I suppose I could be considered a “non-liberal anti-imperialist.” The libertarians’ admiration of Singapore and Hong Kong is overstated as is the progressives’ admiration of the Scandinavian countries. The problem with both libertarianism and progressivism is their universalism, which is not reconcilable with anti-imperialism. I tend to think the city-state is an optimal model of government (if we must have government) but a world of city-states would be decidedly non-universalist. It certainly wouldn’t involve the universalization of Lockean property theory or Swedish social democracy.
By Daniel McCarthy Imaginative Conservative
History ended on October 14, 1806. That was the day of the Battle of Jena, the turning point, as far as philosopher G.W.F. Hegel was concerned, in humanity’s struggle for freedom. Once Napoleon triumphed over the reactionary forces of Prussia, the ideals that post-revolutionary France represented—not just liberté, égalité, and fraternité, but the modern state and its legal order—would serve as the model for Europe and world.
When Francis Fukuyama revisited this idea in “The End of History?”—with a question mark—in the pages of The National Interest a quarter century ago, he had to remind readers what Hegel had meant. Events would still happen, including big events like wars. What had ended was a sequence of political and cultural forms whose internal contradictions each gave rise to the next step in freedom’s development: from the ancient world to medieval Christendom to, finally, what one 20th-century interpreter of Hegel called “the universal homogeneous state.” Or as Fukuyama called it, “liberal democracy.”
By 1989 it was obvious that Hegel had been right: the long series of rear-guard actions attempted by Europe’s reactionary powers came to an end after World War I. Fascism and Soviet Communism thereafter proposed themselves as alternative endings to history—competing modernities—but neither could prevail against liberal democracy, whether on the battlefield or in the marketplace.
