AFTER having explored the “awefulness,” “overpowering-ness” and “energy” of the tremendum, Otto was keen to establish the nature of the mysterium. Once again, by setting out to elaborate on the non-rational he was eager to avoid the snares of rationalism. The mysterium, after all, is considerably more difficult to fathom than the tremendum.
Otto is aware that by separating the term mysterium from that of tremendum he risks diminishing its vitality, but the quality of “awe” nonetheless remains active within the mystery as an echo. Furthermore, he explains, the
elements of meaning implied in ‘awefulness’ and ‘mysterious-ness’ are in themselves definitely different. The latter may so far preponderate in the religious consciousness, may stand out so vividly, that in comparison with it the former almost sinks out of sight; a case which again could be clearly exemplified from some forms of mysticism. Occasionally, on the other hand, the reverse happens, and the tremendum may in turn occupy the mind without the mysterium. (p.25)
Despite what seems like the mutual inseparability of the two terms, Otto is committed to their temporary disentangling for the purposes of his ongoing investigation.
The phrase he uses to describe the emotional reaction to a mystical experience is “stupor,” a condition that renders its subject both speechless and powerless. Appearing as something alien, or “wholly other,” the mystery defies rational explanation in the sense that it cannot be comprehended in any logical manner by those who find themselves overcome by its sudden, enigmatic appearance.
As we have seen, Otto credits primitive man with having been able to detect the mystery as a passionate reconstitution of his ordinary feelings and this Otto identifies as a very basic and fundamental stage of the religious experience. Claims on the part of modern anthropologists and sociologists that such matters are nothing but animism, however, miss the point in that the invisible entities that are encountered by their recipients are themselves a rational construct. In other words, that whom Otto describes as primitive man was more concerned with the experience itself and notions of what may or may not have been causing such an experience are purely secondary:
They are attempts in some way or other, it little matters how, to guess the riddle it propounds, and their effect is at the same time always to weaken and deaden the experience itself. They are the source from which springs, not religion, but the rationalization of religion, which often ends by constructing such a massive structure of theory and such a plausible fabric of interpretation, that the ‘mystery’ is frankly excluded. (pp.26-7)
Mythological interpretation, too, is just as rationalistic as the academic tendency to conceptualise everything. Trying to determine the end, therefore, lessens the importance of the means and the wondrous “stupor” of the mysterium itself is sadly overlooked. It is rather like inviting a friend for a ride in one’s new motor car, hoping that the experience will lead to a discussion about the smooth running of the engine or perhaps the journey itself, and then reacting with some dismay as one’s oblivious companion speaks of nothing but the destination.
Whilst the mystery can seem unnerving on account of its supernatural nature, the mystical experience can often involve natural phenomena that is already familiar to us. Plants and animals, for example, although we must remember that the sudden transmogrification of seemingly familiar objects into articles of unearthliness should not lead us to assume that the things themselves are what is most important. Furthermore, the more basic and findamental human consciousness that we perceive to be ‘natural’ should not be confused with its metamorphosis into something more dreadful and daemonic.
In the case of the latter, Otto believes that when consciousness gravitates towards a more profound, secondary stage, it leads to a form of harmonisation during which the mystery ceases to be “mysterious” in the way that we usually understand the term. Although, as he concedes, some will object that the focus of our mystical experience remains inconceivable to the subject, there is a distinction to be made between something merely appearing “mysterious” due to our lack of understanding – something he describes as a simple “problem” – and that which is absolutely indecipherable:
The truly ‘mysterious’ object is beyond our apprehension and comprehension, not only because our knowledge has certain irremovable limits, but because in it we come upon something inherently ‘wholly other’, whose kind and character are incommensurable with our own, and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb. (p.28)
To illustrate this point, Otto explains that a more debased or profane example of this process often manifests as man’s irrational fear of ghosts. Even when presented within the comparately safer confines of a horror story, spectres appear before our everyday consciousness as something “wholly other” and yet the concept of the ghost is already known to us and cannot really be compared to the more overwhelming unintelligibility experienced during the mystical process.
There is surely nothing more non-rational than encountering that which goes “beyond” the perceived boundaries of our day-to-day consciousness. Ironically, despite our natural tendency to contrast the mysterium with the entirety of what we had formerly regarded as “Being” – i.e. The sudden realisation that something exists beyond our evaluation of the world – we come to regard it as “nothing”. Otto elaborates:
By this ‘nothing’ is meant not only that of which nothing can be predicated, but that which is absolutely and intrinsically other than and opposite of everything that is and can be thought. But while exaggerating to the point of paradox this negation and contrast—the only means open to conceptual thought to apprehend the mysterium—mysticism at the same time retains the positive quality of the ‘wholly other’ as a very living factor in its over-brimming religious emotion. (p.29)
This is identical to the Buddhist notion of śūnyatā, or emptiness. This expression relates to the ultimate reality from which all distinctions and dualities arise, something that must be distinguished from the negation of existence. Within Buddhism itself, there is a term known as “śūnyatā-sickness” and this involves diminishing the significance of the reality of things to the extent that the nothingness of śūnyatā is made more “real”.
Lessening the significance of form, perhaps in the way that the Gnostics came to loathe that which is material, essentially heightens śūnyatā to the degree that it becomes a ‘thing’ in its own right. To juxtapose śūnyatā and Being is to create a false opposition between the two and therefore śūnyatā is an absolute negativity that has transcended what we understand as nihility, or nihilism. From Otto’s perspective, the Buddhist notion of śūnyatā can serve as a fitting example of a numinous ideogram of the “wholly other”.
Finally, whilst terms such as “supernatural” and “transcendent” are used to bestow upon the mysterium a distinctly positive quality and present it in an affirmative light, it is essential to avoid conceptualisation and to view the numinous experience as something positive simply on the basis of it “feeling” that way.
