FOLLOWING on from Guénon’s discussion of the calamitous hostility that has been generated between East and West, something which – in an aggressively Zionist climate – has since intensified to an enormous degree, he is committed to examining the main features of this division in more depth. As he states in the third chapter of his work:

From one point of view — the one that is most important — this conflict reveals itself in the form of an opposition between contemplation and action, or, more strictly speaking, in a difference of opinion as to their relative importance. (p.33)

It is a question of establishing whether the antagonism between the two spheres is based on (a) their being natural opposites, (b) an inability to understand their complementarity to one another, or (c) a matter of hierarchy.

Beginning with the theory that both contemplation and action are fundamentally opposed Guénon accepts that this may, for all intents and purposes, seem to be the case but suggests that

if this opposition were absolutely irreconcilable, there would be complete incompatibility between contemplation and action, and they could never be found together. But in fact this is not so; there is not, at least in normal cases, a people, nor possibly an individual, that can be exclusively contemplative or exclusively active. What is true is that there are two tendencies, the one or the other of which must almost inevitably predominate, so that the development of the one seems to take place at the expense of the other for the simple reason that human activity, in the widest sense of the term, cannot exert itself equally in all realms and all directions at the same time. (pp.33-34)

In other words, learning to approach these tendencies from outside in order to appreciate the relationship that exists between them will help us understand how false the ‘opposition’ really is. Whilst Guénon had very little time for philosophy and psychology, those familiar with either G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831) or Carl Jung (1875–1961) will appreciate that oppositional tendencies can be overcome either through synthesis or individuation.

The second theory, that of complementarity, is certainly more accurate than notions of ‘opposition’ but is ultimately unsatisfactory in the sense that

if one held to it exclusively, one would be tempted, in virtue of the correlation so established, to place contemplation and action on the same level, so that the only thing to do would be to strive to hold the balance between them as evenly as possible, without there ever being any question of the superiority of one over the other; but it is clear that this point of view is still inadequate, given that the question of superiority is and always has been raised, no matter in which way men may have tried to answer it. (p.34)

We have therefore moved from ‘opposition’ to ‘equality,’ although the latter implies that neither category may assume predominance over the other. Indeed, due to the differing characteristics that exist between individuals – not to mention factors of culture and ethnicity – this is an impractical solution that restricts both functions and fails to take into consideration the wide and varied peculiarities of human nature:

It is obvious that the aptitude for contemplation is more widespread and more generally developed in the East, and probably nowhere more than in India, which can therefore be taken as representing most typically what we have called the Eastern mentality. On the other hand, it is beyond dispute that the aptitude for action, or rather the tendency resulting from this aptitude, is predominant among the peoples of the West, at least as far as the great majority of individuals is concerned. (p.35)

Guénon’s reference to India reminds us of the historical controversy that has raged between the ‘right to dominance’ of the brahmin (priest) and kshatriya (warrior) castes. This, in microcosm, explains the modern disparity between the active West and the contemplative East. As we know from the prophecies of the Vishnu Purana, human communities were destined to fall into the hands of barbarians and established monarchies would abandon their responsibilities and rule with an iron fist. The prevailing caste will be that of the shudra, or lowly artisans and labourers, whilst those in the vaishya caste will abandon farming and agriculture and find themselves treated like serfs. Elsewhere, the warriors of the kshatriya caste will plunder the land and property of their own people, instead of protecting them, whilst the priestly brahmins will lose their inner piety and self-respect and be treated like ordinary men. Much of the correspondence that took place between Guénon and Evola deals with the rightful ascendency of either the brahmin or kshatriya caste and the former was to explore this issue in his 1929 work, Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power.

Once again, as far as contemplation and action are concerned the author believes that the solution lies in the formation of an intellectual elite that can ‘restore everything to order’. At the same time, Guénon is concerned that the decline of the Western intellectual – and, thus, the spirit of ‘pure contemplation’ – has led to an exaggerated approach towards action and that some

console themselves by inventing theories that set action above everything else, and even, as in the case of pragmatism, go so far as to deny that there exists anything of value beyond action; or is the contrary true, namely, that it is the acceptance of this point of view that has led to the intellectual atrophy we see today? (p.36)

The imagined ‘opposition’ between East and West is therefore centred on a grossly magnified specialisation that has drawn them further and further apart. The key to solving this problem, the author believes, lies in identifying the essential ‘subordination’ that makes one path correct and the other false. Although this sounds like a contradiction in terms, given the false antagonism that exists between the two sides, we must recall what Guénon said about the ineffectuality of ‘equality’ and the importance of hierarchy. One obvious sign of Western inferiority can be found in the relatively short lifespan of modernity in relation to that of the ancient East. The comparative aggrandizement

into which the modern Western mentality falls through following its own inherent tendency, so that, not content with proclaiming on every occasion the superiority of action, men have come to the point of making action their sole preoccupation and of denying all value to contemplation, the true nature of which they ignore or entirely fail to understand. The Eastern doctrines, on the contrary, while asserting as clearly as possible the superiority, and even the transcendence, of contemplation over action, nonetheless allow action its legitimate place and make no difficulty in recognizing its importance in the order of human contingencies. (pp.36-37)

Guénon is under no illusion that contemplation is superior to action and that the latter cannot possibly endure without something that is external to itself. Action alone, therefore, descends into a state of illusion and cannot be sustained. The very basis for the existence of action is provided by contemplation, because the former is a merely temporary phase of being that ultimately leads to knowledge by way of the latter. Guénon likens this relationship to the manner by which change – itself irrational – can only proceed from an unchanging and non-subjective principle. As he suggests, it

was for this reason that, in the ancient world of the West, Aristotle asserted that there must be an ‘unmoved mover’ of all things. It is knowledge that serves as the ‘unmoved mover’ of action; it is clear that action belongs entirely to the world of change and ‘becoming’; knowledge alone gives the possibility of leaving this world and the limitations that are inherent in it, and when it attains to the unchanging — as does principial or metaphysical knowledge, that is to say knowledge in its essence — it becomes itself possessed of immutability, for all true knowledge essentially consists in ident-ification with its object. (pp.37-38)

The Western mentality, by failing to appreciate the essential hierarchy in which action and contemplation operate, has unleashed a never-ending ‘agitation’ that overemphasises the value of change and progress. In the worst cases, this leads to forms of accelerationism that sweep everything away in the dangerous pursuit of new markets and new systems.

To further illustrate Guénon’s point, consider the fact that Marxist ideology’s strong dependence on the theoretical necessity for capitalism to lead ‘underdeveloped’ societies through the socio-economic stages which are apparently indispensable for the attainment of its own utopian ends. Indeed, the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution essentially cleared the way for the rapid modernisation of Russia and with Vladimir Lenin (1870-1924) having been permitted to pass through Kaiser Wilhelm II’s (1859-1941) Germany on his way to Russia in a sealed train, once the communist leader had served his purpose and bitten the Moscow dust, he was succeeded by Joseph Stalin (1878-1953) and so began the intensive industrialisation of the 1930s. Those who wished to open up new exploitative markets were simply not prepared to wait until Tzar Nicholas II (1868-1918) had gained the upper hand on those landowners who were so thoroughly committed to maintaining the country’s ‘outdated’ feudal system and, thus, impeding the rate of economic change.

Accelerationism is not confined to the realms of Marxism, however, and capitalism has set about implementing similar methods through the use of pharmaceutical scaremongering, neocolonialism and so-called ‘regime change’. Whilst these political and socio-economic examples are those of the present author, this radical shift from the metaphysical to the profane was presented by Guénon as

an ever more pronounced materialization, for matter is essentially multiplicity and division, and this — be it said in passing— is why all that proceeds from matter can beget only strife and all manner of conflicts between peoples as between individuals. The deeper one sinks into matter, the more the elements of division and opposition gain force and scope; and, contrariwise, the more one rises toward pure spirituality, the nearer one approaches that unity which can only be fully realized by consciousness of universal principles. (p.38)

The Frenchman believes that the West’s infatuation with change and activity leads to ‘a state of pure disequilibrium’ that is precisely in accord with the final stages of the Kali-Yuga. He even cites the institution of modern science as a particular indication that ‘unfounded theories and hypotheses’ have a very short lifespan and are soon replaced by yet more speculation that has more to do with a penchant for constant change than the satisfaction of basic human needs.

Ironically, despite the opposition of a few determined souls the overwhelming majority of people look upon the trappings of the modern world as a reflection of themselves and this tendency has increased tremendously since Guénon’s day. Nonetheless, there

is an exact correspondence between a world where everything seems to be in a state of mere ‘becoming’, leaving no place for the changeless and the permanent, and the state of mind of men who find all reality in this ‘becoming’, thus implicitly denying true knowledge as well as the object of that knowledge, namely transcendent and universal principles. (p.39)

Guénon traces the roots of this discordance back to the ‘universal flux’ of Heraclitus (535-375 BCE) and the reaction it provoked in his philosophical counterpart, Zeno of Elea (490-430 BCE). Buddhism too, he argues, developed a ‘dissolubility of all things’ that undermined the spiritual authority of the brahmins and ran contrary to the Traditional outlook. Given what I have explained above in relation to modern accelerationism, however, it is clear that the unbridled action of the West can also use disintegration as a means by which to wipe the slate clean or perhaps create its own ‘Year Zero’. This does not change the fact that, as Guénon rightly points out, it is still fulfilling the more general tendencies of the Kali-Yuga.

Lest the reader imagine that Guénon’s insistence on the formation of an intellectual elite be founded on the ability of its members to interpret the problems of modernity and elicit a solution in a purely cerebral context, this too must be centred on higher principles. This means that

intellectual intuition, by which alone metaphysical knowledge is to be obtained, has absolutely nothing in common with this other ‘intuition’ of which certain contemporary philosophers speak: the latter pertains to the sensible realm and in fact is sub-rational, whereas the former, which is pure intelligence, is on the contrary supra-rational. But the moderns, knowing nothing higher than reason in the order of intelligence, do not even conceive of the possibility of intellectual intuition, whereas the doctrines of the ancient world and of the Middle Ages, even when they were no more than philosophical in character, and therefore incapable of effectively calling this intuition into play, nevertheless explicitly recognized its existence and its supremacy over all the other faculties. (p.41)

Rationalism, as it is critiqued here, is a decidedly modern contrivance and yet it is this which has led to the escalating individualism of the last few centuries.