WHILST Rudolf Otto’s terminology is far less dense and opaque than a thinker such as Martin Heidegger, it is nonetheless important to establish the parameters within which his philosophical system operates. The first crucial factor involves being able to differentiate between the “rational” and the “non-rational,” a juxtaposition that forms the very basis of his methodology.
Given that Otto approaches this matter from a decidedly Christian angle – or, to be more precise, that of the Lutherism into which he had been inducted at the time of his birth – those grappling with the arguments presented in The Idea of the Holy must appreciate that he writes from the perspective of theism. This lifelong belief in God, when viewed from a purely human standpoint, taught Otto to accept that what we regard as the most valuable attributes within ourselves attain their ultimate completion in the Almighty. This conclusion results from mankind comparing the nature of God with its own sense of reason and personality, although Otto insists that in the case of God such attributes are vastly superior in that they are “absolute and unqualified”.
The attributes in question are spirit, reason, purpose, good will, supreme power, unity and self-hood. As he explains, these qualities
constitute clear and definite concepts: they can be grasped by the intellect; they can be analysed by thought; they even admit of definition. An object that can thus be thought conceptually may be termed rational. The nature of deity described in the attributes above mentioned is, then, a rational nature; and a religion which recognizes and maintains such a view of God is in so far a ‘rational’ religion. (p.1)
Whilst Otto draws a contrast between the basic human ability to form a rational idea of belief and that which depends merely on feelings, the German roundly dismisses the idea that Christianity is centred purely on emotion and believes that “conceptual thought” in relation to God can be utilised in a number of ways and that one must not restrict oneself to the rational sphere. In other words, although feelings and emotions may not seem “rational” to an outsider they are a sign that our interpretation of God goes beyond the seven factors of logical classification mentioned above.
Otto warns against the frequent tendency to frame religion – and therefore God – solely in light of these rational attributes, something which is often reinforced by the limitations of ecclesiastical language:
We are prompted to it by the traditional language of edification, with its characteristic phraseology and ideas; by the learned treatment of religious themes in sermon and theological instruction; and further even by our Holy Scriptures themselves. In all these cases the ‘rational’ element occupies the foreground, and often nothing else seems to be present at all. But this is after all to be expected. (p.2)
Like many philosophers, Otto is aware of the thorny problem of human linguistics and this is why he is so keen to avoid conveying the wrong impression from the very outset. Ironically, the fact that a purely rational interpretation of God is so utterly limiting implies that there must be what he describes as a “super-rational” or “non-rational” dimension from which it is possible to enhance our more general understanding. Rational attributes, when viewed or utilised to the exclusion of all else, have their limitations:
They are ‘essential’ (and not merely ‘accidental’) attributes of that subject, but they are also, it is important to notice, synthetic essential attributes. That is to say, we have to predicate them of a subject which they qualify, but which in its deeper essence is not, nor indeed can be, comprehended in them; which rather requires comprehension of a quite different kind. Yet, though it eludes the conceptual way of understanding, it must be in some way or other within our grasp, else absolutely nothing could be asserted of it. (p.2)
This otherworldly category is that of mysticism, something which has the unique ability to provide far more detailed information about the divine than the purely rational. However, unlike many religious commentators Otto is never quick to denounce rationalism entirely or to infer that the non-rational is the only valid means of obtaining knowledge about the Creator. This, at least, is a useful way to prevent the more sceptical reader – particularly those of a more atheistic bent – from hurriedly setting his work aside or assuming that all forms of logic are thereby disqualified from the Ottonian system. Notwithstanding, of course, the great irony that some readers will always find the notion that religion can be explained rationally as something of a contradiction.
Rationalism is not to be rigidly contrasted with the non-rational, he argues, as black to white or fire to water, but retained on account of its complementarity. Nonetheless, to suggest that miraculous events are little more than an occasional glitch in the matrix is itself rational in the sense that it ignores the fact that mysticism enhances the overall religious experience. By clouding the non-rational aspects of the Christian faith, the hyper-rationalism of spiritual dogma often results in the predominance of an excessive intellectuality:
This bias to rationalization still prevails, not only in theology but in the science of comparative religion in general, and from top to bottom of it. The modern students of mythology, and those who pursue research into the religion of ‘primitive man’ and attempt to reconstruct the ‘bases’ or ‘sources’ of religion, are all victims to it. (p.3)
This fundamental lack of balance arises from the general academic practice of presenting everything in conceptual terms, particularly when the rule of thumb is to pursue the linear route of social evolution or human progress, thus dismissing mystical experience as something rather primitive which has been entirely surpassed by rational thought. For Otto, this modern propensity is a gross oversimplification and even fails to appreciate the delicate subtleties of those societies which based their entire worldview on the most profoundly religious values. Furthermore, the mysticism that was so prevalent in the past is ignored simply because it cannot be framed in rational terms.
Needless to say, Otto agreed with mankind’s inability to address such matters and this is why he was so focussed on the woefully neglected province of the non-rational.
