MACHIAVELLI’S attention is now drawn towards the defensive factors that a prince may or may not use to his advantage. The first of these concerns the arming of one’s subjects:
There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects. Rather, when he has found them disarmed, he has always armed them. By arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your subjects become your supporters. Although all subjects cannot be armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be handled more freely.
The arming of the former, of course, who are comprised of one’s existing allies, will inevitably lead to the loyalty of the latter. Reward those closest to you and the remainder will be more willing to follow suit. The prince who disarms the population, on the other hand, acts very foolishly and his actions become a sign of paranoia and cowardice.
If a new prince does not seek to heal the factionalism that exists within the borders of his own territory, it may be exploited by his rivals and
it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. The Venetians, influenced, as I believe, by the above reasons, encouraged the Guelph and Ghibelline groups in their acquired cities. Although they never allowed them to start killing each other, yet they nursed these arguments amongst them, so that the citizens, caught up in their differences, would not unite against them.
If, however, a prince has acquired the principality by underhand means, he will find it difficult to satisfy those around him and it may be easier for him to befriend the individuals who consider him an enemy than the very people who encouraged him to seize the territory in the first place.
On the subject of castles, Machiavelli explains that new princes often set about constructing such defences in order to secure their territory, but there are others who felt it necessary to destroy some of the existing castles in the principality:
This issue can be reasoned thus: the prince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build castles, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from the people ought to leave them alone.
Ultimately, he tells us, castles will not save a prince from a population which has come to loathe him and the importance of castle-building itself is dependent upon whether the prince has foolishly chosen to ignore the hostility of the people and come to regard them as a form of refuge.
On the issue of whether a prince should disarm the population, Frederick notes that things had already changed since Machiavelli’s time:
Now, always-disciplined armies, more or less strong, defend the countries; one would scorn a troop of armed peasants. Sometimes the citizens take up the weapons, and the professionals do not suffer because of it; to prevent any temptation to revolt, one threatens them with the bombardment and the cannon, the “whiff of grapeshot.”
He also believes that disarming the middle-classes is a precaution worth taking, and that such a policy will soon lead to a softening of the heart towards the new leader. A prince should not act with suspicion towards his new subjects, either, particularly if they have thrown off the shackles of a former tyrant and now view the incoming prince with a sense of optimism.
Regarding the potential survival of fratricidal conflict within a freshly-won principality, Frederick concedes that there
are princes who believe that the disunion of their ministers is necessary for their interests; they think of being misled by a united band of men whose mutual hatred serves as the prince’s bodyguard: but if these hatreds produce this effect, they produce also a dangerous strength. If these ministers have to contribute to the service of the prince, they will be thwarted continuously, and they will confuse their particular quarrels with the advantage of the prince and the safety of the people.
Frederick’s insistence that Europe had changed dramatically since the sixteenth century also applies to his thoughts on the use of castles. In short, due to the increasing proliferation of trench warfare in his own era the German views them as something of an irrelevance:
In countries where there are many fortified towns, the armies which cover two ground miles will be at war for thirty years, and will gain, if they are lucky, for price of twenty battles, ten miles of ground.
Rather than involve long and protracted sieges, therefore, large-scale warfare was beginning to evolve into forms of conflict that invariably took place in open country. In smaller towns, on the other hand, where a prince might rule in place of a sovereign, fortification was still a useful form of combat:
The east border of France on the side of Germany is like the opened mouth of a lion, which presents two lines of menacing teeth: a mouth that will swallow all invading troops. This should be enough to show the use of fortified towns.
TO BE CONTINUED…
