units they control, lack of coordination between different units, abused units handed about and ‘expended’ at the frontline by more influential units and so on — it’s hard to see the Corps reform as a success.

It may have not even been a good idea to begin with. The Corps reform seems to have provided an excuse for the activity so derided by public Ukrainian militarists – the willy-nilly creation of new units that lack experienced officers or troops. Many new Corps have been created, but many seem to be paper tigers. The pitiful performance of the newly-formed 20th Corps on the southern front has been particularly visible.

Drapaty down

Won some battles, lost the intrigues

Here’s another example of how badly any potential political competition fares.

General Mikhailo Drapaty began the year strong. His promotion to take charge of the Ground Forces (ie, most of the army) was credited by mainstream and nationalist media in Ukraine as slowing down Russian advances. Personally, I think that the wintertime disappearance of vegetation cover played just as much a role.

Unfortunately for Drapaty, he may have been too effective. Or at least, that’s how his supporters paint things. Many began portraying him as a superior alternative to Syrsky. In January, he was given control of the Khortytsia operational-strategic group, the most important section of the frontlines.

But in June, Drapaty dramatically announced his resignation from his position as commander of the Ground Forces. He claimed to be taking responsibility for yet another case of mass soldier death at a training centre. Nationalists praised him for his bravery in taking responsibility for something generally ignored — by Syrsky and his cronies, as they always complained. Drapaty’s public resignation letter was quite forthright, complaining that:

Ukraine’s military is disadvantaged by a command culture that is unwilling to accept personal responsibility for and learn from battlefield failures

In short, Drapaty’s resignation was obviously his attempt to put Syrsky in a tough position. Will you really get rid of me, the inspiring young commander, thereby proving yourself to be a corrupt brute?

Syrsky played the gambit masterfully. Drapaty was allowed to resign. In late October, he was given responsibility for a section of the frontline in the Kharkiv oblast, a small but difficult area. Still, some believe Drapaty has still been able to make good use of it. An argument erupted recently over whether Drapaty was responsible for the November Ukrainian advances in Kupiansk (he probably wasn’t, but his supporters claim otherwise).

Azovite ultranationalists continue to hold up Drapaty as the man needed in charge of the army instead of Syrsky. Perhaps 2026 will be his year. He certainly has a far better reputation than Syrsky, or even Zaluzhny (whose 2024 escape to London and recent photos of his Maldives holiday have hardly increased in popularity). But ultimately, instead of Drapaty’s rise, the past 12 months have illustrated that military competence is trumped by Syrsky’s skill in court intrigues.

Mad Manko

The fasco-bandit tiktoker satisfies his boss, enrages everyone else

Syrsky’s personnel choices have been indicative. Drapaty was dropped, and Valentin Manko promoted.

Manko surely wins the award of most colorful character of 2025. Back 2013, he was a small-scale farmer in rural Dnipropetrovsk oblast. Then the war started, and he became a medium-level bandit in the fascist Right Sector paramilitary. Charged with violently extorting frontline civilians, he went on the run, fleeing from INTERPOL to Israel. He eventually returned and made a deal with the government to avoid prosecution and secure a political future. Nothing was heard from him until this year.

In August, Manko triumphantly emerged as the head of the newly-created assault forces. The likes of BBC Ukraine called it ‘Syrsky’s personal guard’. Many pointed out that the official emblem of the assault forces is a snow leopard, Syrsky’s nom de guerre.

Many of the assault units first ripened in Syrsky’s Kursk adventure (August 2024-March 2025). Their maturing in Kursk taught the commanders of these units never to question commands, no matter how absurd the plan and self-destructive its implementation.

Manko is an expert at entertaining Syrsky’s (and Zelensky’s) whims. These mean preventing any territorial retreats whatsoever, at the cost of immense losses. Or retaking territory for a glorious PR victory.

The assault forces have become a ‘firefighter’ unit, sent to intervene along the frontline wherever things are particularly bad. Sometimes they succeed in retaking some territory. There have been many reports of assault units’ brutality, but not just against the Russians. Last month, there were claims that the 425th assault brigade had shot fleeing Ukrainian troops in the Zaporizhzhia oblast.

The Kharkov anarchist collective ‘assembly’ recently shared testimony that the assault units are filled with ex-cons and drug addicts, and that extreme physical punishment is commonly used against personnel. Ukraine’s military ombudsman Viktoria Reshetilova stated in October that the 425th assault brigade leads the list in terms of complaints by servicemen on extortion, torture, and beatings.

Besides that, Manko shocks and delights Ukrainian society with his constant antics. There are his endless dancing tiktok videos, often to Russian pop music. There are his tiktok videos posing in a military base with classified maps and a French bulldog. There are his online rants against critics, threatening reprisal by the security services for ‘humiliating me’, or posting low-quality AI porn edits of his critics.

What’s there not to love? He certainly gives people something to talk about.

More seriously, it is likely that any challengers of Zelensky and especially Syrsky would use Manko’s incompetence as justification. Prominent Azov nationalists already attack Manko on a daily basis online.

Let’s move onto the chief figures in the military nationalist community that are likely to rise even higher this year — Azov leader Andriy Biletsky, and military intelligence chief Kyryllo Budanov.

Biletsky rises

The White Fuhrer yearns for power

Now we can actually get onto someone who might pose a real danger to Zelensky.