

Chapter One¹

The Place of Ethics in Anarchist Theory and Practice

A stranger entered a bar just as four anarchists were discussing their ideas. The conversation turned to what constituted true anarchism. The discussion quickly escalated into heated exchanges and blows. The stranger, intrigued by what they had seen, asked one of them: 'So which version of anarchism was right?' The revolutionary, gestured to the continuing disruptive passionate debate and replied: 'This one'.

There is no single way of examining anarchism. Prior to the significant reignition of interest in anarchism from within academic circles from the mid-1990s onwards, that is to say the post-Cold War period,¹ Leninism was viewed as the dominant sometimes even the sole form

¹ *There are inevitably questions of priority and selection, especially in the construction of a book. Whatever goes in the first chapter and especially the first page of the first chapter inevitably will be read more often and seem more significant than perhaps the detailed and sophisticated argument that appears two-thirds of the way through the text. The opening phrases often shape how a text is interpreted. There are many anarcho-capitalists who approvingly cite Peter Kropotkin's Encyclopaedia Britannica entry on anarchism, because he initially defines it as:*

the name given to a principle or theory of life and conduct under which society is conceived without government - harmony in such a society being obtained, not by submission to law, or by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements concluded between the various groups, territorial and professional, freely constituted for the sake of production and consumption, as also for the satisfaction of the infinite variety of needs and aspirations of a civilized being.'

Yet they ignore or fail to have read the sections of the entry that criticise capitalism and the institutions of private property that corrupt individualization and freedom. Thus Roger Scruton (2012, 80) praises Colin Ward and his inspiration Kropotkin for their environmentally-friendly, socially-just and anti-state 'civil' projects, which he believes are open to 'alliance [with] conservatives and free-marketeers'.

of revolutionary opposition, especially from liberals (see for instance Popper 1960; Popper 1966). As a result, much of the research on anarchism during this Leninist period was orientated on historical analysis of failed movements and a sympathetic, albeit occasionally over-romantic, elucidation of anarchism as part of a history of ideas.² During the latter part of the Leninist period, the few evaluations of anarchism concentrated on it as a subset of liberalism, and often classical liberalism, with R. P. Wolff's neo-Kantian *A Defense of Anarchism* and Robert Nozick's *Anarchy, State and Utopia* constituting its core theoretical position.

In the last few years, there has been much greater interest from a range of disciplines such as geography, utopian studies, theology and continental political thought. The motivation for academic re-evaluation has come both from the decline of Leninism as *the* pole of oppositional theory and the growth of diverse forms of (anti-)political contestation, in which anarchist activism has been significant. These include the rise of the direct action environmentalism, anti-Poll Tax and anti-roads movements, then the upsurge of the alter-globalisation movement and later Occupy and militant responses to right-populist and neo-fascist movements. As a result, anarchism has gained a small but significant place in contemporary social studies and its theoretical perspectives are increasingly being engaged with in political theory and social philosophy.

The multiplicity of manifestations of anarchism is not unique to the post-Leninist period. In earlier eras forms of anarchism arose that responded to different conditions and social problems: anarcho-syndicalisms in periods of intense labour disputes prior to the Bolshevik revolution, anarcho-pacifisms arising in periods of intense militarisation; anarcha-feminisms, as women's movements rose up to challenge different forms of patriarchal structure. Similarly, the emphasis provided by green anarchisms, individualist anarchisms, lifestyle anarchisms, anti-civilisation anarchisms, post-left and postanarchisms are responding to particular material problems as well as assumed deficiencies within other anarchist morphologies. In some cases, the response re-configures concepts to make a new ideological structure that is antipathetic to the other more pervasive and stable forms of anarchism.

² *This tendency towards mawkish nostalgia was recognised in a previous era of anarchist writers and activists, who kept harking back to the good old days of the Spanish civil war rather than examining the new challenges of the period. It led Class War to react with a picture of a fascist march and the slogan "The National Front love Britain... almost as much as the anarchists love Spain" (see Home 1988).*

Disciplinary and methodological differences affect the results and the focus of attention. For instance, there is no single way to study *drosophila* (fruit flies). One could catch a fruit fly, cover it in wax, slice it very thinly and study the cross sections of the fly under a microscope. This would elicit data about the internal biological structure of *drosophila*. Another way would be to place a few fruit flies in separate observation tanks and give them different laboratory cages to see which fruits attract most fruit fly species. A third method would be to study fruit fly in the wild and observe their behaviour in their habitats, learning how they interact within their colonies and with other species. A further method would be to study the social meanings of the fruit fly, how it informs local discourses and shapes the traditions of human communities.

Each method yields different types of data, none is universally preferable (though the fruit fly might have a particular disinclination towards the first), but each approach depends on the types of findings that the scientist is seeking. So too, there is no single method for studying and assessing political (or anti-political) behaviours: methods are dependent on the types of answers the researcher is looking for. Methodology is, thus, not value-neutral but formed by the questions the researcher has already identified as being the most pivotal.

Any investigatory method brings with it assumptions about the types of findings the investigator is prioritising, an assumed epistemology about what constitutes legitimate findings and modes of expressing the methods and results, which in turn assume particular types of audience.³ The method this book uses and defends – one based on Michael Freeden's

³ Here I am all too conscious of the sorts of conflicting pressures in constructing the text. Alongside it is uses (either external ones like applicable knowledge for a range of activities or internal ones such as enjoyment), there are academic goals for the text. These range from writing for the audience identified in the original outline agreed by the publisher, trying to maintain an academic standing with colleagues within the field and in the wider discipline, meeting – or deliberately ignoring – the expectations of a REF panel (and the 'gaming the system' methods adopted by the University's subject-related internal REF panels), seeking to link to key concerns in adjacent disciplines and fields or meeting impact evaluations. Then there are the connections to non-academic theorists and activists beyond academia. Anarchist critics of academics have rightly pointed to the often obscurantist writings of canonical figures. Despite being positioned as an expert I have to admit (and there is a feeling of failure and shame in admitting this) that I find many key writers like Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Lacan, Martin Heidegger and Jacques Rancière difficult to follow. The

conceptual analysis (also known as the morphological approach) is no different: it too has its inherent biases. However, in arguing for its usefulness and pertinence in examining anarchism and postanarchism, I am not claiming it is the *only* method or always and everywhere the most appropriate analytic system for identifying and assessing (anti-)political action.

This method's pertinence will be demonstrated by using it to identify anarchism from rival accounts, explaining why so-called anarcho-capitalisms, national anarchisms and conservative (or tory) anarchisms are distinct from the wider anarchist tradition. It can also explain why some versions of individualist anarchism are consistent with the wider anarchist tradition and others, although using similar terms, are outside it. The method also helps to locate postanarchism⁴ in relation to these traditions. It shows that, in the main, postanarchism is an identifiable sub-ideology or hybrid of anarchism, alongside other categories such as libertarian Marxism, green anarchism and anarcho-feminism, and is increasingly finding greater affinities with the main social anarchist traditions as the conventions of postanarchisms develop. In some locations, sub-hybrids become so prominent that they become the dominant ideological form. For instance, Leninism was once a minor form of

conservative response to such feelings of inadequacy is to dismiss the cause of the difficulty rather than to rise to the challenge.

Theory texts, because they deal with abstractions, tend to be more off-putting to general audiences than, for instance, histories. But similarly difficult problems sometimes require sophisticated and complex analyses. No one expects medical research on the aetiology of bowel cancer to be comprehensible to all, so why should specialist theory texts only be written in some fictional demotic language? Why is an activist website replete with its own iconography and specific terminology viewed as any less insular or accessible than an academic's text? The answers are based on values, which is the subject of the text. What virtues or vices are exhibited in complex academic practices? How are the forms of exclusion and marginalisation mitigated? How do the apparent hierarchies of knowledge intersect with other activities to generate or undermine other forms of domination?

⁴ *I have followed Newman in using the term 'postanarchism' as this has become slightly more popular than other variants such as 'post-anarchism', 'poststructural anarchism' or 'postmodern anarchism'.*

Marxism, becoming only the *bolshinstvo* (majority) in one of many Marxist parties by selective exclusion of opposing currents.

This section starts by providing an account of the analytic approach before drawing out Freeden's own version and the adaptations made to it here. It then goes on to discuss intentional, hermeneutic and cultural approaches drawing out those elements relevant to the approach taken here. In many instances, these are already included in Freeden's methods.

Analytic Political Philosophy⁵

The methodological approach used and defended here - a variant of Freeden's conceptual method - develops out of, but is distinct from, standard analytical political philosophy.⁶ There is no single account of analytic philosophy. One of its advocates, Paul McLaughlin (2017), a philosopher with a long-time interest in anarchism, has recently proposed a distinction between Analytic Philosophy (AP), the intellectual tradition (made up separately of a disparate *movement* of key individuals and *schools*, the institutions that utilise the theory and set particular parameters), and analytic philosophy (ap), a theoretical procedure. Even limiting the account to a theoretical procedure, he recognises that descriptions are complex and multiple, identifying multiple divisions and subdivisions (346-53). Nonetheless amongst the plethora of differences and questionable distinctions there are common features: '[1]The

⁵ *One of the main problems I faced in constructing the text was its structure. I had a pretty clear idea of the central argument for the chapter – describing and developing a method based on Michael Freeden's conceptual approach; but was wavering on how to do it. Should I begin with Freeden's method then show how it differs from alternative approaches from analytic philosophy or hermeneutics. Or should I start with these more familiar alternative approaches which build into Freeden's method? I decided to start with analytic approaches as it made it easier to explain the more standard method first and Freeden's approach as a response to it.*

⁶ *I have written elsewhere of how inaccurately standard analytic approaches have been in presenting and assessing anarchism, instead constructing a strawman (see Franks 2011). Nathan Jun (2016) also presents a critique of the way academic analytical philosophy has discussed anarchism and its reduction to the inert and inaccurate philosophical anarchism. Paul McLaughlin (2017) offers a more critical and supportive contrary account which is responded to below.*

semantic demand for linguistic or conceptual clarity; [2] the logical demand for argumentative rigour; [3] the dialogical demand for argumentative interaction; and [4] the gradualistic demand for cautious, step-by-step argumentation.’ To these McLaughlin also adds ‘[5] the epistemic demand for some contribution to knowledge’ (349).

McLaughlin, in addition, wants to defend the value-status of the method of analytical philosophy, from critics who argue it has a liberal or conservative bias, and that it can serve, even if it does not at present, anarchist theory (353-61). Through de-linking institutions and process and historical movement from philosophy, McLaughlin largely positions analytic method as an ideologically neutral method. In doing so he adopts the position of D. D. Raphael (1979, 20) and David Miller (2003, 17-8) that the purpose of political philosophy is to avoid ‘ideology’, by eschewing the promotion of non-rationally justified norms through coherent analysis of terms and checking for internal consistency and logical connectivity.

In common with his earlier account (McLaughlin 2010, 22), McLaughlin (2017) prioritises conceptual clarification and argument analysis, but additionally highlights, that openness to debate and the gradualistic development of wisdom are also features of analytic philosophy. The core of McLaughlin’s account, despite some reservations, is shared by other prominent analytic political philosophers such as Raphael (1979, 12) and Jonathan Wolff (2006, 3). The latter states that: ‘In short, they [political philosophers] present arguments.’ Similarly, Robert E. Goodin (2017, 18) considers clarity and argumentative structure as amongst the primary features of good analytical political theory.⁷

The core of the analytic tradition is *argumentation* – assessing the validity of arguments. *Conceptual clarity* is central to this task as formal validity requires that there is no slippage in the use of terms between premise(s) and conclusion(s). Breaking down terms, as

⁷ *One of the problems that continually ties me up is that of structure: namely where to explain key concepts and theoretical differences. It is often easy to constantly defer engaging with the central theoretical problem as the terms in which the problem is expressed are explained and that clarification is justified. So too here, the focus of the chapter is a method (based on the conceptual approach) for identifying political ideologies in general, and anarchism in particular, which differs from standard analytical accounts. However this explanation involves using terms like ‘theory’ and ‘philosophy’ which are here used synonymously but elsewhere are distinct. Disambiguating these terms requires reference to the difference between conceptual methods and analytic approaches, which is the key theme of the chapter.*

McLaughlin himself does to distinguish between, for instance, institutional accounts of analytic philosophy and procedural accounts (and then between sub-sections and sub-sub-sections of these), ensures stable and consistent interpretations. McLaughlin is typically critical of those, like myself, he believes conflate different versions (363). There are multiple forms of conceptual clarification and some, like Wittgensteinian family resemblances (Wittgenstein 1978, para 66-71) reject that there is a fixed universal definition, others hold that concepts refer to a real, independent universal (see Pettit 2000, 7). Universalist perspectives tend towards accounts of phenomenon based on *necessary* and *sufficient* conditions.

A necessary condition is something that is required for an entity to count as member of a group or to have that label applied to it; without it, it cannot be so classified. A sufficient condition is one that by itself would be enough to identify an entity; though it is possible to still be classified as that thing without meeting that condition. For instance the classical liberalism associated with Nozick must have a particular view of the self: one based on a negative view of freedom centred on the rational subject having absolute property rights in the body. If it does not have this account of the individual as sovereign, then it is not Nozickian liberalism. However, this condition alone is not enough to identify the theory as classical liberalism; other theories, too, might hold a negative rights conception of the sovereign agent, such as Peter Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner's left libertarianism (Vallentyne 2000, Vallentyne et. al 2005). If the description of the sovereign self also included extending property rights beyond one's body and labour to other natural resources and products, with such rights secured by a minimal state whose functions are only to secure such rights, then we would have a necessary and sufficient account of Nozickian liberalism.

Family resemblances do not require a fixed single characteristic or essence for membership of a group. Wittgenstein's own example is of the word 'game'. There may be no single common feature between every example of a game (chess, noughts and crosses, ring-a-ring-a-roses and catch), but there are a variety of traits with a sufficient number shared by all members of the family. As new types of game emerge (say computer games), new traits emerge. There are, however, problems with the Wittgensteinian approach, as it fails to distinguish between elements that core and major and those which are peripheral. Given that ultimately for Wittgenstein (1978, para 43) the circumstances by which an alteration to a definition comes about 'is its use', that is to say social convention, it requires an account of how conventions develop and are policed.

Further, whilst McLaughlin highlights methodological diversity, he, like many other analytic theorists, tends to use necessary and sufficient conditions to describe anarchism through one essential criterion (342; see also R. Wolff 1976 and J. Wolff 2002). For McLaughlin (2018, 342), the description of anarchism is, initially, particularly thin: ‘I define anarchism as *scepticism about authority*’. This is only thickened out a little by the addition of some focus to this scepticism: ‘the belief that authoritative norms, practices, relations and institutions can be and ought to be called into question with respect to their desirability’. McLaughlin makes it clear that this analytical account of anarchism does not posit any positive goals or other ethical principles (such as equality or autonomy). As such, McLaughlin’s emaciated ‘anarchism’ is one found across a range of substantive political traditions. He cites in support of the supposed radicalism of analytical political philosophy in general and his version of anarchism in particular, rights libertarians and anarcho-capitalists (propertarians)⁸ like Robert Nozick and A. John Simmons (356). For McLaughlin, then, the political anarchism of activists is separate to the philosophical version with only provisional or incidental similarities.

McLaughlin tends to use looser conceptual approaches when describing his own preferred position (as one that ‘aspires’ to conceptual clarity, even when he admits many counter-examples), yet he fixes opponents with more rigid defined, necessary conditions, which are then easy to refute with a couple of counter-examples. Similarly, when it comes to logical analysis, McLaughlin rightly acknowledges the plurality of logics available for analysis and points to the importance of informal logics in argument analysis (363-4). However, this does not disguise the fact that many influential descriptions of analytic procedure assume a singular, universal reason and a singular *rational subject* (see for instance Knowles 2001, 6; Raphael 1979, 4, 6, 17-20). Neither does McLaughlin explain the basis for the selection of logic or logics in each evaluation, nor how institutional or professional contexts change the operation of informal logic, (for the contextualisation of reasoning see MacIntyre 2001 and Atkinson 1997, though the latter problematically drifts towards a cultural relativist critique of the universality of critical thinking).

In addition, McLaughlin’s (2019) more recent and sophisticated account of analytical philosophies rejects the dominant institutional practice of the past. This rejected approach

⁸ *To disambiguate the notion of anarchism – and to contest Murray Rothbard’s deliberate co-option of ‘libertarian’ from its anti-state socialist origins in order to win over sections of the New Left – I follow McKay (2008) and refer to anarcho-capitalists as propertarians.*

ascribed a single rational logos to philosophical analysis and academic discourse and rejected or marginalised others which do not subscribe to it. McLaughlin argues that there are a plurality of analytic procedures, but these were restricted by analytic institutional demands. His defence rests on a distinction between the supposedly plurality of analytic philosophical procedure and the more restrictive and less-defensible analytical institutional demands (363, 366). However, McLaughlin's argument illustrates that institutions shape theory, rather than being separate from it. The more diverse approaches, positioned as dissident within the tradition, have their location because of institutional power. They appear and operate within particular organisations and departments. The method adopted here, thus, rejects the division between theory and the institutions in which principles are derived, structured and elucidated.

It is nonetheless worth expanding on what makes the analytic method so attractive, as well as drawing out the significant problems associated with it. First, it provides a clear and consistent method for identifying and assessing different political philosophies. Through identifying necessary and sufficient conditions (or the constellation of core family resemblances) and identifying subtle distinctions, different positions and nuances are recognised and labelled. McLaughlin (2007, 25-36; 2017) does not just distinguish his philosophical anarchism from other political philosophies, but from rival interpretations. Clarifying principles and testing their internal consistency and their applicability provides a well-defined method for assessing the relative merits of competing positions. However, it also misses out much that is important, such as the importance of vagueness and ambiguity in the operation of concepts.

A second, significant advantage is that it provides philosophy with a clear identity. Other disciplines, as McLaughlin (2010) points out, also use argumentation; however, it is the priority given to argument clarification that demarcates it as a discipline. The analytic method promotes rigorous thinking and fidelity to the text through careful reading and thus starts to extend into other disciplines such as history to clarify meaning or highlight ambiguities by placing arguments in their historical setting (see the Quentin Skinner and the 'Cambridge School') (Weinstein 2012, 143; Blau 2017).

Analytic approaches are becoming more explicitly interdisciplinary. They increasingly acknowledge that conceptual interpretation can benefit from using insights from other subjects. For instance, literature or cultural studies can bring new light to bear on a text's meanings and its potential consistency or inconsistency, or can re-imagine a text in a new light quite distinct from any possible authorial intention. They can also provide thought experiments to test out hypotheses and elucidate conceptual differences (Caroll 2002). These

imaginative, literary features of analytic approaches can encourage these potentially fruitful engagements with other disciplines, although the more philosophy does so, the less it maintains a specific identity as a discipline.

Conceptual Methods

Freeden's conceptual approach (sometimes referred to as the morphological approach)⁹ has gained increasing critical attention within academic political theory. Iain McKenzie (2003, 3) in his co-edited collection, *Political Ideologies: An introduction*, called it 'arguably the most significant development in ideology theory in recent years'. Freeden's method has spawned its own academic journal, *The Journal of Political Ideologies*, edited by Freeden, as well as a comprehensive textbook that investigates the major manifestations of ideologies (*Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*) and many volumes that utilise his conceptual approach (see for instance Stears 2002, Turner 2008; Jackson and Stears 2012 and Franks, Jun and Williams 2018).¹⁰

⁹ *I have written about - and used - Freeden's method before. There is a risk of self-plagiarism, but given that few people will have read these works and the descriptions are sufficiently nuanced to meet this book's particular purpose, hopefully any repetition will be forgiven.*

¹⁰ *This is one of the works mentioned above in which my collaborators and I discuss Freeden's. In the past I used to revile authors who self-indulgently cited their own work or worse still, apparently rewrote the same article in slightly different guises. With stunning naiveté I wondered why, with academic freedom and an infinite number of provocative questions and interesting phenomena to explore, would anyone want to keep rehashing the same material? One of my first published pieces was a book review that castigated a writer for reproducing a paragraph and a few basic ideas from one of their works into a different one, without acknowledgement. In defence of the author I traduced as a lippy postgraduate, the focus of their articles, whilst thematically aligned, were different. This mellowing was not influenced by the fact the disparaged author later became a senior colleague. It is the realisation that time pressures and word limits that make building on past work increasingly common. This is not to defend gratuitous self-citation (something that journals in particular, have started to police). Instead, self-citation is legitimate if it is made clear where ideas or analysis have been developed before. It also provides a route for readers to find more in-*

After describing the scope of his study, the location of the functions of ideologies within political theory and identifying the other traditions of ideological analysis, Freedden's (1996, 48) conceptual approach starts with the notion of the political concept: 'a central unit of investigation'. Freedden's (48-52) account concentrates on how concepts are expressed through words and structured together in language to make meaningful expressions which influence thought-behaviour by identifying some issues as problems, targeting some actions as solutions, whilst ignoring or marginalising others and developing group and individual identities.¹¹

Freedden's (55-60) work explicitly builds on W. B. Gallie's (1955-56) inquiry into 'essentially contested concepts'. Gallie (1955-56, 170-01) explains that the key terminology of political discussion is a matter of disagreement between competing movements. Terms like 'democracy', 'rights' and 'equality' are i) both descriptive and normative. ii) These contested terms are internally complex, made up of diverse sub- elements, such as democracy, elections, representation and legitimacy. iii) The different descriptions and use of these contested terms are made of different combinations of these sub-elements and there is nothing universal that prioritises one version over a non-contradictory alternative. iv) These contested terms can change their meanings. Groups can and do modify their interpretations . v) That each interpretation recognises that there are other interpretations and they compete to get their versions accepted. Concepts develop their meaning from the traditions in which they are deployed (176).

Freedden's model also regards political concepts as essentially contested, but argues that there are ways in which they become decontested. Freedden (1996, 2006) argues that

depth defences of key parts of the argument (for more on my partial defence of self-reference see Franks 20....).

¹¹ I first became aware of Freedden's work when I submitted an article to his journal, largely because it had already published a special issue on anarchism, and it was relatively rare to find more generalist political journals willing to consider anarchism as pertinent. The readers' reports were supportive and helpful, with one suggesting I more thoroughly ground my account of ideology and suggested Freedden's (1996) book. It provided at the time, a precise fit with my argument, and I later found it a helpful way of thinking through other conceptual problems. Though I still find it immensely helpful and pertinent, as the chapter makes clear, it does not and cannot provide a totalising methodology suitable for all political investigations, nor should it attempt to do so.

political concepts gain their meaning by their relationship to other political notions or terms. It is the structure of concepts that stabilises the meaning of these malleable terms. For Freeden (1996, 77), ideologies are stable constellations of core, adjacent and peripheral concepts, which mutually define each other. Thus in conservatism the concepts of tradition, stability, established hierarchical authority, organic society and a malign individual essentialism (Freeden 1996, 332-38) mutually define each other. 'Tradition' in conservatism does not mean the established folk customs that challenge land ownership, such as embedded practices of poaching from major landowners in rural areas or hatred of the police, but those which maintain existing economic and social power and thus provide structures of stability against the threat of individuals left to pursue their own interests. As Freeden (2003, 51) puts it simply: 'Ideologies are complex combinations of political concepts in sustainable patterns.'

Ideologies are constructed out of core concepts. These are the ones that are historically enduring and geographically prevalent. These core concepts largely identify the ideology and distinguish it from rivals. Conceptual analysis differs from the necessary and sufficient conditions of analytical approaches, by recognising that elements that were once core move to more peripheral positions over time. For instance, monarchical authoritarianism against democracy was an early central feature of conservatism (such as in Thomas Hobbes or Robert Filmer) but over subsequent centuries, in which democratic structures have proven to provide stability and developed into a tradition, commitment to maintaining representative democracy is much more central to Western conservatism.

Freeden does, however, maintain the notion of a contingent universal. He argues that just as there are different core features of making a room a kitchen (that a cooker and a sink are by convention a core unit 'without which a kitchen would cease to be a kitchen') so too liberalism contains 'a necessary if not sufficient minimum' namely 'liberty and progress' (Freeden 2003, 62). However, this appeal to a universal, albeit one that is contingent, is questionable.

Freeden is right that liberty and progress are pervasive features of liberalism, but as soon as something is announced as a universal, counter-examples start to appear that question this necessity. A bachelor apartment might have a food preparation area, which is simply the plating of food from take-aways or arranging refrigerated convenience foods, with dirty dishes taken away by domestic staff to a separate scullery. It might still be considered a kitchen without the customary 'universals'. Similarly as Freeden and Marc Stears (2013,

340)¹² identify, not all who experience liberalism find it that it respects and enhances their personal freedom, but instead undergo continual exclusion and privation. Nor is it hard to imagine a backwards-looking, deeply nationalistic and chauvinistic political movement, which nonetheless retains other key features of liberalism such as representative democratic structures, an economy based on property relations and (domestically at least) free market norms and values.

In short, and consistent with anarchist, and especially postanarchist, criticisms of universalism, this method accepts Freeden's conceptual method, but re-emphasises, as Freeden (1994, 144-6) himself acknowledges, that it is not a predetermined, fixed denotation that provides the final interpretation of an ideology or a concept's meaning. Thus, no part of the core is necessary; rather, it is just being prevalent and stable. The approach here differs from Freeden over whether there is any contingently eliminable features, as evidence suggests that, whatever feature of the ideological core is deemed contingently ineliminable, there will be some from within that ideology who contest this supposedly irremovable concept.

¹² *I met Marc Stears and Michael Freeden for the first time, not long after I submitted work to Freeden's journal, when Marc and I were the examining panel for a PhD student of Michael's. I had met the PhD candidate at a conference where our shared interests became apparent. The successful candidate's work is also mentioned within the text as they are one of the most cited contemporary academic authors on anarchism. These personal connections make certain texts seem more significant. It does not necessarily make the evaluation of the work more favourable. Respecting someone's work does not mean being uncritical, but considering it worthy of attention. Personal contacts, however, might subconsciously affect the selection of texts and their priority. With so little time and such a glut of academic writings, one is, all things being equal, more tempted to read an article by a name with an already existing emotional connection. Academic management are aware of this and encourage 'networking'. This is more difficult for those located in geographically remote areas, who lack access to funds or who have personal and professional obligations that limit attendance at events to promote formal and informal collegial interactions or who just lack the confidence or social skills to participate in social and academic networks.*

The core principles of anarchism are a matter of some dispute.¹³ The account here differs from Freeden's own approach to anarchism, which is only a marginal concern and regards it as a hybrid of socialism and liberalism with a few conservative principles and thus raises doubts about it having a 'distinct, conceptual arrangement' (1998, 422). Freeden is not alone in doubting whether there is a consistently clear set of principles to define anarchism (see for instance Miller, 1984, 3). Many past texts defend various interpretations based on presumed necessary and sufficient conditions (Wolff 1976; McLaughlin 2018), a central canon (see Kinna 2005 on Paul Eltzbacher) or key historical movements (Quail 1972; Schmidtⁱⁱ and van der Walt 2009). Often the motivation for these clarifying texts is frustration at the framing of anarchist ideas, movements and practices because of inadequacies in the identification of anti-state socialisms (Anarchist Federation nd; MacKay 2011). Some, like this volume, use conceptual approaches and come to very similar, if not identical, formulations (see for instance Pinta 2012), which can explain why there are varieties of anarchism, their commonalities and differences and why some rhetorically similar movements, like anarcho-capitalism (propertarianism) or Tory anarchism have a distinct conceptual framework making them incompatible with the main anarchist morphology.

The account of anarchism here is sometimes referred to social anarchism (e.g. Bookchin 1995) or class struggle anarchism (see for instance Franks 2006, Garland 2010, Schmidt and van der Walt 2009, 19) to distinguish it from propertarian or hierarchical egoist accounts. Core concepts are identifiable by their pervasiveness and stability within anarchist movements themselves across diverse geographies and historical contexts. Sometimes these shared concepts are expressed in slightly different words but nonetheless they are clearly identifiable in these movement's self-definitions: *anti-hierarchy*, *prefiguration* and a *social*

¹³ *The collection edited by Nathan Jun, Leonard Williams and myself (2018) demonstrates some of these conflicting analyses. The book identifies 'anti-hierarchy', 'prefiguration', 'freedom', 'agency', 'direct action' and 'revolution' as core principles; whilst here and elsewhere (see Franks 2014) I use largely just 'anti-hierarchy', 'agency' and 'prefiguration' as core. The others, along with, concepts like organisation and economy, are important adjacent concepts that flesh out the meanings of the core, such that anti-hierarchy means a rejection of economic hierarchies and developing prefigurative horizontal organisation. Some of the contributors to the book also rightly contested the location of their concepts, arguing that adjacent or peripheral ones (like ecocentrism or intersectionality) be moved closer to the core.*

view of the self (see Seymour 1885; Anarchist Federation nd; Pelloutier 2005, 409-15) (see figure 1.1). Anti-hierarchy is evident in anarchism's contestation of economic inequalities of power (such as capitalism) – and thus distinguishes anarchism from propertarianism and modern liberalism. Anti-hierarchy is also fleshed out by notions of anti-statism, as it views the centralising, universalising power of the state as a cause (though not *the only* cause) of social problems. *Anti-capitalism* is a major component of anti-hierarchy, as it regards economic power as a form of illegitimate social power that enhances inequality and domination. This account of terms distinguishes anarchism from state-centred orthodox Marxisms (or Leninism)¹⁴ and social democracy and from the economic liberalism of propertarianism.

<figure 1.1. near here>¹⁵

¹⁴ *'Leninism' is used for orthodox readings of Marxism in order to distinguish it from other more heterodox versions like Autonomism and libertarian Marxism. This categorisation itself is not without controversy as it would include the determinist economic readings of Marx associated with Lenin, Trotsky, Mao and Stalin. It is thus a categorisation which is critically viewed by Trotskyists as it places them in the same theoretical camp as Stalinists with whom they have substantive differences – sufficiently strong to generate assassinations. Whilst recognising significant differences, not least on the role of nationalism versus international revolution, they do share many key features. First, an economic determinist reading of class struggle, in which the cycle of economic activity shapes the possibility for revolutionary transformation. Second, the role of the revolutionary party as central to the coordination of a successful revolution. Third, the requirement for a revolutionary cadre to co-ordinate the function of the party and finally, the importance of winning control of the state – and not simply abolishing it - in order to direct it socialist reconstruction. The fact that the category 'Leninist' used in this way upsets some Trotskyists as well as a few remaining Stalinists as it combines the too under a single heading, is not the main motivation... on this occasion.*

¹⁵ *My thanks to Prof. Sean Johnston who redesigned the figures. I prefer books with pictures as they many intellectual functions, as well as break up the text. Regrettably, my main discipline, philosophy largely eschews images and diagrams except for logical formula or truth tables. Wittgenstein's duck/rabbit provides a rare albeit oft-cited counter-example.*

Prefiguration is the concept that the means used to achieve a goal must foreshadow or embody, albeit perhaps only partially or temporarily, the desired outcome. See for instance James Guillaume's (Q. in Kenafick 1984, 7) famous criticism of rival revolutionary strategy emanating from Marxists: 'How could one want an equalitarian and free society to issue from authoritarian organisation? It is impossible'. Similarly, Emma Goldman's (1923-25, 429-30) criticism of actual Leninist methods, in her memoir of the Russian Revolution, points to their disjunction between means and ends such that temporary repressive methods become habitualised. For Carl Boggs (1977a and 1977b), such was its prevalence and distinctiveness, prefiguration became a defining feature of anarchism.

The *social view of the self* suggests that there is no fixed notion of the political or anti-political actor, but that they are socially formed. It thus distinguishes itself from essentialist notions of the individual found in, for instance, liberalism (the self-interested rational actor) or conservatism (the self-serving, irrational subject). Unlike many egoisms, it recognises that the self is partly constructed by its relationship to others, and is indeed dependent on relations to others. As Crimethinc. (2008, 46) puts it: 'Individuals cannot be autonomous – we are formed by relationships: without them we do not exist'.

These three concepts act to mutually define themselves. Anarchist organisation prefigures anti-hierarchical relations as this is the best way for self-development and it foreshadows liberatory and fulfilling social relations. As core concepts are themselves clusters of sub-concepts (Freedman 1994, 146-7), anti-hierarchy not only includes notions of *anti-capitalism* and *anti-statism* but also notions of *anti-sexism* and *anti-racism*. Thus, as Alex Prichard (2019, 73) explains, it is conceptually linked to rejections of 'domination': 'the multiple intersecting regimes that render us less free'. Anti-statism is also responsible for the particular (anti-)political methods and organisation. Unlike most other ideologies it does not seek legitimacy through gain state power or see flows of power being controllable from the single location of the state.

Anti-hierarchy thus links with 'intersectionality', the interlocking webs of domination and prefigurative responses by agents in solidarity responding to the multiple forms of subjugation (Lazar 2018, esp. 162 and 169-71). The work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1998) from *A Thousand Plateaus* is prominent in accounts of intersectionality. Their rhizome and canal metaphors suggest multiple merging and disconnecting forms of power that have no specific origin or end.

The constituents of core concepts can become more substantial and construct significant adjacent or core principles in their own right. Thus as Lazar (2018) describes, as

responses to patriarchal and ethnic power structures become more relevant, the concept ‘intersectionality’ becomes a prominent conception in its own right and a core concept in radical black feminist movements as well as, increasingly, in many contemporary anarchist ones. Freedom too is both a central feature of anti-hierarchy, substantiating much of the material action against the hierarchy of the state (Jun 2018b, 45), and is thus often regarded as a core concept in its own right (Jun 2018b; Prichard 2019, 71-72).

In one clear sense this is an admission of an error in my past work.¹⁶ In other texts when I have discussed the core concepts of anarchism, I have omitted ‘freedom’ as I believed it to be too amorphous to significantly substantiate and shape anarchist ideology. Dudley Knowles (2003), for instance, notes a hundred different definitions of the term. Too many texts on anarchism (like Wolff, 1970; Woodcock 1975; Sterba 1977; Marshall 1992) held it as a supreme value and this, I felt, was inaccurate, I therefore included *freedom* as a sub-concept of anti-hierarchy and concomitant feature of a social view of the self. By locating it in this way, it deprioritised liberty and clarified its role in constituting more substantive concepts. In addition, it situated anarchism away from liberal ideologies that privilege liberty.

However, the pervasiveness of emancipatory rhetorics is a recurring feature in anarchist analyses and propaganda. ‘We recognize the full and complete liberty of the individual; we desire for him plenitude of existence, the free development of all his faculties’

¹⁶ *I found it hard to admit to an intellectual failing publicly and in writing. It seems easier to confess to private or civic failings than concede that there is a weakness in past work. In part this is due to weaknesses in my character, such as arrogance, lack of self-examination, and immodesty. These character flaws are structurally reinforced by institutional pedagogies that assert the primacy of the academic’s interpretation over that of the student, the pursuit of institutional goals over the ‘luxury’ of academic reflection and self-aggrandizement as the main bureaucratic means for preferment. Such admissions of error carry the risk of devaluing my work in the eyes of others. Will my past work still be cited as much if, as the author I admit it is flawed? The fear is that academic credibility becomes damaged, causing (the already admittedly few) invitations to supervise or examine postgraduates or participate in conferences, workshops and research collaborations to dry up. This would undermine my access to resources and lead to barriers to career progression and, perhaps, to redundancy. Under these pressures, it is no surprise that, when weaknesses are identified the tendency is to ignore them, to correct them without acknowledging past error, or, as I do above, to emphasise their relative unimportance.*

(Kropotkin 2005, 63). Synonyms for liberty are included in the name of Britain's longest running anarchist paper – initially set up by Kropotkin - (*Freedom*), publisher and group (Freedom Press), Free Society Group of Chicago, and social centres (such as London's old Autonomy club and the current Autonomy Centre Edinburgh). Such is the prominence of the concept that my former approach is mistaken, especially as Freedom's method explains how it can be decontested sufficiently within an ideological structure.

Freedom, by being positioned close to notions of prefiguration and anti-hierarchy, means not just negative freedom, which can legitimise economic inequalities, or modern liberal positive freedom, with its restricted view of moral agency, but includes notions of harmonious living and co-operation. This is similar to the notions of non-domination and communal self-development consistent with Jun (2018, 49-56) and Pritchard's (2019) accounts of anarchist freedom.

Not articulating the role of freedom as part of anarchism's conceptual core and keeping it as a sub-component can lead to these other core concepts carrying too much content. As a result, the central elements are under-developed, leading to lack of clarity and unnecessary ideological confusion. Mathew Humphrey (2014), who uses Freedom's method to unpack green ideology has as one of his core concepts 'ecological restructuring'. This single concept covers an emphasis on critically rethinking 'human-to-nature' relationships, a focus on eco-systems, a holistic ontology and epistemology, where parts are not considered in isolation but in terms of their inter-relationships (like Arne Naess's (199), 147 '*relational total-field image*') and ethical commitments to intrinsic rather than extrinsic values, with an additional normative pull towards 'sustainability' (Humphreys, 2014, 423-27). Such diverse elements, whilst they interlink, are probably better expressed as separate characteristics (as in Dobson 1999) as a holistic epistemology does not necessarily imply a commitment to intrinsic values or to sustainability. There are times when the latter two concepts are in conflict, if sustainability is read in a more instrumental, anthropocentric manner.

Adjacent concepts play an important role in decontesting the meanings of potentially vague concepts or conflicting ones. Adjacent ones restrict some interpretations and clarify core concepts (Freedom 2003, 62). For instance, in liberalism, democracy is an adjacent principle (Ibid): it elucidates what was meant by progress and directs liberty as much towards political freedoms as towards economic ones.

Peripheral concepts are more detailed and tightly defined, and are more likely to be context-dependent. They are important for the local way in which ideologies are understood and transmitted (Ibid). So the right to inherit social status has become pushed to the margins

of the ideology whilst allowing equal access to inheriting goods from gay life-partners has become more significant. Because ideologies are fluid (Freeden 2003, 62-3; 2006, 15) peripheral concepts can become increasingly core. Freeden's example is women's rights, which were marginal in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century liberalism (though championed by J. S. Mill and Mary Wollstonecroft), but are increasingly prominent today. Peripheral concepts provide ideologies with flexibility, reinterpreting or reapplying core concepts to local concerns of the moment.

Adjacent concepts are those that become deprioritised in certain contexts and become much more significant in others. Ecocentrism, for instance, is highly significant in Kropotkin's and Reclus's anarchism as it grounds their epistemologies and ethics, but was not so overtly important in Bakunin's writings. However, as material contexts alter, with significant undermining of the ecological commons exacerbating other social and economic divisions, ecocentricism becomes more prominent. Changing the positioning of one concept impacts on the interpretation of neighbouring ones (Freeden 2003, 51-3), so that the movement of ecological concepts into more prioritised positions within the morphological structure and locating them next to core concepts means that the visions of a better society includes challenging anthropocentric hierarchical assumptions and practices of domination (Prichard, 2019, 81).

Ideologies are expressed through, and constituted by, words or other signs (Freeden 1996, 48-9). They shape general perspectives, highlighting some issues as problems and marginalising or ignoring others. They also structure responses and the identities of political actors. Social democratic ideologies, for instance, will identify significant income disparities as a political challenge and the enlightened citizen's participation within the democratic state as a potential solution. Classical liberalism tends to ignore even enormous disparities in outcome. It considers problems as emanating from state interference rather than entrepreneurial actions. It views the main political actors to be the resourceful businessperson and the sovereign consumer. However, ideologies do not necessarily create a totalised worldview and can contain significant lacunae. This can lead to crisis for some ideologies if they do not have an apparent answer to pressing social concerns. The permeability of ideologies can provide a solution. Political movements borrow ideas from rivals, whose conceptual apparatus does seem to have adequate responses. For instance, social democracy derives ideas of sustainability from green ideologies in response to climate crises in order to justify a 'green new deal'. The risk is that a changed ideology loses established support.

Thus, Freeden's account explains why ideologies are dynamic and adaptable. Ideologies seek to highlight and resolve problems. They are in competition with each other for resources (including types of labour) and control of the political discourse. 'Ideologies compete over the control of political language as well as competing over plans for public policy; indeed, their competition over plans for public policy is primarily conducted through their competition over the control of political language.' (Freeden 2003, 55) If one ideology's concepts are the primary means by which ideas are expressed and problems identified, then it is in control of the policy-making agenda and defines what constitutes legitimate responses. One strategy for gaining support is to take some concepts from a challenging ideology and re-position them within the existing dominant structure. This can gain support from previous advocates of the alternative, whilst only subtly altering the dominant ideology and its practices (what is referred to as 'co-option').

This brings us to what Freeden calls the 4Ps of conceptual morphologies: *proximity*, *priority*, *permeability* and *proportionality* (Freeden 2003, 60-66). *Proximity* refers to how a concept only makes sense in relation to the other concepts it is next to. For example, the Nozickian liberal account of 'liberty' differs from the Millsian liberal account. This is because although both link 'liberty' to the 'individual', in Nozickian liberalism 'liberty' is located next to 'property rights', whilst in the Millsian it is connected to 'self-development'. Thus, the meaning of 'liberty' is different. In anarchism 'liberty' is highly proximate to anti-hierarchy and the social view of the self, which also includes notions of self-development, but regards freedom as co-dependent on communal freedom and the enhancement of interpersonal skills and character traits (see Prichard 2019).

Whilst many ideologies, like conservatism, social democracy and modern liberalism, utilise concepts of environmental sustainability to support notions of stability, economic control and distributive justice, it is given less *priority* in their ideological structures than it plays in eco-politics. Whilst ecologism is present in most forms of anarchism, because of its concentration on more anthropocentric concerns such as workers' exploitation, migrant rights and confronting patriarchy, ecological considerations were pushed to more peripheral locations. Specifically green anarchisms highlight this marginalisation in standard anarchisms and (re-)assert the interests of eco-systems, thus directing attention to environmental (lighter green) issues such as human-damaging pollution and ecological (darker green) concerns such as protection of wild spaces for the interests of environmental others. In eco-anarchisms, like Murray Bookchin's social ecology, human domination and exploitation of nature are intimately connected to human subjugation of other humans, both in terms of class and

gender oppression (see for instance Bookchin, 1997, 77-86). As circumstances alter such that environmental issues are seen to be more and more central to anarchist analysis and activities, with ecocentric concepts at the core, the hybrid eco-anarchism becomes the dominant forms of anarchism (see Parsons 2018). A parallel would be the way that democratic conservatism, which was just a minor subset of conservatism in the initial rise of the liberal enlightenment, became the dominant forms of conservatism as the representative, democratic state became the main form of providing stability and developed a set of traditions in its own right.

Permeability refers to the fact that concepts are not fixed and discrete, but intersect and interlock with one another. The notion of democracy (Freedman 2003, 64) carries with it concepts of equality (one person, one vote) and liberty (self-rule). For anarchism, anti-hierarchy carries with it concepts of liberty, anti-statism and anti-capitalism. It is not possible to look at these terms solely in isolation, as equality helps constitute the meaning of democracy and anti-capitalism the meaning of anti-hierarchy (and vice-versa). The permeability of concepts means that rival ideologies use similar principles in their conceptual structure. Where a rival concept provides an advantage to an ideological opponent competitors will seize it.

Take for example ‘sustainability’, an important concept within green politics and one that at various moments has challenged economic liberalism, given that within ecological politics it stands besides notions of post-materialism and economic restructuring (see for instance Humphreys, 2013), as it promotes maintenance of the ecological and social resource-base. However, as the business ethicist Joseph Desjardins (2015) explains, once the term ‘sustainable’ enters into the corporate sphere it lost the meaning it had within ecological discourse. He provides examples of neoliberal uses of term, where Ernst and Young and the Dow Jones Business Index employ ‘sustainable’ to mean seeking sustained term profits over short-term gains (DesJardins 2015, 120-21).¹⁷ With the rise of the anarchist-influenced anti-

¹⁷ *The inspiration for this example was an event held at a not too distant University’s department in which a very senior member of the University’s management team was travelling through their realm to explain the new ‘sustainability’ project for the institution. A few employees had been a little distrustful of this University’s management in the past and its neoliberal academic restructuring and corresponding lack of action on environmental matters, other than the most rudimentary efforts at ecological window-dressing (it wasn’t sophisticated enough to count as greenwashing). These critics were delighted and a little surprised to hear of the project, wondering what disinvestments in fossil fuels they were*

capitalist and alternative globalisation movements, the nationalist right adopted some of the fashions, tactics and discourses of anarchism, but situated them within a fascist conceptual core. As a result, critiques of capitalism and denunciations of the norms of international trade prerogatives became polemics against ‘Jewish finance’ and international migration.

Proportionality refers to the extent to which core principles can accommodate other principles. Libertarianism (or propertarianism) includes liberal principles of freedom but to the exclusion of all the other principles that Freedman considers important to liberalism proper, namely sociability and rationality (Freedman 2003, 66). Thin accounts of anarchism that give absolute supremacy to one principle, such as ‘anti-statism’, ‘epistemological scepticism’ or ‘anti-coercion’, distort the ideology. ‘[I]f one concept expands to fill up all available space, it will end up by crushing or subsuming them’ (Freedman 2003, 81).

Freedman’s model thus helps to explain a number of important features of ideologies in general and anarchist ideologies in particular. The first is why many – but not all - pre-millennial academic accounts of anarchism were so inaccurateⁱⁱⁱ as they portrayed anarchism in highly reductive manners, down to a single supreme principle like anti-coercion or anti-statism or suspicion of authority. The second is how a relatively stable anarchist morphology is identifiable based on the reasonably pervasive and stable concepts identified above: anti-hierarchy, liberty, social view of the self and prefiguration.

Third, it explains why ideologies in general and anarchism in particular adapt and produce different organisations with distinctive names, which nonetheless, are still recognised as part of the same ideological family. The similarities in the ideological structures provide the basis for similar goals, group norms and values, analyses and priorities, activities and tactics, group relationships and shared language and identities (see van Dijk 2013. 178). Even where some of these features differ, such that one group might prioritise

planning, how the sustainability project would impact on eco-design for new buildings, or alter key institutional strategies on overseas recruitment and international research, and went along to hear about a managerial strategy that at last seemed to merit support. Instead, the whole delivery was on a new corporate financial strategy, with ‘sustainability’ used to mean ‘increasing income streams over a longer period’. There was no mention of any ecological concept or entity, despite the title of the project. As one wryly commented afterwards, ‘Our problem is that however cynical we are of University management, it just isn’t possible to be as cynical as them.’ Desjardins, above, provides a more rigorously sourced and transparent example.

their identities in terms of workplace location and struggle (anarcho-syndicalists, for instance) and others as ecological direct actionists (green anarchisms) there is enough correspondence with the others to mutually recognise each other as part of the same ideological family. There are the shared commitments to anti-hierarchy prefigured in their forms of organisation and tactics. These mutual values and forms of organising might generate areas of immediate commonality, in which workers identify the loss of environmental habitats as an attack on common goods and that the necessary social transformation to a more environmentally responsible form of production and exchange must be as democratic as possible, thereby generating a green anarcho-syndicalism (See Shantz 2002, 2012). Postanarchism, too, in many of its forms, has a distinctive constellation of concepts but still consistent with many other recognisable morphologies within the anarchist family.

As a result, Freedén's method also explains why groups with similar titles and apparently shared concepts are, in fact, radically different and members of distinct ideological families. National 'anarchism', with its commitment to racial difference and hierarchies of ethnic supremacy, might adopt similar 'anti-state' terms, but these are placed next to deeply hierarchical concepts, radically shifting the meaning of their anti-statism and their notions of freedom to ones embracing economic domination and ethnic oppression. As a result, organised anarchists do not regard them as part of their ideological family and often exclude them, by force when required.

Finally, Freedén's method helps to explain why political concepts have distinctive interpretations of key terms, leading to broad ideological structures having necessarily vague concepts to maintain loyalty or for rival ideologies to talk passed each other. The political commentator Peter Breinart discusses how Trump supporters continue to see the 45th President as honourable and his opponents as crooked, whilst the president's liberal critics cannot understand how a man with such a record of fraudulent practice, manipulation and outright deceit is viewed so benignly by his supporters that the charge of 'corruption' does not seem to stick. This is because Trump supporters have a different conceptual scheme.

<figure 1.2. near here>

Whilst liberal supporters consider corruption to refer to unjust interference with the rule of law and the democratic procedures that legitimise it, Trump supporters view corruption as anything that interferes with traditional gender identities and established social

hierarchies. Thus liberals, with their support for reproductive rights and the ‘gay agenda’ are corrupt, the President who is protecting established relations of social power and religious norms is ethical and authentic. ‘Once you grasp that for Trump and many of his supporters, corruption means less the violation of law than the violation of established hierarchies, their behaviour makes more sense’ (Breinart 2018).

Anarchist academics have been drawn to Freeden’s methods as either a start point (see for instance Gordon 2008; Adams and Jun 2015) or the main method (see Franks 2007; Pinta 2009, Pinta 2012, Jun 2018b and the contributors to Franks, Jun, Williams 2018) for the reasons above. The conceptual approach assists in identifying anarchist principles, their interconnections and the family relationships between different but overlapping anarchist movements. Fredy Perlman (1984), for instance, in his critique of nationalism, examines how revolutionary socialist nationalists argue that their version is distinct from reactionary nationalists as the former is conceptually linked to the liberation of the oppressed rather than the ethnic and cultural oppression associated with the latter. Although Perlman recognises these differences he presents a largely materialist determinist account of nationalism as developing out of capitalist development and expansion. However, he also argues that ‘nationalism is not a word with a static meaning’ and sketches out its multiple uses dependent on historical context, demonstrating how it has different strategic implications depending on the context within which it is deployed. Thus, whilst he argues that nationalism, because of its close connections to statism, hierarchy and exclusion, only obstructs emancipatory social structures and reproduces oppression, it nonetheless has variable meanings to different audiences depending on whether it is used for state construction, state expansion or securitisation. More generally, Freeden’s method finds parallels in earlier anarchist writings itself. Anti-foundationalism is common to post-anarchism (Newman, 2001; May, 1994), and found also in older anarchist epistemologies and meta-ethics (Bakunin 1970, 54-55; Cohn and Wilbur 2010).

Modifying Conceptual Methods¹⁸

¹⁸ *The issue of structure dogged this chapter and it went through various iterations, none of which seemed entirely satisfactory. It often seems the case that the author’s ideal for the text is an outcome, in which form and content are so unified, that it appears as though it could not have been written or structured in any better way. Even texts intended to disrupt the apparent seamlessness between content and formal convention, such as Bertolt Brecht’s best*

Despite the strengths of Freeden's method, especially, its pertinence to understanding the adaptable but still identifiable manifestations of anarchism, his approach, nonetheless, requires slight modification. First, as already mentioned, it rejects the notion of ineliminable elements of the core, as unnecessary and questionable. Instead, highly prevalent core features capture the key features and are empirically easier to justify. Anti-statism, which is often used in thin descriptions as a necessary and sufficient condition for demarcating 'anarchism', is neither. Rival ideologies might reject the state and replace it with an alternative form of hierarchical domination. Nomadic patriarchy, for instance, predates the development of the state (Hartmann 1976, 137-38). Similarly, anarchists might provisionally and temporarily prefer some state involvement if the only viable alternative is even greater constraints on liberty produced by military rule – such as anarchist support for the democratic socialist government during the Spanish Civil War – or capitalist exploitation, as is the case in anarchist defences of the welfare state against privatisation (see Williams 2018). These are not examples of anarchists being inconsistent. The principle of anti-statism is not entirely absent, as these reforms are justified with recourse to the ambition of eradicating the state. However, anti-statism is not the supreme or sole principle, it is not ineliminable.¹⁹ Anti-statism is understood in relation to other core and adjacent concepts like anti-hierarchy, liberty and the social view of the self and these, in some contexts, take priority.

Additional changes emerge from the underplaying of material resource in Freeden's original model. Freeden (2003, 7-8) rightly rejects orthodox Marxism's reductive account of ideology. This regards political ideas as being generated from the material base of society and providing a false or distorted view of society (like the image from a *camera obscura*²⁰ to use

plays, can themselves be so well crafted that it occludes their very contingency. Here, the structure is provisional and unstable. I want to discuss the relative absence of materiality in Freeden's method and to introduce notions of institutions, practices and traditions which, I believe, can supplement Freeden's approach but so far I haven't addressed the more structurally orientated alternative political methods.

¹⁹ *It is surprising to discover there is not a word 'eliminable', just there is no word 'ept'. If there was a word 'eliminable' this would have been an apt - and ept - time to use it.*

²⁰ *I live near a museum that has a camera obscura. Not only does it reproduce a relatively undistorted image, it also acts a panopticon. The original dignitaries of the town for whom it was built (and now fee-paying tourists and locals) can survey people in their back gardens or in the town's streets and parks without them knowing, but conscious that it is possible.*

Marx's analogy from *The German Ideology*). Ideas which accurately describe society will arise when the economy is run on rational lines without the distortions of alienated labour (Marx 1976, 42). Although this is a pervasive view of Marx's approach to ideology, it is doubtful this is actually consistent with the bulk of his writings. As David Leopold (2013, 21) notes, there is no single consistent model of ideology across Marx's works. Part of Freedman's rejection of a materialist, determinist account of ideology is the epistemic implication that there is a perfect, non-distorted worldview that emerges out of ideal communist circumstances. For Freedman (2003, 8), such an assumption of a universal truth is itself an ideological belief that shapes a worldview. In addition, there are the wider problems of determinism such as the denial of any agent's autonomy, which is itself a problem for any writer who, like Marx himself, dedicates their life to activism: why bother if everything is determined by the laws of technological development?

To dismiss determinism is not to reject the importance of material practices in shaping ideologies. For some Marxists, like Michèle Barrett (1990, 86-90), ideology and material conditions are separate but dialectically inform each other:

[i]t is important to stress a degree of reciprocity here. It is impossible to understand definitions of 'skill' without taking account the material effects of gender ideology. The belief that a (white) man has a 'right' to work over and above any rights of a married woman or immigrants has had significant effects in the organization of the labour force. Such a belief has therefore to be taken into account when analysing the division of labour, but its location in material practice does not render it material in the same way (Barrett, 1990, 89).

Barrett goes on explain that, just because structured ideas exist within material apparatuses and impact on productive social practice, it is mistaken (à la Louis Althusser) to leap to the conclusion that ideology is material. Citing Terry Eagleton, Barrett (1990, 90) argues that if the meanings of concepts are material, then materialism as a concept becomes meaningless as it excludes nothing.

It is not my intention here to resolve the ontological status of concepts and notions of materiality (though metaphysical issues are covered in Chapter Three). For the moment, the central point is that concepts are shaped in and by material practice, and what counts as a *material* practice is itself conceptually contested. The power and reception of ideological messages differs according to the material resource through which they are expressed. For

instance, slogans directed at immigrants telling them ‘to go home’ have a different meaning and impact when placed on government websites and officially-sanctioned advertising hoardings (see Casciani 2013) than when scrawled on a toilet wall.

Different political ideologies operate through different material practices. Democratic conservatism operates through the political party, the think tanks and elite semi-formal associations of influence (what in more patriarchal times were called ‘Old Boys networks’). Radical environmentalism and anarchism, by contrast, operate through horizontally-structured direct action groups. Thus, the focus is on how concepts are structured in social activities that shape participants’ and others’ identities, relationships and worldviews.

The method combines Freeden’s conceptual analysis with practice-based approaches developed by MacIntyre’s (1984) virtue account of practices (developed further in Chapter Two) and consistent with Andreas Reckwitz’s (2002) similar notion of practices. For Reckwitz’s practices are stable combinations of resources (materials, technologies), competencies (knowledge, skills, and techniques) and shared meanings (including ideas and values) (249-50). For MacIntyre (1985, 187), practices are limited to complex activities, they are the ways to develop skills. As such that there are different degrees of performance where, ultimately, a practitioner can achieve excellence. Practices are:

any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.

So for MacIntyre, simple games like tic-tac-toe or undemanding activities like hanging out washing or re-fueling a car, are not practices, but football, chess, farming, architecture, household management are practices. MacIntyre’s examples of non-practices include ‘bricklaying’, which looks far from simple.

For Reckwitz practices are slightly wider, they re(2002, 249-50):

A ‘practice’ (*Praktik*) is a routinized type of behavior which consists of several elements, interconnected to one other: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, ‘things’ and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge. A practice – a way of

cooking, of consuming, of working of investigating, of taking care of oneself or of others, etc. – forms so to speak a ‘block’ whose existence necessarily depends on the existence and specific interconnectedness of these elements, and which cannot be reduced to any one of these single elements. The single individual – as a bodily and mental agent – then acts as the ‘carrier’ (*Träger*) of a practice – and, in fact, of many different practices which need not be coordinated with one another. Thus, she or he is not only a carrier of patterns of bodily behaviour, but also of certain routinized ways of understanding, knowing how and desiring.

For Reckwitz’s and MacIntyre practices are rule-governed activities that produce goods, they shape performers and have their own norms. However for Reckwitz and other sociologists like Elizabeth Shove (2010, 2012), these habit-forming actions can be apparently simple procedures that MacIntyre excludes.

MacIntyre concentrates on the types of good generated by a practice. They have external goods (goals) and internal goods (virtues) (187-88). They are rule-governed activities that require practical skills (including intellectual ones) and help practitioners to enhance those skills (193-94). Such an account is consistent with Freeden (2015, 2-3) who also begins to address practices, in terms of habitual behaviours, but largely concentrates on political theory as a practice that shapes our understanding of the political, rather than look at the ways in which the political and anti-political are expressed in practices. When resources are examined, these are largely in terms of intellectual and conceptual resources for ranking different political priorities (137-49).

For Freeden and MacIntyre concepts play both a descriptive and normative role. Chess, to use one of MacIntyre’s favourite examples (125-26, 187-88, 194), is a social practice; it has formal rules and although these are longstanding they do change over time and place. Norms play a role in determining what constitutes ‘right action’, participation cannot persistently violate the rules of the game as it would cease to function as that game. Norms also function evaluatively: they identify a strong or weak player. They also generate virtues – the internal goods of the game – like patience, good sportsmanship and technical wisdom. So whilst chess may be played for external goods – to win prize money or esteem – it is the internal goods that sustain them, such as the comradeship of mutually-respectful competitors. If these are continually undermined or corrupted, by for instance cheating or bullying in pursuit of the external goods, fewer people will take up the activity and the practice will decline. Under-emphasised by MacIntyre but more significant under ideological

analysis, is how practices shape identity (van Dijk 2013, 178) – such as chess-player, grandmaster, philosopher or trade union representative. Identities might not be unique to a particular practice, and can be generated through overlapping constellations of practices – and the path between different practices develops other types of identity such as ‘concerned citizen’, ‘patriotic subject’ or ‘environmental activist’.

As practices stabilise and become socially embedded they develop into a tradition. Traditions stabilise norms, identities, goals and meanings, though unlike in conservative thought, traditions are also sites of conflict and can produce change (MacIntyre 1984, 221-22). Practices are distinguished from but not separate to institutions. Practices require resources, such as labour and materials. The classification of these supplies is a function of the practice. Depending on the sport the playing surface is a ‘pitch’, ‘square’, ‘field’ or ‘court’. Institutions are often the repositories of resource in which practices take place. Chess regularly takes place in chess clubs and analytic philosophy, as McLaughlin (2018, 343-44) points out, in its institutions or *schools*. Because institutions are predicated on resource and power, they tend to be more instrumental, concerned with the accumulation of ‘external goods’ (MacIntyre, 1984, 194), though it is possible to imagine some institutions operating on sustainable rather than acquisitive principles.

Practices are the location where competing ideologies and conflicts within ideologies are played out. Primary education is a practice that is the site of multiple conflicts, in which Marxists, social democrats, neoliberals and reactionary nationalists have different views by which norms it should operate and what goods it should produce (the discipline party member, the caring, productive citizen, the loyal worker and consumer or the obedient national subject). Institutions, as well as the participants in a practice, play an important role in policing potentially conflicting interpretations of core concepts. For instance, the leadership and resources of political parties, such as the twentieth century Communist Parties, ensured contentious terms like ‘communism’, ‘class struggle’ and even ‘Marxism’ were interpreted in ways that met the needs of the Party and could enforce such interpretations with material resource, exclusion or – in extreme cases – imprisonment, assassination and execution.

Textual canons provide a substantial intellectual resource that sustain traditional interpretations. They provide stable symbolic structures for the decoding a recoding of terms. Because Lenin (1901, 1905), Trotsky (1937) and Stalin (1906-7) – despite their differences – considered anarchism to be ‘individualistic’ and ‘bourgeois’, this metaphysical and political assumption was repeated by institutions that held Leninism to be the representative of the

revolutionary position, even if they opposed it. Appealing to, and using, different canons can shift the interpretation of terms. Referring to different theoretical resources can be a way of shifting a conceptual framework, as Saul Newman (2019) suggests in his account of revitalising anarchism.

However, as MacIntyre explains one cannot disentangle conceptual structures – whether these be conservatism, anarchism or analytic philosophy – from the practices, traditions and institutions through which they operate:

No practices can survive for any length of time unsustained by institutions. Indeed so intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions – and consequently of the goods external to the goods internal to the practices in question – that institutions and practices characteristically form a single causal order in which the ideals and creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of the institution (ibid.).

Practices require resources, which are generated and maintained by their institutions. These institutions in turn shape the practice causing conflict between the desire for external goods (greater resource) and maintaining the internal goods of the practice.²¹ By concentrating on practices, there is an avoidable methodological bias. It prioritises the micropolitical over the macropolitical and thus has a partiality towards non-universal epistemologies and ontologies. This lens is therefore more supportive of virtue approaches.

Practice approaches therefore question McLaughlin's attempt to make clear-cut distinctions between the theory of anarchism and the political movements of Anarchism (365)

²¹ *This is a conflict that is all too plain to see within the higher education sector, where institutions seeking external goods like financial reward and international acclaim as measured by 'best university' indices seem only too willing to undermine the internal goods of education. This can be by prioritising graduate employment and cutting those disciplines whose graduates are more critical of the formal economy or maximising income by eradicating less profitable departments. Another indicator is the growth of misleading publicity and vainglorious self-promotion that would make a mountebank cringe: 'World changing', 'Number one for...', 'A leading force for change...'. The internal goods of education such as development of wisdom, collegiality and integrity are marginalised and undermined.*

and the procedure of analytic philosophy, its traditions and institutions. The conceptual structures of analytic procedure, however conceived cannot operate without a practice, which generates a tradition and requires institutional support. Whilst McLaughlin is critical of analytical institutions, altering them would mean to change the rules by which they operate, modifying their identities and norms and goals and the nature of – and balance between – internal and external goods.

Intentionist, Hermeneutic, Phenomenological and Cultural Semiotic Alternatives

There are a number of advantages of this practice-based form of conceptual analysis, not just over analytic methods also over other methods of analysis such as cultural semiotics or privileging of authorial intent. Freeden (1996, 112) offers a rejoinder to Quentin Skinner's Cambridge School which attempts to resurrect an author's original meaning of the text through careful historical reconstruction that avoids contemporary anachronism and distortion. Such intentional readings can never be successful because the very selection of texts for analysis is shaped by current concerns and priorities. There are institutional or wider social reasons that mean that Thomas Hobbes or Niccolò Machiavelli are selected rather than the tens of thousands of other major and minor political theorists who could have been picked. Further, intentionalist readings overlook the multitudinous readings and uses to which a text is put (113).

Further, as hermeneutic methods point out, and shared by Freeden's approach (115-16), texts carry ideological messages beyond the authorial intent. The unconscious reproduction of messages, might not be inverted or inaccurate (contra the *camera obscura* account of Marx) even if they are not intentionally transmitted. There is always more to a text than the author fully intended.²² Further, changes in historical circumstances mean that variations in interpretation are unavoidable. It is not possible to read Marx and Engels

²² *Occasionally when my work is referred to, it is hard to recognise the use to which it is being put, even when meant favourably. Partly this is due to lack of clarity on my part, rarely is it a wilful distortion. I have to remind a slightly frustrated self that there is a surfeit of meanings within any utterance of which the author cannot be wholly aware. Similarly, a commentator has limited word space and needs to condense a position, which by necessity re-prioritises principles and the argument's emphases. On reflection, I then realise that the sources I use may not recognise the interpretations I have placed on their work and that I have caused them similar annoyance.*

without being haunted by their role, however unintended, in some of the most despotic regimes of the 'short twentieth century'.

One of the criticisms that activists make of anarchist scholarship is that it is too concerned with attempting to recover what supposedly canonical figures of the past meant (see for instance Black Flag (1993, 30) 'Anarchaeologist Club' cartoon). The criticism is that academics are more concerned with uncovering minutiae and revealing hidden nuance, than responding to more pressing contemporary concerns.

If intentionalist, hermeneutic approaches attempt to capture the original authorial meaning of an utterance, then the reverse of these are grounded theory and phenomenological research. In grounded theory, as Kathy Charmaz (1996, 28) describes it:

[Y]ou start with individual cases, incidents or experiences and develop progressively more abstract conceptual categories to synthesize, to explain and to understand your data and to identify patterned relationships within it. You begin with an area to study. Then, you build your theoretical analysis on what you discover is relevant in the actual worlds that you study within this area.

Without bringing pre-existing theoretical frameworks to bear, the researcher attempts to develop a systematic understanding of a phenomenon. Like phenomenologist Edmund Husserl's (2013) transcendental *epoché* the researcher abandons any pre-existing assumptions. Grounded theory shares with phenomenological research the aim 'to describe as accurately as possible the phenomenon, refraining from any pre-given framework' (Groenewald 2004, 45). However, as phenomenological researcher Thomas Groenewald points out, there are unavoidable limits to this ambition.

The investigator, argues Groenewald (2004, 45), 'cannot be detached from his/her own presuppositions'. The very reason one field is chosen over another and some behaviours are brought to focus is because of a pre-existing worldview. Whilst a researcher looking at an anarchist history, movement, text or theory might reflect and change their views on it, their interest in it is not neutral. There are wider social reasons why that topic exists, why it has been chosen over others and why resources such as intellectual labour are available to be expended on its study. There is a tendency to see these background conditions as necessarily reactionary: that an academic study, for instance, must be done with the connivance of dominant powers and is thus corrupted. However, this is to ignore the continuous efforts of

students and staff to protect and extend autonomy, to protect and enhance researcher's independence against managerial and state direction.²³

Phenomenological research is of two kinds. One is when it attempts to capture the sensations and meanings of the participants; the other is when it is based on the researcher's own perspectives. Examples would be of researchers interacting with material artefacts such as Neolithic stones or natural environments to reflect on the bodily and mental sensations of such engagements (Brück 2005, 46-50). Whilst such autobiographical reflections can assist in identifying shared values and motivations, such a purely subjective account on its own is inadequate. Just as autobiographical musings on how participating in an anti-capitalist rally, an Occupy protest or an Extinction Rebellion disruption can identify moments of celebration, revelry, desolation and fear, solidarity and isolation, phenomenological method cannot say whether such responses were shared or exceptional, appropriate or incongruous. It provides no basis for verification or falsification. Being purely individualist it cannot uncover the reasons why experiences are similar or different from one another or why phenomenon are experienced in particular ways or chosen to be studies in the first place.²⁴

The first type of phenomenological research, examining the sensations of others, can include this autobiographical second type, as it encourages reflection on the researcher's role in shaping the research including what constitutes matters important enough to note down (Groenewald 2004, 48). For phenomenological research of the first kind, the focus is to understand the world from the subject's perspective. Activist research often involves such a method. Part of understanding an action or movement is comprehending and sharing the meanings and values of those who participate. The reliability of these studies is assessable against results by other researchers carrying out similar studies, or by comparing them against autonomous accounts by participants. However, because phenomenological approaches are only interested in examining and articulating the experience, it cannot ask questions about why events are experienced in such a way. To do so is to refer to social and material forms that are beyond individual experience.

²³ *Many of my colleagues have tales of how there are attempts, formally and informally, to shape research projects that meet institutional objectives to conform to the prejudices of senior managers. Under the old research assessment exercise, I was informed that I should drop research on anarchism as it would not score highly in the philosophy panel and to consider developing an interest in the philosophy of mathematics, which tended to score better.*

²⁴ *These criticisms of subjectivism methodologies are also relevant for Chapter Three.*

Dick Hebdige's (1979, 13) cultural semiotics seeks to examine even the most seeming innocuous cultural forms for the way they impose – or contest - a hegemonic structure of interpretation. In Hebdige's (1979) ground-breaking study of youth sub-cultures, he examines the clothes, hairstyles, jewellery, musical performance, methods of dissemination, linguistic uses and other symbolic expression for the ways these subcultures reinforce or challenge dominant discourses and the underlying social categories which they naturalise or contest. As Uri Gordon (2008, 19) notes, cultural expressions have similarly been subject to similar semiotic readings: 'External appearances like styles of clothes or hair are important cultural signifiers, visible before any political conversation begins.'

Gordon (2008, 19-20) is right to emphasise the everyday, micropolitical function of anarchist ideology (as opposed to the macropolitical that works at the level of the state and the supra-state).²⁵ He recognises that anarchist methods themselves actively reflect on the dominant culture's symbolic order and develop guerrilla methods of drawing attention to and subverting them, through tactics variously described as subvertising and *détournement*. The problem with cultural semiotics is that it can concentrate on the eye-catching, but trivial, over more significant expressions of the ideology. This modified conceptual approach, by contrast, draws attention to the resources involved and their material impacts, thereby avoiding misrepresenting the more spectacular but ethereal manifestations of anarchism as being more significant than the more pervasive everyday organisational practices.

The focus on (anti-)politics at the micropolitical level should not be understood as ignoring or failing to respond to macro-level political structures. Anarchist rejections of state participation is not to ignore the state, as Molyneux (2011) claims, but to respond and undermine it through generating prefigurative practices and traditions that undermine, replace and transcend it rather than being shaped by it.

The advantages of practice approaches are that they avoid the ontological and epistemological problems of determinism – which denies any agent autonomy – or wholly individualist approaches which consider the agent as wholly autonomous and uninfluenced by structure. Practices limit choices and privilege certain viewpoints over others. They

²⁵ I gave a similar definition of 'macropolitics' in a footnote in the introduction, so I wondered whether it was needed in the main body of the text. However, my guess is that a reader may prefer simply to concern themselves with the main argument rather than engage with the commentary, so will have missed it, hence its inclusion again.

generate particular types of discourse, identities and values, but there are possibilities to alter or transcend a practice.

Modified Approaches: Anarchism or anarchisms?

In many general theory texts and introductions to political ideologies, until relatively recently, little distinction was made between the various movements that use the name ‘anarchism’ or have it thrust upon them. As a result, radically different morphologies from anarcho-capitalism to egoism to anarchist communism were treated as equal manifestations of anarchism (see for instance Heywood 1998, 199-206) – and used to explain its apparent incoherence and lack of success (Molyneux 2011). Freeden (1996, 311), who does not subject anarchism to sustained analysis, notes that anarchism ‘straddles’ both liberalism and socialism. This is a position shared with some activists and theorists like David Goodway (1989, 1), Rudolf Rocker (1988) and George Woodcock (1975, 40), who regard anarchism as a conjunction of liberal individualism with socialist egalitarianism.

The argument here is threefold. First, that there are multiple similar, overlapping forms of social anarchisms. These include anarchist communism, anarchosyndicalism, anti-state communism (including council communism), autonomism, class struggle anarchism, libertarian Marxisms, libertarian socialism, situationist-inspired movements and many (though not all) anarcha-feminisms and eco-anarchisms. They share sufficient similarities in their ideological structure to develop similar analyses, promote sympathetic practices and prioritise similar values. Second, that there is a marked distinction between these and, as identified above, most (but not all) individualist anarchisms, in particular egoism and proprietarianism. It is important to stress this point and also highlights that there are some forms of individualist anarchism which, as they contest economic hierarchies and have a more social view of the self, become compatible with social anarchisms.²⁶ Third, on occasions peripheral differences can lead to significant cleavages and differences in analysis. This argument also raises and answers the question as to how postanarchisms fits with members of the anarchist ideological family?

²⁶ The need to stress this is that although I argued this before (Franks 2013), I had not made this explicit enough as some prominent scholars like Lawrence Davis (2019, 64) felt that I was arguing that anarcho-capitalism was an anarchism and all individualisms were incompatible with social anarchism.

Social anarchisms regard property rights to be non-natural or universal but the product of various oppressive social forces such as militarism, colonialism and the state (see for instance Graeber 2015). Social self-development comes about through prefigurative social action that contest these hierarchical structures. For anarcho-syndicalists the main, but not sole, site for this is the workplace organisation and seeking to alter the rules and outcomes of various types of labour (Pelloutier 2005). For anarchist communists, the site for forms of struggle and prefigurative action primarily – but not exclusively – is the wider community. Social anarchisms promote organisational forms that use formal rules and informal norms to share skills, flatten hierarchies and prevent fixed leaderships in ways that are antipathetic to proprietarianisms and oppressive egoisms and the supposedly efficient structures of Leninist vanguard parties.

Propertarians, like Murray Rothbard, David Friedman and Tibor Machan have a radically different conceptual framework to anarchism proper. Theirs is based on the primacy of the sovereign individual, property rights and negative freedom and the exclusion of economic anti-hierarchy. As such proprietarianism understands liberty as the absolute prohibition on coercion in order to protect the negative rights of the rational individual, with only consensual agreements providing legitimate bases for human interaction, thus negating the legitimacy of the state as de facto it acts without individual consent (Wolff 1976). Proprietarianism has a distinctive view of the political subject as the autonomous property-holder and freedom as the ability to dispose of this property in anyway which does not violate others property rights even if it causes others to be in an increasing economically dependent position (see Declark 2010). It has a particular ethical discourse based on rights and duties. These norms are embedded in distinctive forms of organising and tactic incompatible with social anarchism. Propertarians, for instance, operate in academia, especially, but not exclusively business schools, and through largely professionally-tiered lobby groups such as, in the United States, the Cato Institute, Mises Institute, Heritage Foundation and Libertarian Party and, in the UK, the Libertarian Alliance, Adam Smith Institute and Institute of Economic Affairs.

Other types of individualism have a different conceptual core and thus fit more easily with social anarchisms. L. Susan Brown (2003, 107-08 and 115) who shares similar concerns about coercion with proprietarians, but views the individual as more socially-connected. She is also more critical of property rights as these restrain self-development. However, where existential anarchisms prioritise a form of self-development predicated on domination or exclusion of others, in perhaps more standard Stirnerite forms, they tend away from social

forms of anarchism. In largely academic circles in the United States and Britain, especially in the 1980s, the propertarian constellation became synonymous with ‘anarchism’.

Successfully synthesising a common anarchism is not possible, despite efforts by the likes of Voltairine de Cleyre and Ricard Mella to construct an ‘anarchism without adjectives’ (see Turcato 2009, 458; Presley and Sartwell 2004): that is to say, an account of anarchism and a set of practices that can unify radically disparate ideologies. Their efforts were based on reducing anarchism to a minimum of ‘anti-statism’ and attempting to decontest differences such as over economic arrangements, by leaving it to future, post-revolutionary societies to determine. But in practical terms this synthesis could not hold. Should this synthetic anarchism support workers breaking their contract of employment to seek better wages and greater freedom from alienated labour? Free marketeers can only reject such violation of the consensual work agreements of capitalism, whilst social anarchists support organisations that contest the hierarchies and economic oppressions that force people into exploitative conditions of work. The apparently common concepts, like anti-statism, have radically different meanings when placed into contrasting conceptual frameworks. For social anarchists, the term refers to the state’s role in protecting and enhancing property relations that support economic inequality, using the coercive apparatus of judiciary, military, policing and prisons. Propertarians, by contrast, use the notion of anti-statism to refer to redistributive functions and support all the oppressive functions and practices criticised by social anarchists so long as they are conducted by private enterprise (Friedman n.d., chap. 29; Lester 2009, 4). ‘Anti-statism’, the minimum that is supposed to unify the two types of anarchism, actually divides them.

Instead, anarchism (that is to say social anarchism) is best understood as a range of different sub-groups, which frequently come together into stable alliances. Ideological hybrids and sub-groups such as anarcha-feminisms, green anarchisms, queer anarchisms and post-colonial anarchisms, are largely consistent with the main principles of anarchism, but highlight lacunae or refigure key concepts in previously marginalised directions.

<figure 1.3 near here>

Anarcha-feminism (Figure 1.3) prioritises issues of patriarchy and gendered hierarchies into the conceptual core. As a result, it reshapes understanding of the self and forms of domination, including the absences in earlier supposedly more neutral accounts, of economic exploitation and how these anarchist economic analyses omitted or marginalised affective,

domestic and reproductive labour which fell largely or wholly on women. Anti-patriarchy is not absent in other forms of anarchism – it permeates and provides avenues of solidarity – but in anarchy-feminisms the priority and proximity differ. It is thus an identifiable sub-category, which is more starkly observable when compared with examples of overt and coded sexism in current and historical anarchist movements and theoretical texts (see for instance Prichard (2013, 107-09) on Proudhon;²⁷ Koval 2019, 266-7; Class War 1997; Do or Die!, 2000, 82-3; Filar 2015).

Similarly eco-anarchism (figure 1.4) highlights human-nature relationships and seems to replace existing instrumentalist attitudes with practices that allow the other entities that make up diverse eco-systems to thrive. It highlights the interdependence of human liberty (thus, referring to notions of community) and sense of self on the natural world (each person is a complex ecosystem containing trillions of micro-organisms which have different DNA to humans). Such ecological concerns are not just a recent feature of anarchism. The early anarchists, in particular Elisée Reclus (2004), discuss the importance of harmonious human to nature relationships as core to a liberatory politics. More recently a range of different eco-anarchisms has arisen (Aaltola 2010; Parson 2018, Price 2019) that consider the ways in which humans view ourselves and others to be inherently based on human interactions with natural ecologies. To develop the right responses to one requires the right responses to the other. Eco-anarchist criticisms of hierarchy are extended to include anthropocentrism, practices that ignore the interests (broadly drawn) of other species. Prefigurative action needs to embrace environmental principles in the here-and-now as well as a long-term goal.

<figure 1.4. near here>

²⁷ *Some of the Proudhon's more infamous patriarchal assumptions can be found in De la Justice dans la Révolution et dans l'Église XIth Étude*
https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/De_la_justice_dans_la_R%C3%A9volution_et_dans_l%E2%80%99glise/Onzi%C3%A8me_%C3%89tude however my French is so bad that my summary relies on the multilingual skills of contemporary commentators and translators. I can only share the sentiment, if not the ability of one of them who dedicated his book to his daughters with the declaration 'May it show the importance of being bilingual!' (McKay 2011, vii).

Further morphological sub-groups arise such as green anarchy-feminism (figure 1.5). This pushes gender and biocentric issues into the core and in doing so tweak the meanings of other key terms. Barriers to fully social development include exploitation of nature, which dialectically interacts with patriarchy (see Biehl 1991, 128-29; Fitzgerald and Pellow 2014). Eco-anarchy feminism uses methodologies from feminism that critique apparently fixed categories such as male/female to understand the power-dynamics to investigate human/non-human categories. For many, oppressions in one area are connected to oppressions in another, leading to the development of discourses and practices of intersectionality.

<figure 1.5 near here please>

Having too many concepts in the core (not that six is too many), can lead not to conceptual clarification, but over-complication and confusion, which limits an ideology's ability to offer solutions to problems. This is exemplified in the stereotype of the over-sensitive radical so socially aware (or 'woke') to the potential multiple sources of micro-oppressions in their speech-acts that they fail to act or speak clearly, so hesitant are they to commit unintentional linguistic violence. Another problem is to identify the more marginal from a significant form of oppression can lead to the strengthening that oppression. Refusing to support strikers because of the pickets' incidental sexism, homophobia, racism or antisemitism – although these are not the motivations for the strike – allows capitalist domination to go uncontested (for an example see Albon 1996). The act of solidarity, however, should still challenge discriminatory behaviour and these are more likely to be successful when done in the spirit of camaraderie against a common enemy.

Intersectionality highlights how different modes of oppression interlock and generate new forms of subject identities, destructive social practices and institutions and structures of domination. It is a term, as Lazar (2018, 160-62) identifies, influenced by post-structuralism. Whilst there is much to support the idea that forms of oppression intersect – it fits with the idea of corrupt behaviour producing other types of corruption, in the same way virtuous behaviour encourages the development of further virtuous acts – it can be problematic. First, intersectionality does not suggest that multitudinous oppressions – and therefore resistance to oppressions – necessarily conjoin. Intersecting is an entanglement. So whilst David Nibert (2014, 8-9) provides a narrative of animal exploitation and early imperialism and patriarchy operating through mutually supportive practices, it does not follow that resistance to one necessarily leads to resistance to the other. Theorists of intersectionality highlight how

ignoring the dynamics of other oppressions whilst resisting just one, might shift that form of domination but reproduces and intensifies others (Lazar 2018, 162-63).

Finally, intersectionality also highlights an important epistemological feature of anarchism. Not all oppressions are immediately apparent. There is no objective position by which repressive power is immediately identifiable. Those subjected to it are best located to respond. It places a limit on claims to authority and rejects a universalist perspective which claims to speak on behalf of all of the oppressed.

Postanarchisms and Post-Left Anarchisms

Post-left anarchists claim that their position is not an ideology because they assume that ideologies must proclaim the universality of its values, and they reject such claims (Black 2009). Some postanarchists deny that theirs is ideology on similar grounds. Postanarchism, they argue, is aimed at unsettling anarchism from reifying values, rather than offering any vision or (anti-)political strategy (Saint Schmidt 2008; Newman in Rousselle 2013, 80). Nonetheless, it has a field of action, preferred discourses and identifiable theoretical devices and positions. It also operates with particular types of material practice. The fact that it is diverse and fluid does not prevent it being an ideology – ideologies change and have different sub-categories. Postanarchist discourse prioritises notions like ‘fluidity’, ‘unfixed’ and ‘multiple’ that can themselves become reified.

There has long been a tension within and between postanarchist writers as to the location of postanarchism with respect to the conceptual morphology and corresponding material practices of anarchism. For Newman the position is more interesting and flexible. He states that ‘postanarchism is [...] shorthand for “post-structuralist anarchism” rather than as sometimes alleged by its critics, a theoretical approach that supersedes anarchism’ (Newman 2019, 293).

However, it is not just critics of postanarchism who represent it as a claiming to be a break with, or transcendence beyond, diverse but interlinked social anarchist morphologies. Hakim Bey and Bob Black who follows him, present accounts of postanarchism (referred to by Black as ‘post-left anarchism’) as a negation that supersedes it. The post-left anarchism is more critical of social anarchist movements: ‘Anarchism staggers around with the corpse of a Martyr magically stuck to its shoulders – haunted by the legacy of failure and revolutionary masochism – stagnant backwater of lost history’ (Bey 2003, 61) and more succinctly: ‘Classical anarchism, like leftism in general is played out’ (Black 1997, 147). Even Newman himself suggests that ‘if anarchism is to remain relevant to political struggles today, it must

construct new understandings of politics, ethics, subjectivity and utopia which are not grounded in essentialist or rationalist ontologies and which eschew guarantees of the dialectic' (2010, 163-64) – it is 'both a continuity and discontinuity with classical anarchism' (140). Lewis Call (2002, 69) similarly sees his postanarchism as both a 'continuation of Bakunin's project' and having 'vital distinctions' from it too.

Newman's account of anarchism often shares much with Freeden's method: 'Let us think of anarchism, then as a diverse and heterodox assemblage of ideas, moral sensibilities, practices and historical movements'. However, Newman combines the disparate movements through a single characteristic 'an anti-authoritarian impulse' (2015, 1) or elsewhere 'equal-liberty' (2010, 144-45). However, he and other leading postanarchists flesh out postanarchism in much fuller ways, though with occasionally significant differences in their account. May (1994, 139) develops his account of postanarchism through methods of homeostasis and assemblages of independent but interconnected parts. May's method comes close to a Freedenesque model, in his description of political theoretical positions.

There is no single postanarchism, just as there is no single anarchism, though there are fairly stable core features of both. Differences seem most pronounced is because of the ways in which anarchism is portrayed by postanarchists. In some postanarchist iterations anarchism is based on universal (*a priori*) principles (May 1994, 65) and fixed 'natural laws' (Newman 2001, 38-39), rather than evolving but stable concepts. Second, that the principles ascribed to anarchism by postanarchists, whilst certainly present in some writings, are not core to anarchism and often marginal or absent. For instance the commitment to an account of the individual as having a benign social essence which political order corrupts (May 1994, 63; Newman 2001, 38-42; 2010, 4). This essentialism shifts the meaning of the 'moral agent' as being one with a pre-ordained natural role. It also alters anarchist accounts of freedom to mean fulfilling this natural role. Finding the rules of natural conduct promotes a set of epistemological practices that privilege scientific elites – who can know the interests of others better than the subjugated and thus paternalistically represent them (Newman 2001, 39-41) – leading to the postanarchist commitment to anti-representationalism as a response (May 1994).

However, Jesse Cohn and Shaun Wilbur (2010) argue that this account of the difference between postanarchism and its earlier precursors is inaccurate. Significant earlier anarchists rejected essentialism and scientific reductivism. Classical anarchists such as Errico Malatesta (1984, 73) viewed the concept of 'natural harmony' as 'the invention of human laziness' (see too Goldman(1969, 61-62): 'Poor human nature, what horrible crimes have

been committed in thy name!'). Even Kropotkin (nd. and 1992, 43) with whom benign essentialism was most associated, did not argue for a fixed benign essentialism but argued that humans were made up of diverse drives some of them individualistic and anti-social. Thus there is greater concordance between anarchism and postanarchism, affirming Newman's (2010, 5) major contention that postanarchism works within anarchism rather than being a transcendence or a transgression.

Instead, postanarchism shares much more in common with many contemporary and historic forms of social anarchism. Both postanarchism and social anarchisms are theoretically-diverse and have a shared interest in identifying dominating modes of power that structure the centralised state and the economic modes of production and distribution in all social institutions. There also have diverse agents, though postanarchisms and especially post-left anarchism tend to deprioritise workers struggles (Morland 2004, 26; Black 1994), though it is not absent. Despite the change in canon to those of major poststructuralist figures, like Jean Baudrillard, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Felix Guattari and Jean-François Lyotard, which might indicate a transformation in meaning, the over-all interpretative regimes, on many occasions are not so different. This is perhaps unsurprising given that many poststructuralists were initially engaged with left-libertarian groups (Plant 1992, 5) or considered themselves still under the influence of revolutionary politics (Foucault 1991, 117 and 140-41).

Duane Rousselle (2013, 74-76) positions postanarchism not as a 'vanishing mediator', which helps to reposition the anarchist project after a period of stasis then becomes subsumed into the new ideological structure, but as a 'displaced mediator' that can keep challenging and reconfiguring anarchism. In this way postanarchism helps generate a newly emergent anarchism. There is much to recommend this reading, as Rousselle shows postanarchism has prompted re-readings of standard anarchist texts and reprioritised previously marginal figures (78). The fact that such mediators have operated within anarchism – and other ideologies – where poststructuralist theory was marginal, such as ecologism and feminism, does not challenge Rousselle's analysis as he is not claiming postanarchism as the only mediator.

As will be discussed, postanarchists' analyses of the epistemological, ontological and meta-ethical weaknesses of anarchism provide useful approaches to challenge and refine anarchist practices, which have ossified or become corrupted and no longer perform their critical function. Such critiques are consistent with the reflexivity common to anarchism. However such self-critiques are not without their dangers. The terminology used in these imminent critiques can be unfamiliar, even if the underlying concepts are consistent with

anarchist theory and practices. These terms and methods can seem strange and elitist especially for those without educational capital. These restructured anarchisms might move into less accessible, more elite directions. In such circumstances postanarchist discussions, like the poststructuralist discourses from which they originate, risk representing anarchism in ways inconsistent with the anti-representationalism they criticise others for.

Summation²⁸

Freedden's conceptual approach provides a method for clarifying and analysing anarchisms, particularly when it is developed without the contingent ineliminable element in the core and with greater emphasis on material activities or practice. It avoids the constrictions of finding universal characteristics, but still recognises core, shared features that can diverge over time and space, developing into sub-categories or ideological rivals. Normative principles are key elements of ideological structures and help to distinguish differences within and between ideological families. The next chapter examines the content and structure of these normative principles and explains why it is consistent with a social virtue ethics rather than with the consequentialism usually ascribed to revolutionary politics or the rights-based theories more frequently used to characterise anarchism.

²⁸ *I had wondered how to present the summary of each chapter and how it would lead on to the next. One idea was to present the chapter summation in the form of ten bullet-points with a click-bait caption as the title, satirising academia's engagement with social media. 'Can you recognise postanarchism after this makeover?'; 'Ten reasons conceptual analysis will create a better, sexier, method'; 'Analytic philosophers never expected this explosive response'. However, Andy Tattersall (2019) has done a far better job of satirising researcher's attempt to achieve impact in this way, so I'll simply point you in his direction.*

ⁱ According to JStor from the 70 years from 1929 to 1999 there were 126 journal articles with anarchism in the title or the abstract (an average of fewer than 2 a year), for 2000-2018 there were 100 (an average of over 5 a year). Over the same periods Google Scholar lists 26,500 and 46,400 articles, reviews or books mentioning anarchism (fewer than 400/annum and 2400/year respectively).

ⁱⁱ It is worth repeating *Libcom*'s warning about this work that in '2015 it came to light that one of the authors of this work, Michael Schmidt, has advocated merging anarchist and white supremacist ideas both privately under his own name and publicly under pseudonyms. We are not aware of such themes in this work but readers should be advised.' There is no suggestion that the co-author Lucien van der Walt was aware of Schmidt's reprehensible views and actions.

ⁱⁱⁱ One notable success of academic networks like the Anarchist Studies Network (a specialist group of the Political Studies Association) and the North American Anarchist Studies network has been to challenge and change longstanding academic marginalisation and misrepresentations of anarchism. It is however, important to note that this has been based on and supported by the intellectual labour of many non-academics, whether in the Anglophone world, individuals like Iain McKay, Colin Ward and Martin Wright or the various class struggle anarchist groups like Anarcho-Syndicalist Federation and *Rebel Worker* (in Australia), SolFed, Anarchist Federation and Class War (in the UK).