By Francisco Albanese
Modern military thought has often described the evolution of warfare in terms of successive generations. The most influential version of this model emerged in the late 1980s, when Lind et al. (1989) distinguished between three established generations of modern warfare and suggested the emergence of a fourth. First-generation warfare was associated with massed manpower, linear formations, and the disciplined concentration of force. The second shifted the emphasis toward firepower and attrition. The third, shaped by maneuver warfare, sought instead to bypass strength, exploit vulnerabilities, and dislocate the enemy rather than simply destroy him through superior firepower.[1]
Fourth-generation warfare complicated this sequence. Its battlefield extended beyond the confrontation between regular armies and increasingly involved insurgencies, decentralized organizations, non-state actors, political legitimacy, information, and the erosion of clear boundaries between war and peace. In this respect, the transition from the third to the fourth generation involved more than another improvement in military technique. It widened the domain in which strategic effects could be produced.
Yet the language of generations eventually became inadequate to describe what the theory itself was beginning to reveal. Warfare does not progress through clean historical replacements. Attrition survives maneuver warfare; maneuver remains relevant in irregular conflict; conventional armies coexist with proxies, economic coercion, cyber operations, psychological warfare, and information campaigns. Different forms of conflict can operate simultaneously within a single strategic confrontation. The generational model therefore risked imposing chronological order on phenomena that were increasingly overlapping rather than replacing one another.[2]
The later xGW framework recast the problem by replacing generations with gradients.[3] A generation implies succession: one form emerges after another. A gradient describes a strategic logic that may coexist with others, combine with them, or reappear under very different technological and historical conditions. The question is no longer simply when a form of warfare emerged, but what principle organizes the use of force and influence within it. This produces a different map of warfare.
At the lower gradients, strategic action remains comparatively direct. The first gradient organizes individuals into a collective capable of projecting force. The second confronts strength with strength and follows the logic of attrition: superior firepower, endurance, and the capacity to impose greater material losses on an opponent. The third gradient alters this relationship by avoiding strength and attacking vulnerability. Maneuver becomes an instrument of dislocation rather than simple destruction.[3]
With the fourth gradient, the object of conflict becomes less material. Physical destruction remains possible, but strategic effectiveness increasingly depends on legitimacy, cohesion, perception, and the adversary’s capacity to orient itself within the conflict. The target is no longer merely the enemy’s forces but the relationships that allow those forces to function politically and socially.
The fifth gradient carries this logic further. Its defining principle is not simply propaganda, deception, or psychological warfare, all of which long predate the theory. It concerns the manipulation of the observational context itself: shaping the environment through which an adversary perceives events so that otherwise rational observation leads toward a desired interpretation and, ultimately, toward a desired action. Abbott’s formulation (2010) makes this transition especially clear. The decisive problem is no longer only what the opponent sees, but the structure within which seeing acquires meaning.[4]
This is why the shift from generations to gradients matters. The higher gradients do not abolish the lower ones. A military can conduct attritional warfare at one level, maneuver warfare at another, employ proxies and political pressure at a third, and simultaneously attempt to manipulate the interpretive environment of its adversaries. The gradients describe different logics of conflict operating within the same strategic system.
They also imply a progressive change in the relationship between violence and strategic effect. As conflict moves upward through the gradient, kinetic force becomes relatively less central while indirect, informational, psychological, cultural, and contextual effects become increasingly important. Violence need not disappear. Its strategic significance may simply become detached from its immediate physical application.
At the fifth gradient, this detachment can become extreme. A successful operation may be difficult to recognize as an operation at all. Perception itself becomes part of the battlespace, while the distinction between observing the conflict and participating in it begins to collapse. Krishnan (2022) captures this feature by placing fifth-generation warfare at the point where manipulation of perception, identity, and context can prevent the target from fully identifying either the belligerent or the existence of the confrontation itself.[5]
The strategic question therefore changes across the gradients. Earlier forms of warfare ask how enemy forces can be destroyed, exhausted, bypassed, or politically neutralized. Fifth-gradient warfare asks something more elusive:
What must the adversary see, and under what conditions must he see it, for him to act in the desired way?
That question becomes particularly important in an environment of persistent satellite surveillance, open-source intelligence, ubiquitous sensors, and near-continuous observation. Under such conditions, visibility is no longer simply the opposite of secrecy. It can become an instrument in its own right.
The emergence of persistent commercial satellite surveillance changes the conditions under which secrecy operates. Military programs that would once have remained hidden behind geography, restricted airspace, and controlled access are increasingly visible to private companies, journalists, analysts, and open-source intelligence communities. The consequence is not simply that secrecy has become harder. It is that observation itself becomes a strategic variable.
China’s submarine construction program offers a particularly useful example.
Satellite imagery obtained by The War Zone in September 2026 showed a new Chinese nuclear-powered attack submarine under construction at the Bohai Shipyard in Huludao. The imagery revealed several features associated with a new generation of Chinese undersea platforms: a pumpjet propulsor, an X-shaped stern arrangement, an unusually large hull, and structural openings whose purpose remained uncertain. The same year had already produced evidence of other unfamiliar submarine designs at both Bohai and Jiangnan shipyards. Taken together, these observations suggested not merely incremental modernization but simultaneous experimentation with several configurations whose precise relationship remained unclear.[6]
The technological significance is substantial. Pumpjet propulsion is generally associated with reduced acoustic signatures and improved efficiency at higher submerged speeds, while X-shaped stern controls can offer advantages in maneuverability and hydrodynamic performance. The submarine observed at Bohai also contained a large rectangular opening behind the sail, prompting speculation that it might accommodate a vertical launch system. Other interpretations remained possible, including access to the reactor compartment. Even the designation of the submarine remained uncertain: although frequently identified as a Type 095, differences in dimensions and configuration raised the possibility that several developmental variants were being observed rather than a single standardized design.[6]
This uncertainty is more strategically interesting than any individual technical feature.
The conventional intelligence problem would be to determine what China is hiding: the submarine’s acoustic performance, weapons load, reactor design, sensor architecture, or eventual operational role. But persistent observation creates another possibility. When a state knows that major shipyards are repeatedly photographed by commercial satellites, the distinction between what is hidden and what is shown becomes less straightforward. Anything exposed in such an environment exists within an anticipated field of observation.
That does not establish that the Chinese government deliberately exposed these submarines. No publicly available evidence presently demonstrates that the September imagery resulted from a planned deception operation, and the uncertainty surrounding the boats may simply reflect the ordinary consequences of observing a complex development program from orbit. The analytical importance lies elsewhere: a strategic environment in which continuous observation is expected creates the possibility of using controlled visibility as an instrument. In other words, concealment and disclosure cease to be opposites.
A submarine program can remain secret in its decisive characteristics while allowing selected external characteristics to become visible. A prototype can expose one technological direction while concealing another. Multiple hulls or developmental configurations can complicate the observer’s effort to determine which characteristics represent experimental branches, transitional designs, or the eventual production standard. What appears to be increased transparency may therefore produce greater uncertainty rather than less.
This is where fifth-gradient warfare becomes relevant: the principle is not that every ambiguous Chinese weapons program should be interpreted as a deception. Such a claim would be unfalsifiable and therefore analytically useless. The more interesting proposition is that the contemporary intelligence environment itself can be manipulated. Once adversaries depend on satellite imagery, open-source analysis, technical inference, social media, and specialized defense journalism to construct a picture of military development, those systems of observation become part of the strategic environment.
The target is consequently not only the sensor. It is the interpretive chain behind the sensor.
A satellite records a hull. An analyst estimates its length. Another compares the stern geometry with an earlier class. A defense publication evaluates possible vertical-launch cells. Social-media accounts compare imagery from different dates. Intelligence institutions integrate those observations into assessments of Chinese naval development. Military planners convert assessments into requirements, procurement decisions, force structures, deployment patterns, and budgets.
The original image can therefore propagate through an entire strategic system.
From the perspective of fifth-gradient warfare, the critical point is not whether the image itself is true or false. It may be entirely authentic. The relevant question is whether the observational environment can be arranged so that accurate observations generate strategically useful interpretations.
This distinguishes contextual manipulation from crude misinformation. A false photograph can eventually be exposed. A fabricated specification can be disproved. But an authentic object placed inside an ambiguous developmental context may produce several plausible interpretations at once. The observer is not necessarily deceived about what he has seen; he may instead be uncertain about what the observation means.
That distinction closely resembles the movement from third- and fourth-gradient warfare toward the fifth. Maneuver warfare seeks to attack where the enemy is vulnerable. Fourth-gradient approaches complicate the opponent’s ability to orient politically and morally. Fifth-gradient warfare moves one step deeper, toward the conditions under which orientation itself occurs. Abbott’s formulation (2010) places the manipulation of observational context at precisely this level. The objective is not necessarily to provide the adversary with false information but to shape the context through which information acquires significance.[7]
China’s broader military development makes this possibility particularly relevant. Its official military strategy has long emphasized information dominance, system-versus-system operations, integrated command structures, precision strike, reconnaissance, early warning, and the exploitation of information resources. The 2015 defense white paper also identified the maritime domain as increasingly important and described a transition by the People’s Liberation Army Navy from a primary focus on “offshore waters defense” toward a combination of offshore defense and “open seas protection.”[8]
The current submarine expansion fits within that broader transformation. U.S. naval intelligence assessments cited by The War Zone in 2026 described a Chinese shift toward substantially expanded nuclear-submarine construction and anticipated significant improvements in reactor design, sensors, weapons integration, and acoustic quieting in the Type 095 and Type 096 programs.[6] What remains much harder to determine from outside is how the various experimental hulls now appearing at Chinese yards fit together.
That ambiguity may eventually disappear as more imagery becomes available. But during the period in which it persists, it has effects of its own.
The observer must decide whether China is testing several independent submarine classes, rapidly iterating toward a single mature design, building specialized vessels for different operational roles, or deliberately preserving multiple pathways before committing to production. Each interpretation implies different future capabilities and demands different responses.
The strategic importance of persistent surveillance therefore contains a paradox. More observation does not necessarily produce greater certainty. A sufficiently complex target can become more ambiguous as additional fragments of information accumulate. And once observation becomes continuous, a sophisticated state can potentially cease treating surveillance only as an intelligence threat and begin treating the adversary’s need to observe as an opportunity.
Notes
- Lind, W. S., Nightengale, K., Schmitt, J. F., Sutton, J. W., & Wilson, G. I. (1989). “The changing face of war: Into the fourth generation.” Marine Corps Gazette, 73(10), 22–26. The original formulation distinguishes first-generation warfare based on line and column tactics, second-generation warfare centered on firepower, and third-generation warfare centered on maneuver.
- The limitations of treating warfare as a clean sequence of generations form part of the broader criticism of generational warfare discussed in Krishnan’s comparison of 5GW, hybrid warfare, and gray-zone conflict.
- Herring, A. R. (n.d.). The XGW framework: Classification and creation of doctrines for conflict and confrontation. Red Herrings. The framework explicitly describes itself as a descendant, rather than a continuation, of the Generations of Modern Warfare model and organizes warfare according to doctrinal gradients whose elements can carry over into higher levels.
- Abbott, D. H. (Ed.). (2010). The handbook of 5GW: A fifth generation of warfare?Nimble Books. The conceptual shift from generations to gradients and the emphasis on manipulation of observational context are summarized and discussed in Krishnan (2022).
- Krishnan, A. (2022). “Fifth generation warfare, hybrid warfare, and gray zone conflict: A comparison.” Journal of Strategic Security, 15(4), 14–31. Krishnan characterizes 5GW as a form of conflict centered on perception and identity in which the target may have difficulty identifying the belligerent or even recognizing that a conflict is occurring.
- Trevithick, J., & Newdick, T. (2026, September 21). “Chinese next-generation submarine developments spotted in new satellite imagery.” The War Zone. The September imagery showed a pumpjet propulsor, X-shaped stern controls, an unresolved large opening behind the sail, and other features whose purpose and relationship to the presumed Type 095 program remained uncertain. A separate submarine observed at Jiangnan earlier in 2026 added to uncertainty about the number and relationship of Chinese next-generation designs.
- Abbott, D. H. (Ed.). (2010). The handbook of 5GW: A fifth generation of warfare?Nimble Books. The volume develops the shift from generational terminology toward gradients and treats manipulation of observational context as a defining characteristic of the fifth gradient. Krishnan (2022) later situates this concept in relation to hybrid warfare and gray-zone conflict.
- State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. (2015). China’s military strategy. Beijing. The document emphasizes informationized warfare, system-versus-system operations, maritime military struggle, and the transition of the PLAN toward combining “offshore waters defense” with “open seas protection.”
Works cited
Abbott, D. H. (Ed.). (2010). The handbook of 5GW: A fifth generation of warfare? Nimble Books.
Herring, A. R. (n.d.). “The xGW framework: Classification and creation of doctrines for conflict and confrontation.” Red Herrings. https://arherring.wordpress.com/the-xgw-framework/
Krishnan, A. (2022). “Fifth generation warfare, hybrid warfare, and gray zone conflict: A comparison.” Journal of Strategic Security, 15(4), 14–31. https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.4.2013
Lind, W. S., Nightengale, K., Schmitt, J. F., Sutton, J. W., & Wilson, G. I. (1989). “The changing face of war: Into the fourth generation.” Marine Corps Gazette, 73(10), 22–26.
State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. (2015). China’s military strategy. Government of the People’s Republic of China.
Trevithick, J., & Newdick, T. (2026, September 21). “Chinese next-generation submarine developments spotted in new satellite imagery.” The War Zone. https://www.twz.com/sea/chinese-next-generation-submarine-developments-spotted-in-new-satellite-imagery
