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Divisions Within the Ruling Class and Their Implications

By Keith Preston August 25, 2023

Divisions Within the Ruling Class and Their Implications

A Review of Caleb Maupin’s “Where is America Going? Marxism, MAGA, and the Coming Revolution”

Available here.

Caleb Maupin has emerged as one of the most uniquely insightful commentators on the American Left.  Only in his mid-30s, Maupin is already a veteran activist, having been a member of the Workers World Party and aide to former US Attorney General turned antiwar activist Ramsey Clark,  as well as a television reporter for Russia Today, prolific writer, author of numerous books, and ideological leader of an interesting new organization called Center for Political Innovation (CPI). His past works have examined a range of important topics such as economic crises and development, globalization, US elections, Communist history, the Israel Lobby, and the relationship between Christianity and socialism. His examination of the life and career of Kamala Harris is particularly interesting as he exposes the Vice-President as a psychologically disordered personality and dangerous sociopath. Maupin has likewise critically examined the Internet phenomenon known as “BreadTube” and its suspicious origins and connections.

One of Maupin’s latest works is Where is America Going? Marxism, MAGA, and the Coming Revolution, which is an effort to apply Marxist analytical methods to contemporary American political and economic conditions. Many nuggets of information are contained in this book and it would be impossible to do justice to Maupin’s ideas in a single review. A few of the book’s major arguments are discussed below.

Crisis of Overproduction

The Marxist concept of a “crisis of overproduction” is central to Maupin’s analysis, along with its relationship to falling rate of profit, and the relationship of capitalism to imperialism. According to Marxist theory, the relationship between capitalism, the crisis of overproduction, and the falling rate of profit is central to understanding the inherent contradictions of capitalism as a mode of production. Capitalism, as an economic system based on private ownership and profit-seeking, leads to cyclical crises, where surplus goods are produced, but workers’ wages limit their ability to consume all the commodities. Consequently, profitability declines for capitalists, contributing to economic downturns. The falling rate of profit is another crucial factor, driven by increased investment in machinery relative to labor, reducing the surplus value extracted from workers and creating economic instability.

Marxism-Leninism extends Marxist analysis to include imperialism as a stage of capitalism. Imperialism emerged as dominant capitalist nations sought to expand into weaker regions for access to new markets, resources, and investment opportunities to counteract the crisis of overproduction and falling rate of profit. This process of domination and exploitation results in superprofits that sustain a labor aristocracy within imperialist countries. The labor aristocracy represents a privileged segment of the working class, benefiting from better wages and conditions due to imperialist exploitation.

Maupin argues that the technological developments associated with the computer revolution have created a crisis of overproduction. A key aspect of the book’s thesis involves divisions within the US ruling class. To explain these divisions, Maupin draws on the argument postulated by Carl Oglesby in the 1970s that domestic US politics can best be understood within the context of a “Yankee-Cowboy War” pitting the traditional northeastern establishment comprised of old money elite families like the Rockefellers and Morgans against the insurgency of the lower levels of the capitalist class based in the Sunbelt. The northeastern establishment are Anglophiles and Europhiles, and regard themselves as part of an international elite along with the royal, aristocratic, banking, and old bourgeoisie dynasties of Europe. However, the Sunbelt capitalists represent newer elites associated with the rise of energy companies and armaments manufacturers based in the South, Midwest, Southwest, and West. The Sunbelt wing is more nationalist than internationalist, favoring an America-centric unilateralism over the preference of the northeastern establishment for international institutions and a multilateral geopolitical framework.

An important area of concern involves the alliance of Silicon Valley with the northeastern establishment. Maupin highlights the role of Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter and father of MSNBC commentator Mika Brzezinski, in promoting the computer revolution as part of a geopolitical strategy for establishing American dominance of the Information Age, thereby ushering in the digital capitalist revolution that has taken place in recent decades leading to the present crisis of overproduction.

Bonapartism

Parallel to Maupin’s discussion of the crisis of overproduction is the Marxist concept of “Bonapartism,” named after Karl Marx’s 1852 work, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, which described the seizure of power in France by Louis Napoleon Bonaparte III, nephew of the famous Napoleon Bonaparte, in the aftermath of the crises generated by the mass uprisings throughout Europe in 1848. Marxist theory postulates the concept of Bonapartism as emerging in times of intense class struggle and political and economic crisis. This term refers to the rise of a strong, authoritarian leader who presents themselves as above conflicting class interests, while serving the interests of the ruling class. Bonapartism relies on a powerful state apparatus to maintain control and stability during times when traditional ruling class factions fail to do so.

Maupin provides a multiplicity of fascinating examples of how Bonapartism has functioned in different societies since the era of the Second Industrial Revolution. He cites Abraham Lincoln as an illustration of an American Bonapartism, who governed during the US Civil War as a strongman, and whose function was to overcome contradictions within the ruling class of the era by crushing the Southern agrarian slave labor-dependent wing of the ruling class on behalf of the Northern industrial wage labor-dependent faction, the ancestors to today’s northeastern establishment. Following the Civil War, Lincoln’s Republicans remained dominant until another crisis was generated by the rise of the labor movement fueled by the growing US proletariat and the massive influx of immigrant workers from Southern and Eastern Europe.  In the 1910s, President Woodrow Wilson emerged as another Bonpartist figure. Wilson was an unusual character as he was both a Virginia-born Southern segregationist and racist and a Ph.D.-level academic with degrees with prominent Northern universities who has served as the president of Princeton.

As a Democrat allied with the northeastern establishment, Wilson sought to gain hegemony for his party over both the Republicans and rival interests within the Democratic Party, such as the party’s labor, immigrant, and Catholic factions. Wilson played a pivotal role in the North-South reconciliation of the era, whereby the northeastern elite tacitly acquiesced to the maintenance of the Southern system of racial stratification and segregation in exchange for the Southern elite’s loyalty to the United States. Toward this end, Wilson allied himself with the Ku Klux Klan, at the time a mass organization with millions of members, and utilized the power of the federal government to suppress organized labor and radical groups, many of whom were comprised largely of immigrants. Alcohol prohibition was enacted during the Wilson administration as well, in part as a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant attack on Catholic culture. Perhaps most significant of all was Wilson’s entry of the United States into World War One on the side of England and France, which the Anglophile northeastern establishment favored over the comparatively conservative “old European” and West Asian empires of Wilhelmine Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Turks.

Bonapartism is often cited by Marxists as prototype for 20th century fascism with fascism itself being a type of Bonapartism. Maupin applies this analytical framework to the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany during the interwar period. He likewise provides a discussion of the nature of fascism. Unlike many contemporary leftists, who define “fascism” in the broadest possible terms,  Maupin offers a more concrete definition of fascism as “whatever demagogy and propaganda mishmash is need to justify the heavy-handed repression and violence used to stabilize a country amid economic crisis and the threat of revolution” (p. 76).  This definition is consistent with the common Marxist view of fascism as the strong arm of the capitalist class, utilized by capital to defend class interests against insurgent threats to the hegemony of capital. Maupin recognizes that not all right-wing authoritarian and/or reactionary regimes are “fascist.” Most are not.

However, a question can be raised concerning whether fascism can be adequately defined merely as the use of repression by the ruling class in pursuit of economic stability or to resolve an economic crisis and ward off insurgencies from the left. Certainly, such can be a function of fascism, with fascist regimes then assuming a Bonapartist role. Yet, the question remains as to whether such is the essence of fascism. A premiere historian of fascism, Stanley Payne, suggests an extensive enumerated compilation of attributes to discern the phenomenon of fascism, encompassing the establishment of an authoritarian state, the incorporation of a regulated economic sector within the state’s purview, the utilization of fascist symbolism, manifestations of anti-liberal, anti-communist, and anti-conservative sentiments (Payne, 1980, p. 7). Within this framework, Payne posits that a shared objective among various fascist movements is the eradication of the autonomy, or in certain instances, the total dissolution, of expansive capitalist structures. Payne’s assertion underscores the pervasive motif underpinning all fascist ideologies (Payne, 1995, p. 10).

Is fascism an instrument of capitalism, or is fascism the achievement of hegemony over the capitalist class by the state? To be sure, some within the capitalist class may acquiesce to or even favor the emergence of a fascist regime, but is capitalist acquiescence or even support the critical feature of fascist ascendency?

Maupin provides a discussion of Nazi economic policies and contrasts these with the policies of President Franklin Roosevelt, who is also characterized as Bonapartist figure. A New England patrician, Roosevelt pursued reformist quasi-social democratic policies with the ironic support of both the Communist Party USA and northeastern elites such as the Rockefellers, Kennedys, Morganthaus, and Lehmans, while earning the staunch opposition of other sectors of the ruling class such as the Morgans, Duponts, Henry Ford, and the National Association of Manufacturers. Some in the anti-Roosevelt camp favored a fascist regime of the kind which had emerged in Italy and Germany, and which would suppress strikes and the influence of organized labor in the aftermath of the Great Depression. General Smedley Butler was approached with but rejected an offer to lead such a coup.

Maupin argues that a renewed interest in fascism has emerged among the US ruling class in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. A major catalyst has been the perceived climate crisis and the longstanding concerns among US elites about the alleged dangers of global overpopulation. As a result, Malthusian sentiments are once again surfacing among the American elites. Recent US administrations have consistently sought to imposed “degrowth” policies on the developing world, including the reduction of multiple previously industrialized nations, such as Iraq and Libya, to pre-industrial status through military destruction, the imposition of anti-developmentalist austerity policies on developing or underdeveloped nations, and rising hostility toward regimes such as China and Russia which pursue developmentalist policies for their own nations and for their client states in Africa and elsewhere.

It is Maupin’s contention that the US ruling class is actively seeking to decrease the living standards of both Americans and ordinary people in other nations. Toward this end, populist movements that seek to increase the material conditions of the working class are denounced by elites as “fascist” or “racist” in an effort to rally social progressives and  the liberal class sectors of the middle class behind the ruling class’ objectives. The working class is demonized as racist, reactionary “deplorables.” Elites make a show of faux progressive tolerance of minorities while simultaneously destroying the livelihoods of black and brown people. Faux progressive activist organizations funded by elite foundations seek to fuel the “culture war” as a distraction from rising class conflict and growing economic deprivation and oppression. It is the superrich comprised of the oil-bankers such as the Rockefellers that are the most aggressive champions of this paradigm, and who reject potential solutions to climate concerns such as the adoption of fusion energy, which would threaten their petroleum-based global financial empires.

Efforts by the northeastern establishment to create a faux Left as controlled opposition date as far back as the postwar period, when the CIA established the Congress for Cultural Freedom, a configuration of anti-Soviet leftists. The one-time director of the Congress for Cultural Freedom was Irving Kristol, a one-time Trotskyist and one of the founders of the neoconservative movement (“neoconservatism” was itself a term coined by the social democrat Michael Harrington and adopted by Kristol as a label for his movement). Maupin traces the development of the contemporary “woke” progressives (what he calls the “synthetic left”) to the lingering influence of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which enlisted progressives, social democrats, and proponents of the counterculture as useful idiots, the influence of which continues to be felt through such phenomenon as “Breadtube.”

Maupin outlines what he considered to be the objectives of the Malthusian superrich: the establishment of ultra-monopolies protected by the state under the guise of “cooperative capitalism”; “cancel culture” to silence political opponents; the physical and mental weakening of the population through anti-intellectualism, poor education, and unhealthy lifestyles; social atomization, under consumption, and population reduction; and global war to preserve imperialism by countering insurgent developmentalist regimes in the Global East and Global South. The final endgame is a “hi-tech dark ages” in the form of a “low-wage police state.”

Maupin sees the present Bonapartist threat as originating from the northeastern establishment wing of the ruling class with its degrowth agenda, in contrast to most of the American Left, which regards the Trumpist movement as the most immediate danger. For example, Daniel Lazare has argued that “Trump’s cult of the personality is taking on Bonapartist traits. Rather than a fellow member, he plainly sees himself as a monarch, lording over the GOP while in temporary exile.” (Lazare, Weekly Worker, May 20, 2021). A debate between Maupin and Lazare on the question of where the Bonapartist threat is located would be interesting to observe.

Divisions Within the Ruling Class

A core element of Maupin’s body of arguments involves the recognition of divisions within the ruling class, drawing on Oglesby’s “Yankee-Cowboy War” thesis. An interesting and important section of the book includes a timelines that examines the divisions within the ruling class that emerged during the era of the Jimmy Carter presidency between 1977 and 1981. In the late 1970s, the US was experiencing the major economic crisis of “stagflation,” which was largely the result of counterproductive economic policies pursued by the Nixon administration in the early 70s, the full consequences of which were only beginning to be realized by the end of the decade. The US had experienced a humiliating defeat in Vietnam and the loss of puppet regimes in Iran and Nicaragua to revolutions.  “World Communism” was at its apex with a third of the world’s countries living under Marxist-Leninist regimes, and leftist guerrilla insurgencies developing elsewhere.

In the 1970s, the Rockefellers were arguably at the apex of their power. Nelson Rockefeller was the governor of New York and subsequently became Vice-President during the Gerald Ford administration. While Richard Nixon and Ford were Rockefeller Republicans, Nelson’s brother David formed the Trilateral Commission in the early 70s, with Jimmy Carter recruited as David’s protégé. The 1976 presidential election essentially pitted a Republican candidate handpicked by Nelson against a Democratic candidate handpicked by David. Zbigniew Brzezinski was the Rockefeller’s foreign policy liaison to the Democratic Party with Henry Kissinger filling the same function among the Republicans. At the time, the United States amounted to a subsidiary of the Rockefeller empire and their allies among the northeastern establishment. The Kennedys assumed the role of the liberal opposition to Rockefeller hegemony, and Senator Ted Kennedy unsuccessfully challenged President Carter for the Democratic nomination in 1980, just as his nephew Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. is now challenging President Biden.

Jimmy Carter gave his famous “malaise” speech during this period, which urged Americans to consume less in response to the various economic crises of the era, from stagflation to fuel shortages. The victorious presidential campaign of Ronald Reagan in 1980 represented a revolt against the northeastern, Rockefeller-led establishment by the forces of Sunbelt capital, aligned with the military-industrial complex and anti-Carter elements within what is today called the “deep state.” The Reagan presidency marked the hegemony of Sunbelt capitalism within the ruling class for the next 28 years until the election of Barack Obama in 2008 following the financial crisis of that year.

I found this section to be particularly fascinating as it was during this period that I first began to observe both domestic US politics and world affairs and I retain fairly vivid memories of the era. In the 1970s, I was part of the evangelical Christian subculture, attending a small fundamentalist Christian private school in a small Virginia town. In 1972, my schoolmates and I were transported by bus to a Nixon rally, where I got shoved around for no apparent reason by some older, loudly pro-Nixon youths. Consequently, I cheered when Nixon was forced out of the presidency a couple of years later amid the Watergate scandal. In 1976, I rooted for Carter, much to the disdain of my schoolmates, many of whom refused to sit with me in the cafeteria on Election Day. That none of us were actually old enough to vote didn’t matter. By 1980, I was annoyed by Carter’s reimposition of Selective Service registration in response to the US military’s decline in the aftermath of Vietnam and rooted for Reagan instead, a position I subsequently reversed in 1984. By the end of the 80s, I was to the left of the Democrats and have continued ever since to drift further and further into the political and cultural Twilight Zone.

Countergangs

Another important aspect of Maupin’s analysis involves the concept of “countergangs.” Again drawing from Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, the example is cited of how Napoleon III was able to create a critical mass of ground-level supporters that came to be known as the “Society of December 10.” These supporters were drawn heavily from the ranks of what the Marxists call the “lumpenproletariat.” Marx described this class as follows:

The lumpenproletariat is passive decaying matter of the lowest layers of the old society, is here and there thrust into the [progressive] movement by a proletarian revolution; [however,] in accordance with its whole way of life, it is more likely to sell out to reactionary intrigues. (Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto, 1848).

Alongside ruined roués with questionable means of support and of dubious origin, degenerate and adventurous scions of the bourgeoisie, there were vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged convicts, runaway galley slaves, swindlers, charlatans, lazzaroni, pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, procurers, brothel keepers, porters, literati, organ grinders, rag-pickers, knife-grinders, tinkers, beggars; in short, the entirely undefined, disintegrating mass, thrown hither and yon, which the French call la bohème. (Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 1852)

Maupin discusses how contending ruling class factions have utilized “counter gangs” or malcontented elements within society as constituencies even to the point of creating armed insurgencies. A range of illustrations from the past are provided along with a discussion of contemporary tendencies such as Black Lives Matter, Antifa, the Proud Boys, Breadtube, Twitch-streamers, the cult of Jordan Peterson, and others. At present, factions of the US ruling class are utilizing sectors of these kinds as countergangs. During the late Cold War, the US began using countergangs to oppose or disrupt Communist regimes and movements worldwide (for example, supporting Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge against the Vietnamese or the mujahideen against the Soviets during the Soviet-Afghan War, both of which were policies developed by Brzezinski). Critical to the discussion of countergangs is the proliferation of what military historian William S. Lind calls “fourth generation warfare” or the shifting of the focus of war away from states and towards non-state actors, such as the range of Takfiri insurgents that emerged in the Middle East during the first two decades of the 21st century. It is likely that the continued utilization of countergangs will be a critical factor in the ongoing widening of divisions within the ruling class.

An Illiberal Future?

An additional theme that emerges from the book involves the depiction of geopolitical conflict and divisions within the ruling class as a battle between liberal and illiberal forces. In the developed West, the forces pursuing the degrowth agenda and low wage police state are the forces of liberalism. The French economist Thomas Piketty has referred to this conflict as one pitting the “Brahmin Left” against the “Merchant Right,” with educated technocratic elites favoring degrowth and the merchant classes (what Maupin calls “the lower levels of capital”) favoring economic growth. Internationally, the primary geopolitical conflict pits Western liberal pro-globalist degrowth regimes against conservative-nationalist pro-development states. In the United States, the Yankees favor degrowth while the Cowboys (the location of the “lower levels of capital” or the “merchant right”) favor growth. Cultural alignments parallel economic alignments. Adherents of conservative or traditional values tend to favor growth while the “woke” progressives are aligned and, in many instances, puppet mastered, by those favoring degrowth.

Within the context of such an analytical framework, Maupin calls for an “anti-monopoly coalition,” citing the precedent of, among others, the Chinese Communist revolution. The four small yellow stars on the Chinese flag signify the “four great classes” of peasants, laborers, small landowners, and the “national bourgeoisie” who favored national patriotism against Western imperialism. A larger sized fifth yellow star represents the Communist Party as the leadership of the alliance of the four great classes. Similarly, a popular movement in the United States against the superrich and their degrowth, low-wage police state would include comparable classes, including the “lower levels of capitalism” who favor national patriotism against the globalists. Toward this end, Maupin calls for socialists and communists to move out of the left-wing activist ghetto and to organize the actual forces of resistance: “Out of the Movement and to the Masses!” is a slogan Maupin has developed as a representation of this perspective.

Potential Counterarguments

Because Maupin’s arguments and analysis rely so heavily on Marxist theory, it is important to consider how non-Marxists or critics of Marxism might respond to the analytical framework Maupin provides.  Concerning the crisis of overproduction and the falling rate of profit, critics contend that capitalism’s technological advancements and innovations have increased productivity and efficiency, mitigating the notion of a systemic crisis of overproduction. They argue that these advancements can lead to new markets and consumer demands, preventing the economy from becoming saturated. Additionally, critics suggest that government interventions, such as fiscal and monetary policies, can stabilize the economy and lessen the severity of economic downturns. By adjusting interest rates, increasing public spending, or implementing stimulus packages, governments can influence economic cycles and potentially avoid prolonged crises. Moreover, the impact of global trade and international markets allowing capitalist economies to access broader markets worldwide has exercised the impact of reducing the localized impact of overproduction.

Regarding imperialism and the labor aristocracy, critics argue that global economic expansion and foreign investment have contributed to overall economic growth and development, not just in dominant countries but also in weaker nations. They contend that imperialism has brought benefits to developing economies, such raising living standards. Critics also propose that wage differentials within and between countries can be explained by factors such as labor mobility, varying skill levels, educational attainment, and regional economic conditions. They argue that these differences are not solely the result of imperialism creating a labor aristocracy within certain countries.

Regarding Bonapartism, critics raise concerns about its oversimplification of complex political dynamics. They argue that political power struggles and transitions are influenced by a wide range of factors beyond the concept of Bonapartism. Historical events involve complex interactions between various social classes and interests, and reducing them to a simple Bonapartist framework may overlook critical nuances and agency within political leadership. Critics contend that understanding the motivations and specific actions of political leaders requires a more nuanced and comprehensive analysis.

However one assesses the quality of these arguments and counterarguments, it is clear from the historical record that economic systems undergo paradigm shifts periodically.

Capitalism, as a mode of production, has undergone significant changes throughout its history, adapting to various economic, social, and technological developments. One crucial transformation occurred during the Industrial Revolution of the late 18th century, which mechanized production processes, spurred industrialization, and introduced wage labor. This shift from agrarian economies to factory-based industries laid the foundation for modern capitalism. In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, capitalism experienced financialization, with financial markets and institutions playing a more dominant role in the economy. This led to increased speculation, complex financial products, and heightened financial risks. Additionally, globalization, enabled by technological advances and transportation, facilitated the freer movement of goods, services, and capital across borders, reshaping the global economic landscape. Historically, capitalist countries responded to social challenges and economic crises by introducing social safety nets and welfare state policies, providing citizens with unemployment benefits, healthcare, and public education.

Throughout history, several significant economic paradigm shifts have occurred in response to major crises or transformative events within capitalism. One notable example is the Great Depression of the 1930s, which challenged the prevailing classical economic theory emphasizing self-regulating markets. In its place, Keynesian economics emerged, championed by economist John Maynard Keynes, whom Maupin acknowledges as exercising great influence during the Great Depression era by advocating for increased government intervention, fiscal spending, and monetary policies to combat unemployment and stimulate aggregate demand during economic downturns. Another transformative event was the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. This marked the end of fixed exchange rates and led to the adoption of floating exchange rates, signifying a paradigm shift in the international monetary system.

The stagflation experienced in the 1970s also sparked a significant shift in economic thinking. As traditional Keynesian demand management failed to address the combination of stagnant growth and high inflation, supply-side economics gained prominence. This new paradigm emphasized reducing government regulation, lowering taxes, and incentivizing investment and production to drive economic growth. Hence, the beginning of the neoliberal era accompanying the Reagan Revolution. Additionally, the 2007-2009 global financial crisis exposed weaknesses in financial systems and regulatory frameworks. In response, there was a paradigm shift towards increased financial regulation and oversight, resulting in the implementation of reforms like the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States and the Basel III framework globally.

Growing concerns about environmental degradation and climate change have given rise to a paradigm shift towards sustainable development and the green economy. Policymakers and businesses are increasingly incorporating environmental considerations into decision-making, promoting renewable energy, eco-friendly technologies, and sustainable resource management. Lastly, the digital revolution has had a profound impact on the economy, transforming the nature of work and employment. The rise of the gig economy, characterized by temporary and flexible work arrangements, represents a paradigm shift in the traditional employer-employee relationship, raising questions about labor rights and social safety nets.

Governments have also intervened in the economy with various degrees of regulation to address market failures, protect consumers, and stimulate economic growth. Technological innovations have played a pivotal role in shaping capitalism’s mode of production. From the mechanization of the Industrial Revolution to the digital revolution of recent decades, technology has transformed industries, labor markets, and consumer behavior. Technological advancements, such as automation and artificial intelligence, continue to impact the nature of work and production processes.

However, many of these emerging trends flow into the wider paradigm that Maupin alleges to be emerging, particularly the crisis of overproduction generated by technological explanation (for example, artificial intelligence) and the “degrowth agenda” associated with the growing emphasis on “green initiatives” and “sustainability.” Possible technical objections aside, Maupin’s general analysis holds up very well in light of contemporary economic and technological trends.

As for the question of how to best respond to the economic crisis, Maupin calls for “a government of action” that implements policies intended counter the degrowth agenda of the superrich.  According to the Center for Political Innovation website,  such “action” would involve the creation of massive public works projects to upgrade America’s infrastructure and eliminate unemployment, an “economic bill of rights” that guarantees the basic material needs of everyone, and public control of banking, credit, and natural resources.

It is interesting to compare the arguments of Maupin, a Marxist-Leninist with a strong Stalinist orientation, with those of Kevin Carson, a left-wing anarchist with Noam Chomsky-like “anarcho-social democratic” inclinations, and whose most recent book I reviewed some months ago (Preston, Kevin A. Carson and The State: Theory and Praxis, May 13, 2023).

Implicit in Maupin’s arguments is the notion that the pro-labor left in the United States should align itself with the pro-growth wing of the ruling class rather than the anti-growth wing. At present, nearly all of the American Left is aligned with the Democratic Party and the northeastern establishment against the Republicans and Sunbelt capital.  While this has been the case for generations, Maupin points out the exception of the Lyndon LaRouche organization. LaRouche, a Trotskyist who came to admire the developmental economics of Friedrich List and Henry Carey, endorsed Ronald Reagan over Jimmy Carter in the 1980 election, based on the view that the Malthusianism of the northeastern establishment posed the greatest long-term danger, while Sunbelt capital’s alliance with the military industrial complex ensured continued economic growth and technological expansion, and provided the best hope for the development of fusion energy. However, like most US Leftists,  Kevin Carson favors continued alignment with the superrich liberal wing of the US ruling class. Carson describes his overall vision of the economic future as follows:

We should note that the question of cooptation is itself very much dialectical in nature, depending heavily on the background situation.  From a certain perspective, things like Rockerfeller [sic] and Ford Foundation funding of counter-institutions or establishment of friendly ties with grassroots movements, and government sponsorship of solidarity economy projects, can arguably be seen as a positive sign. Depending on the shifting correlation of forces, and which of the respective systems is in the ascendant or decline, such attempts to buy access may reflect a strategy less of cooptation than of “being eaten last” (although the two aren’t mutually exclusive).

The most likely possibility in my opinion is that the liberal or progressive wing of capital sees itself as part of a system in decline, and wants to retain as great a range of options as possible. For them the best case scenario is indeed cooptation: to enclose the solidarity economy within the institutional framework of a social democratic model of capitalism, and use green technologies as the basis for a new engine of accumulation or Kondratiev long-wave (in return, of course, for a more robust social safety net and a floor under working class purchasing power). Although this is unlikely to exist as a stable, long-term possibility, they’ll take it if they get it (Carson, The State: Theory and Praxis, 2022).

In contrast to Maupin’s enthusiasm for Marxist central planning, Carson favors a decentralized system of localized production for localized use and consumption, which he describes as follows:

So what can we say about the general outlines of a stateless society? First, it will emerge as a result of the ongoing exhaustion, hollowing out and retreat of large hierarchical institutions like state, corporation, large bureaucratic university, etc. It will generally be based on some kind of horizontalism (prefigured by movements like the Arab Spring, M15 and Occupy) combined with self-managed local institutions. Second, its building blocks will be the counter-institutions cropping up everywhere even now to fill the void left as state and corporation erode: Community gardens, permaculture, squats, hackerspaces, alternative currency systems, commons-based peer production, the sharing economy, and in general all forms of social organization based on voluntary cooperation and new ultra-efficient technologies of small-scale production. And third, to the extent that it reflects any common ideology at all, it will be an attachment to values like personal autonomy, freedom, cooperation and social solidarity. But the specifics will be worked out in a thousand particular ways, far too diverse to be encompassed by any verbal model like “communism” or “markets” (in the sense of the cash nexus).

I expect a wide variation in small-scale institutions, both within and between communities: workers’ collectives, business firms, cooperatives, p2p networks, etc. Multi-family social units like squats, cohousing projects and extended family compounds may take practice autarkic communism internally and take advantage of small-scale machinery to meet most of their needs through direct production, while obtaining the rest through exchange on the market. Property rules in land and enterprise ownership will vary from one community to the next.

Even if we stipulate starting from basic assumptions like the broadest understanding of self-ownership and the nonaggression principle (not that even a majority of the anarchist movement actually comes from the philosophical tradition which regards these as words to conjure with), that means very little in terms of the practical rules that can be deduced from them. There is simply no way, starting from basic axioms like self-ownership and nonaggression, to deduce any particular rules that are both obvious and necessary on issues like (for example) whether I have the right to intervene to stop an animal being tortured by its “owner,” or what the specific rules should be for squatters’ rights and constructive abandonment of a property long left idle.

Even the definition of physical aggression against an individual is, to a large extent, culturally defined. The surrounding environment impinges on the physical body in a million different ways, and the boundary between those that are considered aggressive and those not (like photons or sound waves that physically affect the sensory organs and subsequently the nervous system and internal mental state) is somewhat arbitrary. The same is true for varying cultural definitions of the boundary between person and environment, and how much of the surrounding physical environment not actually part of the human body can be regarded as an extension of the self or an envelope of “personal space.” Bear in mind that common law definitions of assault assume such a spatial envelope, and include actions short of physically touching another person’s body with one’s own.

Any post-state society will include both individuals and communities adhering to many conflicting ideas of just what “freedom,” “autonomy” and “rights” entail. Whatever “law code” communities operate by will be worked out, not as obvious logical deductions from axioms, but through constant interaction between individuals and groups asserting their different understandings of what rights and freedom entail. And it will be worked out after the fact of such conflicts, through the practical negotiations of the mediating and adjudicating bodies within communities” (Carson, “Anarchism Without Adjectives,” Center for a Stateless Society, February 2, 2015).

A debate between Maupin and Carson concerning their contending economic visions would likewise be fascinating.

Historic Socialisms

The final section in the book discusses historic socialist movements and their successes and failures. Despite its worldwide intellectual influence, the original international socialism of Marx and Engels was largely a failure as the Marxist parties of Europe eventually transformed into middle-class reformist parties,  and deterioration into the “ideology of the bankers,” with many of these parties supporting their national capitalist classes during World War One, most famously the German Social Democratic Party, which had initially been formed by those close to Marx and his family. In the West, social democracy became the ideology of the managerial state, championed by Fabian intellectuals like HG Wells, and easily coopted by the super-capitalists.  In contrast, the ideas of Eugen Duhring involved a backward-looking romanticism and mysticism, tinged with elements of anti-Semitism, in ways that foreshadowed Nazism.  Maupin argued that only Asian Communism was able to carry out a successful socialist program.

I find this to be an interesting argument because it has long seemed to me that Communism is inherently conservative, a command economy similar to those of ancient or pre-modern empires like the Egyptians, Romans, Mauryans, and Incas, or an “Asiatic mode of production” like the Ottomans, Muscovites, Mughals, Safavids, Yuans, or Quing dynasty. Communism succeeded (at least for a time) in the 20th century because the Leninists took a European Romantic philosophy (Marxism) and reinvented it as an Asiatic agrarian conservatism.

The more I study the history of socialism and communism, the more I think the libertarian Murray Rothbard and the liberal George Watson were correct that socialism has its roots in a quasi-conservative reaction against the radicalism of the Enlightenment, classical liberalism, the market revolution, industrialization, and the related social and cultural changes. Marx pointed out that there were plenty of “right-wing” socialists in his own day, the feudal, conservative, and bourgeois socialists he and Engels denounced in the Communist Manifesto. The Marxists and other similar groups were the left wing of socialism. However, they still had strong intellectual roots in the Counter-Enlightenment, French Romanticism, and German Idealism, all of which had illiberal inclinations.

It seems like a serious understanding of the history of the left/right spectrum would be something like this: Throne and altar traditionalism is the right wing of conservatism, with socialism/communism being the left wing of conservatism, and with socialism having its own internal right (e.g. Bismarckian “Prussian Socialism”) and left wings (Marxism, Blanquism, etc.), with classical or conservative liberalism (the English Whig philosophy of Locke, Hume, and Burke) being the right-wing of liberalism and reformism, progressivism or social democracy (the trajectory of thought from John Stuart Mills to John Rawls) being the left-wing of liberalism. Rothbard was probably at least partially correct that fascism is best understood as a conservative/socialist hybrid. Rothbard said socialism aims to “achieve liberal ends by conservative means.” Perhaps it could be said that fascism is an effort to achieve conservative ends by socialist means.

It’s very interesting to observe how socialism is evolving worldwide. Socialists and communists appear to be moving away from hardline Marxism-Leninism or strict dialectical materialism in favor of culturally, nationally, or even religiously based forms of socialism. World socialism is now considered to be Putin’s Russian Orthodox nationalism, Xi’s “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” Dugin’s Eurasianism/Fourth Political Theory, Sandinista “Christian socialism,” Venezuelan/Bolivian “Bolivarian socialism,” the DPRK’s “Juche Idea,” Iran’s “Islamic socialism,” Iraqi/Syrian “Baathist Arab socialism,” the late Qaddafi’s Jamahiriya/Third Universal Theory,  Peronist “justicialism,” African socialism, etc. along with remaining Marxist-Leninist states like Cuba, Vietnam, and Laos. Globally, socialists are moving away from and denouncing the “pink, green, and rainbow” Western Left as stooges/tools of imperialism.

The prevailing consensus among socialists appears to something like Lenin’s New Economic Policy or Deng Xiaoping’s “capitalist road,” i.e., socialized capitalism directed by the state, which ends up being mercantilism in practice. No more trying to build industries based on backyard furnaces or rice paddy slavery. One of the most popular “Marxist” economists today is Ha-Joon Chang, a South Korean who is really just a developmental economist or an institutionalist in the tradition of Veblen or Galbreath. A lot of the geopolitical conflict today is between Western neoliberal pro-globalist regimes and Eastern conservative-developmental-mercantilist regimes (like Russia and China and their allies).

Of course, these are or were among the most illiberal countries, which is indicative of the inherently conservative nature of socialism. Whenever I have debated Communists about repression or military aggression by their admired regimes, they often end up sounding like Republicans from the Reagan-Bush eras, e.g., claiming Soviet militarism was entirely defensive (they  often make the same argument about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine), or that KGB repression was necessary to weed out subversives controlled by the CIA (basically, “reverse J. Edgar Hooverism”), or that the Berlin Wall was simply about immigration enforcement (“Marxo-Trumpism”). The ease with which socialism can be fused with Islam and Christianity (e.g. “liberation theology”), not to mention the significant Jewish presence in socialism and communism, indicates that figures such as Max Stirner, Friedrich Nietzsche, Oswald Spengler, Ayn Rand, Alain de Benoist, and others were correct in their arguments that socialism constitutes a form of secularized Abrahamic religion, and relationship that Maupin likewise sympathetically acknowledges.

Another interesting trend involves the “MAGA Communism” current, with the emergence of US Communists that are more sympathetic to the Republicans than to the mainstream left, as Maupin’s analysis would suggest, because, after all, the Republicans are now the predominantly working-class party. It’s also fashionable among the younger wave of “conservative Communists” (for lack of a better term) to denounce everything as “degenerate” (e.g., pornography, gambling, drugs, transgenderism, etc) in a manner similar to the religious right or conventional social conservatives.

By contrast, the Western Left in its present form is just a reworking of the traditional framework of Western capitalism. Too many conservative critics of the Woke phenomenon focus only on the rivers that flow into the Woke Ocean such as the oxymoronically labeled “cultural Marxism” of the Frankfurt School, Gramscism, critical theory, postmodernism, etc. while ignoring the foundations of the ocean floor itself: liberal imperialism, the archaic “white man’s burden,” capitalism, bourgeois morality, neo-puritan pietism, and Abrahamism. Today’s progressives are the “bourgeois socialists” Marx lambasted in his time (the Fabian types). Stalin referred to them as “rotten liberals,” who were insufficiently committed to socialist praxis, while classical liberals from the other end of the politico-economic spectrum like Ludwig von Mises called them “useful idiots” who served as a fifth column for socialist revolutionaries. But, whatever one’s ideological vantage point, capitalism has since completely co-opted the social democratic types and incorporated them into the framework of imperialism. Such was the case even in the early 20th century as Maupin points out.

Points of Disagreement

“If you took the most ardent revolutionary, vested him in absolute power, within a year he would be worse than the Tsar himself.” ― Mikhail Bakunin

The major point of disagreement I would have with Maupin is that I think his overall vision is far too conservative. Opposing Western imperialist wars against the nations of the East and South is a laudable enterprise, and among the most important issues of our time, particularly given the ongoing Damocles’ sword of nuclear proliferation. Opposing military aggression by the state of which one is citizen against other states is the first duty of a radical. Maupin and his colleagues deserve infinite praise for their efforts in this area.  Whether conservative, nationalist, authoritarian regimes are admirable merely because they oppose the United States and Western neoliberalism, while practicing developmentalist economics, is another question.

I favor multipolarity from a geopolitical perspective. The world order that is presently emerging greatly resembles that of 1900, when multiple contending empires were in competition for expanding their respective spheres of influence. A global unipolar regime possessing modern surveillance technology would be the worst dystopia imaginable. Even inmates in 20th century concentration camps and gulags, or rice paddy slaves in Southeast Asia, knew that somewhere in the world human life was flourishing, which might not be the case in a universal THX 1139 dystopian tyranny. But the best that one can hope for in a multipolar world is that the contending powers function as a constraint on each other with an armed peace, mutual containment, and détente being the result. It may be that nuclear proliferation has actually been a deterrent to war by raising the costs to prohibitive levels, as Martin Van Creveld has speculated in his analysis of how the function of war is gradually being transferred from states to non-state actors.

The economic program of the Center for Political Innovation likewise seems comparatively mild. Conservatives and right-libertarians would obviously be horrified by the Communist ideological framework of Maupin and CPI but their “communism” amounts to FDR-like social democratic reforms and List/Carey-like developmentalist economics.  It is doubtful that the economics of the CPI is any more state-centric than the present US system of corporate plutocracy, banking cartels, the military-industrial complex, international system of military base imperialism, an all-pervasive administrative state at every level of government, and the repressive apparatus of the “criminal justice system” (police state). Many years ago, I attended a lecture by Robert Scheer where he remarked that the United States not only has a military-industrial complex, it is a military-industrial complex. Maupin and the CPI are practically libertarians in comparison.

I am not and have never been a Marxist. Mikhail Bakunin, an early critic of Marxism, expressed concerns that Marxist theory could inadvertently lead to a new form of tyranny. He likened Marx’s ideas to Bismarck’s authoritarianism, suggesting that the concentration of power within the Marxist framework could result in oppressive regimes. It is essential to note that Bakunin’s critique was not devoid of controversy as he posited that Marxist communism was a tool of global domination by bankers, paralleling the later conspiracy theories of the John Birch Society, and he also harbored anti-Semitic sentiments. Nevertheless, his concerns gained resonance in the 20th century as socialist experiments often led to authoritarian regimes, validating his apprehensions. Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman offered scathing critiques of Bolshevik Russia, highlighting the divergence between Marxist ideals and the realities of authoritarian governance. Their insights underscored the tension between the principles of communism and the suppression of individual freedom, casting a shadow over the application of Marxist theory in practice. Murray Bookchin, a former US Communist who became a Trotskyist and then an anarchist, examined the roots of Soviet and Maoist authoritarianism within the basic convictions of Marxist philosophy. Like Bakunin, he suggested that Marxism’s foundational ideas inadvertently fostered oppressive regimes. This introspection leads to an exploration of whether communism was a manifestation of the Asiatic mode of production, reviving ancient and medieval tyrannies in new forms.

I would hope the political future involves a more radical sociopolitical transformation.  This transformation might be propelled by cultural migration generated by globalization and the internal fracturing of conventional nation-states, the emergence of cause-group enclaves, the establishment of outgroup sanctuaries, the innovation of startup societies, and the rise of networked microstates. Concurrently, the dynamics of transnational federations, non-state actors, and fourth/fifth generation warfare will also reshape the landscape and contribute to the reimagining of societal structures and power dynamics. Cultural migration and self-sorting will give rise to cause-group enclaves, fostering communities that will be unified by shared values, beliefs, and aspirations. These enclaves, which will form around specific causes, will transcend geographic limitations and will be instrumental in nurturing socio-political change.

By clustering like-minded individuals, cultural migration will facilitate the exchange of ideas and will provide a fertile ground for the emergence of alternative socio-political models. These entities will offer safe spaces for marginalized groups to exercise autonomy and challenge dominant power structures. Concurrently, startup societies will experiment with novel governance models, harnessing innovative technologies and socio-economic paradigms to create self-sustaining communities outside conventional frameworks. The proliferation of networked microstates, characterized by decentralized decision-making and horizontal networking, will mark a departure from traditional nation-state structures. Transnational federations will further transcend these boundaries, allowing for cooperative efforts among geographically dispersed entities. This collaborative approach will underscore the importance of shared values over geopolitical affiliations, fostering a global network of self-governing units.

The ascendancy of non-state actors in global affairs will challenge the monopoly of nation-states on power. Fourth/fifth generation warfare strategies, characterized by asymmetrical tactics and information warfare, will disrupt conventional notions of conflict. Anarchist principles will find resonance in these dynamics, as decentralized and agile structures navigate complex geopolitical terrain. Countereconomics, encompassing alternative economic systems and grassroots initiatives, will disrupt traditional capitalist frameworks. Dual power construction will involve building parallel structures that offer essential services and governance mechanisms, gradually diminishing the legitimacy of centralized authorities. These strategies will lay the groundwork for systemic change from the bottom up. Peer-to-peer networking will leverage technology to facilitate direct communication and resource sharing, fostering self-reliance and collective empowerment. The techno-futurist/rewilding dichotomy will encapsulate the tension between embracing technological advancement and advocating for a return to sustainable, nature-centric practices.

Cultural migration, the formation of cause-group enclaves, and the emergence of startup societies will create spaces for innovation and challenge established norms. Networked microstates and transnational federations will highlight the potential for cooperative self-governance across borders. Meanwhile, countereconomics, dual power construction, and peer-to-peer networking will demonstrate the practical application of decentralist principles in reshaping economic and social structures. As the world witnesses the rise of non-state actors and new forms of warfare, the enduring relevance of the fourth generation model will become evident.

Conclusion

Where is America Going? Marxism, MAGA, and the Coming Revolution indicates that Caleb Maupin is arguably the most insightful public intellectual on the American Left at present.  There are others who address many of the same sociopolitical and economic currents, such as Michael Lind, John McWhorter, and Joel Kotkin, but usually without the wider body of historical and geopolitical contextualization provided by Maupin. My studies of the history of “movement conservatism” in the United States (a movement which I have always opposed) led me to the conclusion, formed many years ago, that Oglesby’s “Yankee-Cowboy War” thesis is essential to understanding the foundation of primary political conflicts in the United States. In the 20th century, the conflict between the Northeastern establishment and the Sunbelt wing of the US capitalist class replaced the Northern industrial/Southern agrarian rivalry of the 19th century and this conflict continues to be the essence of power politics in the United States.

In the late 1980s, I was as zealous an opponent of Reaganism as anyone could be. In the 1990s, I came to realize that in the long-run it would be the liberal wing of the ruling class that was the greatest enemy, following the massacres at Waco and Ruby Ridge carried out by federal agents with the acquiescence of the liberal class, and the ongoing calls by the liberal class for US aggression in Central Europe, the Caribbean, Africa, and elsewhere on what I call “human rights imperialist” grounds, out of recognition that “democracy and human rights” are merely the contemporary version the “white man’s burden” of 19th century liberal imperialism. The George W. Bush-era neocons (a synthesis of the Buckleyite CIA right with the Kristolite CIA left, both of which became prominent in the 1950s and 1960s) represented and continued to represent a unique evil. The recklessness of the neocons in many area of policy weakened the Sunbelt wing of capitalism and the allied military-industrial complex to the degree that the northeastern establishment was able to reclaim their former hegemony during the Obama era.

Despite the disruptions of the Trump era, the northeastern establishment has continued to hold its position with the Biden administration in many ways being a replay of the Carter administration. Trump serves as a neo-Nixonian figure who has revived a range of pre-Reagan traditions within Republicanism, ranging from Eisenhower-Nixon populism to Taft isolationism to the Main Street conservatism of figures like Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover to the xenophobic conspiracism of the 19th century Know-Nothings or the petite bourgeois anti-elitism of the John Birch Society. The neocons have responded to the rise of Trumpism by recolonizing the Democratic Party from where they originally came, while simultaneously leading the Never Trump Republicans, creating decoys from Trumpism (such as “national conservatism,” led by former Irving Kristol protégé Yoram Hazony), or embedding themselves in and attempting to co-opt Trumpism.

On the eve of the Biden election, Glenn Greenwald wrote:

“If Biden wins, that’s going to be the power structure; a Democratic Party fully united with neo-cons, Bush/Cheney operatives, CIA, FBI, NSA, Wall Street and Silicon Valley: presenting itself as the only protection against “fascism.” And much of the left will continue marching behind it.

Greenwald accurately described the present alignment of the dominant ruling class factions and their constituents, who constitute the “real right” (i.e. the ruling class and its ideological superstructure in the present era). Consequently, the “real left” would include tendencies that have expressed opposition to the dominant ruling class alignment such as the Center for Political Innovation, Rage Against the War Machine, Party of Communists, Peoples Party, Black Hammer, Peoples Democratic Uhuru Movement (currently facing federal repression), the LaRouche Organization, Libertarian Party, Mises Institute, Gray Zone, AntiWar.Com, various other socialist, populist, or libertarian groups, liberals like Cornel West and Chris Hedges, and military dissidents like Douglas Macgregor, Daniel Davis, Tulsi Gabbard, and Scott Ritter. Caleb Maupin and the Center for Political Innovation are among the most zealous and active of these tendencies, and I salute them. Where is America Going? Marxism, MAGA, and the Coming Revolution is a must-read.

References

Carson, Kevin (2015, February 2). Anarchism Without Adjectives. Center for a Stateless Society. https://c4ss.org/content/35425

Carson, Kevin (2022). The State: Theory and Praxis. Independently published.

Lazare, Daniel (2021, May 20) Assault on Democracy. Weekly Worker.

https://weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1348/assault-on-democracy

Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich (1848). Communist Manifesto. Public domain.

Marx, Karl (1852). The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Public domain.

Payne, Stanley G. (1980). Fascism: Comparison and Definition. University of Wisconsin Press, p. 7

Payne, Stanley G. (1995). A History of Fascism: 1914-1945. University of Wisconsin Press, p. 10.

Preston, Keith (2023, May 13). Kevin A. Carson and The State: Theory and Praxis. AttacktheSystem.Com https://attackthesystem.com/2023/05/12/kevin-a-carson-and-the-state-theory-and-praxis/

 

 

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