Screencap this: within two to ten years, Israel will ditch the US and realign itself with China. This sounds unlikely based on the past, but the past is already gone. My prediction is based on applying the main principle from George Friedman’s The Next Hundred Years (which I reviewed here): world leaders may appear all powerful to the masses they rule, but in reality their options are highly constrained. Given those constraints, it is not that difficult to predict what they will do.

Let’s apply this to Israel and Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu wants to preserve and expand Israel. This goal requires him to not just conquer but to ethnically cleanse Gaza, destroy Hezbollah, deal with Syria, and align Iraq. He is constrained by Iran also vying to be a regional power, Iran’s various proxies, Israel’s internal “culture of critique,” and changing military technology.

But most importantly, Israel is constrained by declining support in the US, which is probably why Netanyahu allowed October 7 to happen so that he could make use of US support while he still had it. The ensuing genocide in Gaza is ironically why support for Israel has gone from slowly declining to rapidly cratering, especially among the youth who, along with being the future, are also the current war fighters in a country where a draft is probably no longer feasible.[1]

The gravity of Israel’s situation was revealed in the recent “Twelve Day War” against Iran. Israel had a massive initial advantage. While in the midst of diplomatic negotiations, Israel made a surprise attack by launching drone swarms from within Iran’s borders, similar to the one Ukraine launched in Russia. This notably crippled Iran’s air defense systems and ballistic missile and drone sites. Mossad also assassinated key military leaders and nuclear scientists. This initial onslaught was accompanied by talk of installing a “democracy” under the Crown Prince in Exile, Reza Pahlavi.

Despite Israel’s initial advantages, Operation Rising Lion quickly devolved into a stalemate. Israel continued to pound Iran with airstrikes while maintaining substantial air superiority, but Iran still managed to launch numerous retaliatory strikes. Iranian counter attacks at the start of the conflict tended to be larger and managed to critically strain Israel’s supply of various interceptors (which are a lot more expensive than the Iranian projectiles they intercepted). And while the number of Iranian projectiles tapered off toward the end of the conflict, enough of them still got through to cause major disruption. For example, they damaged the Haifa oil refinery and a power station, and impacted near the Israeli stock exchange and Mossad headquarters. Ben Gurion Airport and Haifa Port were also threatened. Moreover, it is more likely that Iran tapered off its strikes as a signal for de-escalation than due to a lack of ability.

Perhaps what was most important about the Twelve Day War was what didn’t happen. Hezbollah, which has a large inventory of rockets and missiles in Lebanon, did not participate in the war and said they would only enter if the Iranian regime was severely threatened. And the Yemeni Houthis only launched two ballistic missiles as a symbolic gesture.

The stalemate was ultimately broken by Operation Midnight Hammer, a US strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities using 14 bunker buster bombs launched from strategic stealth bombers and 24 cruise missiles from a submarine (again during diplomatic negotiations). The total cost of the strike was around $200 million, and its effectiveness is highly disputed. Iran retaliated against the US with between 10 and 19 ballistic missiles against Al Udeid Airbase in Qatar, but this was only a symbolic gesture, and Iran provided advance warning to the US, which evacuated the base. Nonetheless, despite probably firing between two to four Patriot interceptors per missile, one ballistic missile did get through. A ceasefire was agreed to a few days later.

Both Iran and Israel are claiming victory. But it will prove to be a long-term strategic defeat for Israel, because although Israel had an overwhelming initial advantage, it was still only able to achieve a stalemate, which had to be broken by the US. Unless Mossad can pull another rabbit out of a hat, Israel will be unable to replicate the the initial advantages it had this time in a future conflict.

Israel’s internal drone launch against Iran was spectacular, but Iran will now be on the lookout for infiltration. Iran also claims to have arrested 700 spies and saboteurs, and while that number is probably grossly exaggerated, there still have been many arrests and several executions. Furthermore, Iran has intensified its deportation of illegal Afghani immigrants due to security concerns.

And while the details are ambiguous, China appears to be helping Iran rebuild their air defense systems. The US is also replenishing Israel’s missile defense systems, but those systems are not cost effective, could be rapidly depleted in a war of attrition, and must compete with US security commitments to Ukraine and Taiwan.

Furthermore, much of the damage Iran sustained was from the Israeli air force. While impressive, any air force has a major Achilles’ heel: airbases, specifically runways. In a future war in which Iran can more easily penetrate Israeli defenses due to an absence of an initial drone strike from within Iranian borders, its likely that Iran will be able to strike Israeli runways, fuel depots, etc. A single pebble from the debris of a ballistic missile strike if sucked into an Israeli jet engine can cause expensive damage or even a crash. Even intermittently shutting down air operations to clear debris would severely hamper Israel’s offensive capabilities.

Iran has learned several things. First and foremost, the risk of an attack is actually higher during negotiations with the US and Israel, not lower. They have also learned that they can run the US out of a major base with ease and with little to no risk of retaliation. Compare this to the Global War on Terror, when the US was inventing flimsy excuses like WMD in Iraq to bomb and invade countries. The US may have a lot of fancy weapons, but its use of those weapons has become constrained by low support for foreign intervention in general and Zionism in particular. And because a popular uprising didn’t occur in the midst of a stalemate, the risk of one during a war that goes more favorably for Iran is practically non-existent.

Iran also now knows that it doesn’t even need to waste resources on a nuclear program to deter Israeli aggression. Its conventional second strike capabilities proved sufficient, even when it began a war with a massive and probably unrepeatable disadvantage. What irony. I wouldn’t be surprised if Iran abandons its nuclear program to focus on conventional weapons because they have proven so effective and to make it harder for the US to intervene in a future conflict, or if they do intervene, to ensure an even harsher drop in legitimacy and support for Zionism as a result.

Israel’s internal drone launch and the benefits it conferred was almost certainly a one hit wonder. This means that the next conflict between Israel and Iran will go much worse for Israel. How much worse? I don’t know. But heavy damage to infrastructure and to military jets that are stranded on the ground, the closure of ports and airports, economic losses due to constant shelter in place orders, and most importantly, broken morale, are all reasonably likely.

In short, Israel doesn’t have many good options vis-à-vis Iran. When someone has few options, it is easier to predict their next move. Israel’s best option is to ditch the US for China and possibly Russia.

The US will no longer be able to do much for Israel. However, China is a patron of Iran and could force both countries to drop the goal of regime change. They could then divide the Middle East into Iranian and Israeli spheres of influence. This wouldn’t be much of a change from the current status quo, given that Syria has fallen into Israel’s lap due to Bashar Assad’s incompetence. There would probably be a two-state solution for Palestine, which Israel won’t like but which won’t be an existential threat if the Palestinian state is kept on a Chinese leash. Interestingly, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz during the Twelve Day War. It may not have followed through due to discrete Chinese pressure—perhaps an omen of things to come.

China wouldn’t take on Israel out of charity, however. Nor would the Chinese worship Jews as gods or allow them to systematically bribe, blackmail, and brainwash their leaders. China is a serious country which will not tolerate a dilution of its sovereignty. Instead, this would be a purely interest-based quid pro quo. What would Israel bring to the table?

Israel has collected a lot of secrets about the US military, economy, and elites over the years. We know about Jonathan Pollard’s antics. Imagine what we don’t know about. Israel could give China US weapon systems, strategic perspectives, the identities of agents, and probably much more. Israel could also release all of its compromat on US elites to curry additional favor with China, to destabilize and demoralize America, or simply out of neurotic spite, like a supervillain shouting “You have failed me for the last time!” before executing a hapless minion. Additionally, China could use a realignment as an opportunity to complete its Belt and Road Initiative which seeks to establish economic routes from China to Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.

Historically speaking, 180 degree geopolitical realignments are rare but not unheard of. For example, France and Britain allied against Germany despite formerly being arch-enemies. The US and Britain have a close relationship despite Britain razing Washinton DC during the War of 1812. Vietnam plays both sides yet leans more towards the US than China despite Chinese aid during the Vietnam War. Realignments seem unthinkable until they happen, after which they become the “new normal.”

China already has extensive ties with Israel. Military cooperation began in the 1980s, when Israel supplied arms and technology to China in response to Western sanctions after Tiananmen Square. The US had to intervene against an Israeli deal to sell China an airborne early warning and control system in 2000, and against another deal to upgrade anti-radar drones in 2005. Furthermore, 20,000 Chinese guest workers are in Israel, even after October 7. China is also Israel’s largest trading partner after the US.

I’m not alone in thinking a realignment is possible. On July 6, 2025, the Israel National News published an article titled “As the West dies, Israel’s future lies with rising Asia.”

I don’t see how Israel won’t betray the US within the next two to ten years, primarily through divulging sensitive secrets to China. When this happens, I will take great pleasure in saying “I told you so” to Zionists and Eurasianists alike.

Notes

[1] A July 2025 Homeland Institute poll found a sharp decrease in support for Israel over a year and a half among white voters age 18-29 along with an increase in the likelihood they would resist a draft.